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INTRODUCTION. HAYEK, NOZICK ÄND THE PROBLEM OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
AND THE POLITICAL ORDER.
This thesis addresses one of the perennial problems of political 
life, that of the proper relationship between the individual and 
the political order. In particular, it examines aspects of the 
political thought of two contemporary libertarian philosophers who 
attempt to come to terms with this problem.
How much, and what kind of, freedom the individual should 
be allowed for ordering his private life, which influences upon 
others are legitimate, and how much the government should interfere, 
how, and in what areas, are questions of fundamental importance to 
ideologues, politicians and political theorists alike.
There seem to be irreconcilable differences between those 
for whom the state is a promoter of the individual as the primary 
unit of social meaning and value, and those who accord that status 
to the community. Even within the individualist tradition, there 
are different definitions of the private sphere of the individual 
and different views as to the priority of freedom as an end of 
government.
There is clearly a continuum of individualism to communitarianism. 
At one end atomic individualism takes persons as unaffiliated 
beings to whom every contact with others is a burden that must be 
justified by exclusive reference to the individual. Others, such 
as Locke and Rousseau, claim that freedom can only occur within
wel1-articulated political, social and moral orders. At the other 
end are communitarians, or collectivists, who see individuals 
primarily in terms of their attachment to others in political and 
social relationships. On this view, social roles and institutions 
define individual identity, and self-fulfilment is found only in the 
achievement of a common, collective purpose.
One of the most important recent contributions to the debate 
concerning the proper relationship between the individual and the 
state appeared in Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971). However, 
there has been a reaction against Rawls' individualist defence of 
the welfare state by 'libertarians' who give absolute priority to 
individual freedom over welfare and social justice, and who argue 
against the use of the state's coercive apparatus to achieve and 
enforce so-called common ends. That any form of government intervention 
in individual lives for the purpose of mutual aid is either possible 
or desirable has been challenged most strongly by Robert Nozick 
in his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). A study of other post-war 
liberal thinkers reveals that many of Nozick's political conclusions 
are not novel. F.A. Hayek, in both The Constitution of Liberty (1960) 
and Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, 1976 and 1979), offers a 
sustained and compelling defence of individual freedom as the primary 
end of political organisation.
The irreconcilability of various forms of the 'positive' or 
'interventionist' state such as the welfare state with Hayek's 
'liberal order' or Nozick's 'minimal state' reflects differing 
perceptions as to the reasons why individuals belong to a political
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association and divergent views of man and society. Such theories 
contain assertions about the effects of state coercion on individuals, 
particular conceptions of such terms as 'freedom','rights' and 
'justice', and different views as to their relative importance.
Many liberals in the twentieth century have accepted, and 
even defended, such practices of the welfare state as the redistribution 
of economic resources and regulation of the market; they have 
attempted to find a compatibility between the requirements of 
freedom and equality, and have discovered an active role for the 
state in the promotion of individual interests. This embraces 
the notions of positive freedom and rights espoused by such nineteenth 
century thinkers as T.H. Green, who argued that freedom involves 
more than simply the absence of a particular class of external 
constraints, namely interpersonal coercion. An older definition, 
proposed by Locke and Mill and still accepted by Hayek ('negative 
freedom') has the implication that one can be materially or morally 
impoverished and still free. It accords more importance to non­
coercion than to the effective power or capability to act.
My focus is upon freedom and rights in the political sense of 
constitutional protections, and not in the philosophical sense, 
although the two are connected. A man may be a slave to his passions
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and hence unfree in the philosophical sense, but he may enjoy 
political freedom and benefit from the protection of the negative 
rights that permit him to become morally enslaved (through the 
disavowal of paternalist interventions).
Libertarians like Hayek and Nozick insist that positive 
conceptions of freedom and rights, and their attendant commitment to 
an interventionist order, are 'liberalism gone wrong', and vigorously 
denounce such views. They argue, from various premises, not merely 
that individual freedom should always take priority over social 
justice and welfare rights, but that the latter are meaningless 
and illusory. Such arguments, for Hayek and Nozick, determine the 
legitimate uses of coercion by the state. They find in the unimpeded 
mechanism of the free market an ideal solution to the problems of 
social life and political association. They conclude that the only 
proper coercive function of the state in a free society is to 
protect the individual against force, theft, fraud and breaches of 
voluntary contract. (Hayek also sees an extensive non-coercive role 
for government as being consistent with his principle of freedom.)
On these issues Hayek and Nozick are in fundamental disagreement 
with Rawlsian individualists and others who attempt to reconcile 
freedom with other values, with utilitarians who argue that social 
needs can be balanced, common ends determined and individual wills 
sacrificed, and with uncompromising communitarians who would impose 
collective decisions upon individuals for the 'common good'. 
Libertarians strongly condemn what they see as the sacrificing of 
individual rights and freedom in the name of justice. They define 
the problems of political life in a distinctive and challenging way, 
and question, on individualist grounds, the assumptions and impli­
cations of the widely accepted interventionist state. In particular, 
Hayek and Nozick explore questions of great political significance - 
the purposes of government, the nature of freedom and rights, the
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legitimacy of the existing political order and the ends of justice - 
and propose uncompromising and controversial solutions to the problems 
they raise. They have provoked an enormous response from both 
philosophers and political scientists, which makes imperative a 
balanced critical assessment of their principal ideas.
Despite their divergent backgrounds, sources, approaches and 
emphases, Hayek and Nozick are both concerned with the fundamental problem of 
the role of thepolitical realm in the life of the individual.
Moreover, they find their solutions in shared general principles.
They find, in the individualist conception of freedom and rights, 
a criterion for judging the legitimacy of institutions, policies 
and political practices. The justificatory arguments used to support 
their positions embrace both consequentialist and deontological 
approaches, making possible an assessment of the whole range of 
possible arguments for the non-interventionist order. The political 
imperatives derived from the stated principles of Hayek and 
Nozick have important implications for arguments about the individual 
and society.
In this introduction I want to summarise briefly the argument 
of the thesis and explain its particular approach. As a textual 
analysis, it has four aims, or themes: expository, interpretive, 
comparative and critical. In terms of the structure of the thesis, 
these aims are often, but not always, overlapping. Part I is 
concerned with exposition and comparison only, reflecting the need 
to make coherent and cohesive the political position espoused by 
Hayek and Nozick and the principles they seek to uphold. It lays the
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groundwork f o r  the  i n t e r p r e t i v e  and c r i t i c a l  m a t e r i a l  i n  P a r t  I I ,  
which a d d re s s e s  the  problem o f  th e  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  s ou rces  o f  t h e i r  
though t  and exposes  them to  the  c o u n te rc la im s  o f  th o se  who su p p o r t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s .  A cco rd ing ly ,  P a r t  I o u t l i n e s  the  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n c lu s io n s  o f  Hayek and Nozick:  t h e i r  p r i n c i p l e s ,  im p e ra t i v e s  
and i m p l i c a t i o n s .  P a r t  I I  a s s e s s e s  the  arguments f o r  and a g a i n s t  
t h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s .
Hence i s s u e s  a re  r a i s e d  a t  a comparat ive l e v e l  in  P a r t  I 
i n  o r d e r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  the  p a r t i c u l a r  c la im  t h a t  Hayek and Nozick 
appea l  to  s i m i l a r  and c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  p r i n c i p l e s . This  i s  c l e a r l y  
d i s t i n c t  from t h e  c r i t i c a l  purpose o f  P a r t  I I ,  which seeks  t o  examine 
t h e  i s s u e s  in  a d i f f e r e n t  way. That  t h e  purposes  a re  d i s t i n c t  
( though r e l a t e d )  de te rm ine s  the  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  th e  compara t ive  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  Hayek*s and Nozick*s p o s i t i o n  from th e  c r i t i c a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e i r  arguments .  I t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  p roceed  to  
th e  l a t t e r  t a s k  w i th o u t  f i r s t  having under taken  the  fo rmer .  A 
genu ine ly  compara t ive  t r e a t m e n t  must f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h  r e l e v a n t  
c o n n ec t io n s  and s i m i l a r i t i e s  b e f o r e  a c r i t i c a l  a s sessm en t  can be 
made o f  th e  arguments advanced. However, in  o r d e r  to  s o lv e  the  
problem o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  a t  the  compara t ive  l e v e l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  
may be c o n t r o v e r s i a l  w i th o u t  im media te ly  t a k i n g  them up,  I use  
an e x t e n s i v e  system o f  c ro s s  r e f e r e n c i n g .  I m p l i c i t  in  my approach 
i s  t h e  gene ra l  aim o f  c r i t i c i s i n g  Hayek*s and Nozick*s arguments 
f o r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  r a t h e r  than  commenting i n  d e t a i l  on the  p o s i t i o n s  
them se lves .  I t  would be u n f a i r  t o  c r i t i c i s e  Hayek and Nozick 
w i th o u t  f i r s t  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  and arguments .
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Hence I regard both the comparative and critical exercises 
as important. However, the core of the thesis is undoubtedly in 
Part II. The central purpose of the thesis is to find out what can 
be said about the libertarian proposition that governments should 
do a lot less than they do at the moment. To this end, the following 
questions are paramount: Are the arguments for the non-interventionist 
political order convincing? Do they effectively dismiss the welfare 
state? Do they achieve the results desired by Hayek and Nozick, 
or can their arguments be used to support alternative political 
conclusions? Are their assumptions about man and society correct?
How do their opponents attempt to refute libertarian claims?
Are they successful?
With these caveats and questions in mind, I argje in Part I 
that the notions of freedom rights and justice appealed to by Hayek 
and Nozick are sufficiently similar to make a close comparison 
possible. They have shared 'concerns'. (Chapters 1 and 3).
Secondly, and more importantly, Hayek's and Nozick's principles 
direct them towards specific political conclusions. (Chapter 2)
In particular, they are both committed to what I term a 'non­
interventionist political order'. This kind of preferred political 
association is their chief normative conclusion.
These claims on behalf of the non-interventionist order are 
questioned by those who see a positive role for the state in the 
achievement of individual goal-satisfaction. For them, the require­
ments of justice, needs and welfare demand much more than this
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'nightwatchman’ role of the state described in classical liberal 
theory. These counterclaims and the critical questions I raised 
earlier about libertarian theory are to be addressed in Part II.
Part II attempts to elucidate and analyse the various ways 
in which Hayek and Nozick reach, and try to justify, their uncompro­
misingly libertarian conclusions. This involves a critical examination 
of the premises and arguments appealed to and the implicit assumptions 
contained in Hayek’s and Nozick's justifications of the non­
interventionist state.
The structure of Part II reflects both the similarities and 
differences in argument between Hayek and Nozick. Chapter 4 outlines 
and challenges Hayek's argument foi the non-interventionist state 
which he couches in terms of the benefits that freedom provides. 
Chapter 5 addresses the moral arguments advanced by Nozick for 
right -protection (and against coercion) that are derived from 
the nature of man. Chapter 6 attempts to find a common individualism 
in Hayek and Nozick that is essentially manifest in their views 
of the nature of society. Hence I explore both the areas of Hayek's 
and Nozick's arguments that are different and those that overlap.
Both Hayek and Nozick attempt to establish particular political 
conclusions by trying to dismiss the claims of political opponents. 
This strategy, whilst appealing as a powerful critique of the 
welfare state, must also be shown to provide a justification 
for their own position. They need to demonstrate the validity
of their premises and show the necessary relationship between
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premises and conclusions, to the exclusion of possible alternatives. 
In these tasks, particularly the latter, they are open to counter­
argument. Do they dismiss, for example,the proposition that the 
interventionist state is legitimate simply by appealing to arguments 
as to the benefits of freedom or the immorality of coercion?
Does their individualist view of society rule out all forms of 
positive state activity, even though there are different kinds and 
degrees of coercion with greatly differing affects on individual 
lives and choices? I argue that, although the theories of Hayek 
and Nozick severely question both the aims and methods of the wholly 
collectivist interventionist order, they need not,on the otherhand, 
restrict the state to the merely classical liberal role of night-
watchman .
PART I POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
CHAPTER I. PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL ORDER.
I.INTRODUCTION.
The initial task in a comparative and critical exposition of 
the political theories of Hayek and Nozick is to delineate and 
characterise the principles they see as fundamental to the just 
political order. This chapter is concerned with such principles: 
that of individual freedom in the case of Hayek and individual 
rights in the case of Nozick. I aim, in this chapter, to clarify 
the meanings of these key terms, and, in the following chapter, to 
demonstrate their importance as principles of political life.
It will be argued that the values of freedom and rights, 
as conceived by Hayek and Nozick, have important normative conse­
quences for the role of the political order in the life of the 
individual. More specifically, the adoption of these principles 
and the meanings and importance ascribed to them by Hayek and 
Nozick lead to a shared political maxim. This is that the state 
(government, political order) may not coerce the individual in 
the formulation or execution of his or her free choices except 
in the punishment of interpersonal coercion or rights infringement.
In broad terms, this has three crucial implications for 
political life: the state must not dictate individual goals, it 
need not help individuals postively in the achievement of their 
goals, and it must not formulate its own goals if this involves 
the coercion of individuals. Despite important differences between 
Hayek’s liberal order and Nozick’s minimal state (these will become
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apparent in later chapters), both authors agree on the fundamental 
principle that the voluntary choices of individuals must remain 
beyond state interference and control, provided that the individual 
actions involved are non-coercive. Protection of individual freedom, 
on this view, is the state's only coercive role.
II.HAYEK'S NOTION OF FREEDOM.
According to Hobbes, '[ljiberty, or freedom, signifieth, 
properly, the absence of opposition...'.^ Hayek, in formulating 
his principle of freedom as a political maxim, clearly works 
within this tradition of viewing freedom as the absence of external 
constraints upon individual action. But it is a particular kind 
of constraint that is of primary concern to Hayek and that he is 
interested in minimising in the political order.
He states at the outset of The Constitution of Liberty:
[w]e are concerned in this book with that 
condition in men in which coercion of some 
by others is reduced as much as possible in 
society. This state we shall describe ... 
as a state of liberty or freedom ... The 
state in which a man is not subject to co­
ercion by the arbitrary will of another or 
others ...- By 'coercion' we mean such con­
trol of the environment or circumstances 
of a person by another that, in order to 
avoid greater evil, he is forced to act 
not according to a coherent plan of his own 
but to serve the ends of another.’5
Hayek's notion of freedom, then, covers only one class of actions
amongst a whole range of possible constraints which can inhibit
an individual's acting in specific ways.
Hayek's basic social unit is the free choosing individual,
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unimpeded by the  d i c t a t e s  o f  th e  w i l l s  ( though n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y
the  a c t i o n s )  o f  o t h e r s .  He t a l k s  o f  t h e  ’p r i v a t e  domain o f  the
i n d i v i d u a l ' ,  o r  the ' p r i v a t e  s p h e r e ' ,  in  which th e  i n d i v i d u a l
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i s  f r e e  to  a c t  and to  fo rm u la te  g o a l s .  Whether o r  n o t  t h e s e  
cho ices  a re  f u l f i l l e d  and goa ls  ach ieved  w i l l  be de te rmined  by 
many f a c t o r s  - i n c l u d i n g  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  chance ,  the  a c t i o n s  o f  
o t h e r s  w i th  whom we i n t e r a c t  - i n  g e n e r a l ,  by fo r c e s  t h a t  may be 
beyond our  d i r e c t  c o n t r o l .  The Hayekian d e f i n i t i o n  o f  freedom 
i s  no t  concerned  with  the  r e s u l t s  o f  our  c h o ices  (whether  o r  
n o t  o u r  p l a n s  a re  a c t u a l l y  f u l f i l l e d ) ,  b u t  w i th  whether  i t  i s  us 
who make t h e  c h o i c e s .  Hence the  only  k ind  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  a c t i o n  
p r o h i b i t e d  by t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  freedom i s  t h a t  o f  d i c t a t i n g  what 
an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  choice  w i l l  be .  But t h i s  i s  a c r u c i a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  
which c l e a r l y  has  f a r - r e a c h i n g  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  r a m i f i c a t i o n s .
Hayek r e c o g n i s e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  many r e s t r a i n i n g  f a c t o r s  
t h a t  may i n f l u e n c e  the  way we a c t :  n a t u r a l  a b i l i t i e s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  
a c c i d e n t s  o f  n a t u r e ,  t r a d i t i o n s ,  h a b i t s ,  the  concern  o f  and fo r  
o t h e r s ,  and our  own w eaknesses ,  impulses  and o b s e s s i o n s .  Most 
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  the  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  
depends upon the  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r s .  Hayek sees  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
as p e r t a i n i n g  only  to  the  a b i l i t y  to  pe r fo rm  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  and 
n o t  as c o n d i t i o n s  o f  unfreedom, which i s  d e f in e d  s o l e l y  in  terms 
o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  c o e r c io n .
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' f r eed o m '  and ' c a p a b i l i t y '  i s  a 
c r u c i a l  one f o r  Hayek. As w i l l  be seen  l a t e r ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  freedom does n o t  imply a commitment t o  s u b s t a n t i v e
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e q u a l i t y .  He makes two im p o r ta n t  c l a im s .  F i r s t l y ,
[w jh e th e r  o r  n o t  a person  i s  ab le  t o  choose 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y  between a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  o r  to  
adhere  t o  a r e s o l u t i o n  he has made, i s  a 
problem d i s t i n c t  from whether  o r  n o t  o t h e r  
peo p le  w i l l  impose t h e i r  w i l l  upon him.*>
Hence the  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  drawn. But s e c o n d ly ,  and more im p o r t a n t ly
f o r  Hayek, i s  th e  c la im  t h a t  c a p a b i l i t y  has  n o th in g  whateve r  to
do wi th  freedom. The concep ts  a re  both  d i s t i n c t  and u n r e l a t e d .
. . . t h e  range  o f  p h y s i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  from 
which a pe rson  can choose a t  a g iven moment 
has  no d i r e c t  r e l e v a n c e  t o  freedom . .
The q u e s t i o n  o f  how many c ou r se s  o f  a c t i o n  
a re  open to  a p e r s o n  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  very 
im p o r t a n t .  But i t  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  q u e s t i o n  
from t h a t  o f  how f a r  in  a c t i n g  he can 
fo l low  h i s  own p l a n s  and i n t e n t i o n s ,  to  
what e x t e n t  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  h i s  conduct  i s  
o f  h i s  own d e s i g n ,  d i r e c t e d  towards ends 
f o r  which he has  been p e r s i s t e n t l y  s t r i v i n g  
r a t h e r  than  toward n e c e s s i t i e s  c r e a t e d  by 
o t h e r s  in  o r d e r  t o  make him do what they  
want.  Whether he i s  f r e e  o r  n o t  does no t  
depend on the  range  o f  cho ice  b u t  on whether  
he can expec t  to  shape h i s  cou rse  o f  a c t i o n  
in  accordance  w i th  h i s  p r e s e n t  i n t e n t i o n s . . . ?
Seemingly Hayek sym pa th ises  w i th  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  who, because  o f  
c i rc um s tanc es  beyond h i s  c o n t r o l ,  cannot  f u l f i l  h i s  p l a n s .  However, 
Hayek’s n o t i o n  o f  freedom cannot accommodate such problems .  The 
k ind  o f  c o n s t r a i n t  in v o lv e d  outweighs  the  n e t  e f f e c t  o f  th e  con­
s t r a i n t  on an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  pe r fo rm  an a c t i o n .
The c o n s t r a i n t s  n o t  r e l e v a n t  t o ,  and t h e r e f o r e  exc luded  from, 
Hayek 's  p r i n c i p l e  o f  freedom can c l e a r l y  in c lu d e  human a c t i o n s .
For example,  th e  case  o f  an employee l o s i n g  h i s  job because  o f  
a management d e c i s i o n  by h i s  f i rm  o r  employer c l e a r l y  in v o lv e s  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  wi th  t h e  l i f e - p l a n s  and cho ices  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  
by a human ag e n t .  His a c t i o n s  a re  shaped ,  even d i c t a t e d ,  by the
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a c t i o n s  o f  the  employer.  But Hayek contends  t h a t  such an i n t e r f e r e n c e  
i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o e r c i v e ,  n o t  only  because  the  employment 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s ,  a cc o rd ing  to  Hayek, a v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t  in  the  
f i r s t  p l a c e ,  b u t  a l s o  because  th e  employer does no t  use  fo r c e  or  
t h r e a t s  t o  make t h e  employee do s p e c i f i c  t h i n g s .  He does no t  make 
the  employee an in s t ru m e n t  o f  h i s  own w i l l .  On Hayek' s view,  the  
employee s t i l l  has  the  ch o ice ,  in  a f r e e  s o c i e t y ,  o f  look ing  f o r  
a n o t h e r  j o b . ^
Hayek conc ludes  t h a t
[ i ] t  i s  only  in  very  e x c e p t i o n a l  c i rcum ­
s t a n c e s  t h a t  the  s o l e  c o n t r o l  o f  a s e r v i c e  
o r  r e s o u rc e  which i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  us would 
c o n fe r  upon a n o t h e r  th e  power o f  t r u e  co­
e r c i o n .  L i fe  i n  s o c i e t y  n e c e s s a r i l y  means 
t h a t  we a re  dependent  f o r  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  most o f  our  needs  on th e  s e r v i c e s  o f  
some o f  our  f e l l o w s ;  i n  a f r e e  s o c i e t y  th e s e  
mutual s e r v i c e s  a re  v o l u n t a r y ,  and each can 
de te rm ine  t o  whom he wants to  r e n d e r  s e r v i c e s  
and on what te rm s .  . . . T h i s  i s  as t r u e  o f  
s o c i a l  as o f  economic r e l a t i o n s .  I f  a h o s t e s s  
w i l l  i n v i t e  me to  h e r  p a r t i e s  on ly  i f  I con­
form to  c e r t a i n  s t a n d a r d s  o f  conduct  and d r e s s ,  
o r  my ne ig h b o u r  converse  w i th  me on ly  i f  I 
observe  c o n v en t io n a l  manners ,  t h i s  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  c o e rc io n .  Nor can i t  be l e g i t i m a t e l y  
c a l l e d  " c o e rc i o n "  i f  a p ro d u c e r  o r  d e a l e r  
r e f u s e s  to  supp ly  me wi th  what I want excep t  
a t  h i s  p r i c e . ^
Hence i n  the  f r e e  s o c i e t y  t h e r e  i s  no im p e ra t i v e  t o  supp ly  an 
i n d i v i d u a l  w i th  the  t h i n g s  he needs o r  wants t o  f u l f i l  h i s  g o a l s .  
F a i l u r e  to  do so cannot  f o r  Hayek c o n s t i t u t e  a s t a t e  o f  unfreedom 
f o r  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l .
Moreover,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n s  made by Hayek a re  p o l i t i c a l l y  
as w el l  as c o n c e p t u a l l y  im p o r t a n t .  Attempts by th e  s t a t e  to  e l i m i n a t e ,  
o r  even r educe ,  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on i n d i v i d u a l  s e l f -
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f u l f i l m e n t  would l e a d ,  he c l a im s ,  in  d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s .  Some 
o f  th e s e  would c l e a r l y  be u n a c c e p ta b l e  t o  Hayek because  they  would 
i n f r i n g e  freedom in  h i s  s ense  o f  the  word. For example,  a g en e ra l  
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w ea l th  promoted by the  s t a t e  and e n fo rc e d  through 
compulsory g rad u a ted  t a x a t i o n  would c l e a r l y  i n c r e a s e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  some to  a t t a i n  more o f  t h e i r  g o a l s ,  t h e re b y  improving t h e i r  
c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a c t i o n .  But on Hayek’s d e f i n i t i o n ,  t h i s  would no t  
only no t  promote freedom; i t  would invo lve  a lo s s  o f  r e a l  freedom 
f o r  those  fo rced  to  pay f o r  th e  e q u a l i s a t i o n  o f  incomes. The l a t t e r  
would,  in e f f e c t ,  become f o r  Hayek an in s trum ent» f  s t a t e  c o e rc io n .
Hayek's  view o f  freedom can be c l a r i f i e d  by a b r i e f  exam ina t ion
o f  a l t e r n a t e  usages  o f  th e  te rm.  F i r s t l y ,  t h e r e  i s  ’c i v i l '  o r
' p o l i t i c a l '  f reedom, t h a t  i s ,  s o c i e t y ' s  choosing  o f  i t s  e l e c t e d
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and l e a d e r s ,  i t s  'h a v in g  a s a y '  in  p o l i t i c a l
d e c i s i o n s .  But Hayek con tends  t h a t
. . . a  f r e e  p e o p le  i n  t h i s  sense  i s  no t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a p e o p l e  o f  f r e e  men, n o r  need 
one s h a re  in  t h i s  c o l l e c t i v e  freedom to  be 
f r e e  as an i n d i v i d u a l .10
This leads  Hayek to  conclude  t h a t  democracy - in  the  sense  o f  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  th rough  e l e c t i o n s  and m a j o r i t y  r u l e  - i s  n e i t h e r  
a n e c e s s a ry  n o r  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  the  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  freedom. *
Another s o - c a l l e d  freedom t h a t  Hayek d i s t i n g u i s h e s  from h i s  
own concep t ion  i s  ' i n n e r '  o r  'm e t a p h y s i c a l '  f reedom. For him, 
how one uses  o n e ' s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  o r  even how one r eac h es  c o n c lu s io n s  
o r  d e c i s i o n s  about  a c t i o n s  and l i f e - p l a n s ,  i s  o f  no r e l e v a n c e  
to  whether  one i s  coe rc ed  by o t h e r s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  has  no p l a c e  in
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12an accurate account of the nature of individual freedom.
The third, and, for Hayek, the most damaging misapplication
of the term freedom is its description by some thinkers as 'power'
or 'wealth' - or the ability to act independently of any impedi- 
13ments. A weaker version of this view is that capability for action is 
at least relevant to freedom, even if it does not equal freedom.
But Hayek rejects both positions.
He sees the two principal competing formulations - freedom
as the absence of coercion versus freedom as effective power -
as reflecting the two divergent strands of liberalism over the
period from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, and as
having resulted in two distinct and indeed contradictory positions.
Quoting J.S. Talmon, Hayfek explicates the two definitions.
One finds the essence of freedom in spon­
taneity and the absence of coercion, the 
other believes it to be realised only in 
the pursuit and attainment of an absolute 
collective purpose ... one stands for or­
ganic, slow, half-conscious growth, the 
other for doctrinaire deliberateness; one 
for trial and error procedure, the other 
for an enforced solely valid pattern.
Hayek dismisses the view that there is a thing called 'coercion'
(dictating an individual's choices) which is part of something
else called 'freedom', meaning 'satisfying one's wants'. Freedom
as the absence of coercion is quite different from 'power' meaning
'the ability to give content and meaning to one's freedom in
specific ways'. It is this distinction, I have argued, that is
central to the Hayekian principle of freedom.
8 .
I I I . NOZICK'S CONCEPT OF RIGHTS.
For Nozick,  what i n d i v i d u a l s  may l e g i t i m a t e l y  do to  one
a n o t h e r  i s  d e f in e d  in  terms o f  t h e i r  r i g h t s .  His i n i t i a l  c l a im
in  Anarchy,  S t a t e  and Utopia  i s  t h a t
[ i n d i v i d u a l s  have r i g h t s ,  and t h e r e  a re  
t h i n g s  no p e rson  o r  group may do to  them 
(w i thou t  v i o l a t i n g  t h e i r  r i g h t s ) . So s t r o n g  
and f a r - r e a c h i n g  a re  t h e s e  r i g h t s  t h a t  they  
r a i s e  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  wha t ,  i f  a n y t h in g ,  the  
s t a t e  and i t s  o f f i c i a l s  may do . . . 1 6
N oz ick ' s  c h i e f  concern  i s  w i th  th o s e  a c t i o n s  and i n t e r f e r e n c e s
with  i n d i v i d u a l  g oa l s  t h a t  may be r e g a rd e d  as l e g i t i m a t e .
This concern,  and N o z ic k ' s  commitment t o ' a  p a r t i c u l a r  c once p t ion
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s ,  have e q u a l l y  as im p o r ta n t  ( an c j , i t  w i l l  be
argued ,  s i m i l a r )  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  as Hayek’s
n o t io n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom.
According to  one view o f  r i g h t s ,  e x p re s s e d  by A.J.M. Milne ,
’To have a r i g h t  i s  to  be e n t i t l e d  to  do something o r  have  sorae- 
17t h i n g  done . . . ' .  Of ten  in  p o l i t i c a l  d i s c o u r s e ,  r i g h t s  c la ims - 
whether  f o r  'human'  r i g h t s ,  ' n a t u r a l '  r i g h t s ,  ' r i g h t s  o f  p e r s o n s '  
or  ' c i v i l '  r i g h t s  - have a t tem p ted  t o  e s t a b l i s h  th e  r i g h t s  i n d i v i d ­
u a l s  have to  p a r t i c u l a r  t h i n g s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  th e  r i g h t  to  l i f e  and 
l i b e r t y ,  th e  r i g h t  t o  good h e a l t h ,  th e  r i g h t  to  h a p p i n e s s ,  the  
r i g h t  to  a 'm e a n in g f u l '  e x i s t e n c e ,  th e  r i g h t  t o  p r o p e r t y ,  and more
r e c e n t l y ,  th e  r i g h t  t o  work,  the  r i g h t  to  a minimum wage,  th e  r i g h t
18t o  s t r i k e ,  and t h e  r i g h t  to  ' a  s a y '  i n  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s .
Some r i g h t s  a re  s a i d  to  be u n i v e r s a l ,  p e r t a i n i n g  to  'man qua man' ,  
whereas o t h e r s  a r e  accorded  to i n d i v i d u a l s  because  o f  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  
o r  o c c u p a t io n ,  such as the  r i g h t s  o f  the  em ployer ,  the  employee,
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or the rights of doctors to set fees and hours of consultation. 
Some rights are general, others particular. However, all rights 
claims imply or prescribe obligations for others to respect those 
rights, and in most cases these obligations are positive and 
specific. For example, the right to a minimum wage means that 
employers have an obligation not to pay their workers less than 
a specified amount.
Nozick, however, poses the problem differently. For him, 
there is no automatic right of any individual to particular 
actions, objects or situations. One has a right to do or to have 
something only if, in the course of an action, one does not in­
fringe the rights of others. There are no particular, positive 
rights that engender obligations in others to do or provide specific 
things, except in the case of voluntary contracts. The only general, 
universal right for Nozick is the right not to have one's particular 
rights infringed, not to be forced by others to do certain things. 
According to Nozick,
[t]he right to engage in a certain relation­
ship is not a right to engage in it with 
anyone, or even with anyone who wants to or 
would choose to, but rather it is a right 
to do it with anyone who has the right to en­
gage in it ... Rights to engage in relation­
ships or transactions have hooks on them, 
which must attach to the corresponding hook 
of another's right that comes out to meet 
theirs.
For Nozick, there are moral side constraints upon our actions
20which delimit our rights and which prohibit aggression. In 
effect, these constraints determine the ways in which we can 
properly interact with others; they prescribe our rights.
1 0.
’Aggression', for Nozick, covers such actions as force, theft,
21fraud and breaches of contract. In defining rights in this way,
he appeals to the notions of voluntary consent and free choice.
A person may choose to do to himself, I 
shall suppose, the things that would im­
pinge across his boundaries when done with­
out his consent by another ... Also, he may 
give another permission to do these things 
to him ... Voluntary consent opens the
border for crossings.22
Nozick seems to be saying two things. Firstly, there is an absolute, 
general moral obligation not to treat others in certain ways, 
and secondly, the particular rights we have (and can legitimately 
enforce) are only those consensually arrived at. If these two 
conditions are met - the observance of moral side constraints 
and free choice - any individual action can be legitimised, despite 
the consequences of the action for the lives of others.
This has an important negative implication. The 'right to
life’ is simply the right not to have your life terminated or
injured; the right to good health does not require that anyone
23actually provide health care; there is no right to work, but 
only the right to work for someone who chooses (and has a right) 
to employ you; there is no right to a particular job, a particular 
property or a particular kind of life.
Nozick's example of the twenty-six sets of marriage partners 
is illustrative of his view of rights. He labels the partners 
A and A' to Z and Z' .
A and A' voluntarily choose to get married,
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each p r e f e r r i n g  the  o t h e r  to  any o t h e r  
p a r t n e r .  B would most p r e f e r  to  marry A ' , 
and B’ would most p r e f e r  to  marry A, bu t  
by t h e i r  cho ices  A and A’ have e f f e c t i v e l y  
removed th e s e  o p t i o n s .  When B and B' marry,  
t h e i r  cho ices  a re  not  made n o n - v o lu n ta ry  
merely by th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  something 
e l s e  they  each would r a t h e r  do.^
We e v e n t u a l l y  a r r i v e  a t  Z and Z ' .
The f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  on ly  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  
i s  ( in  t h e i r  view) much worse ,  and the  f a c t  
t h a t  o t h e r s  chose to  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  r i g h t s  
in  c e r t a i n  ways, th e re b y  shap ing  the  e x ­
t e r n a l  env ironment o f  o p t io n s  in  which Z 
and Z' choose,  does no t  mean the y  did  n o t  
marry v o l u n t a r i l y .25
Nozick a l s o  d i s c u s s e s  th e  more c o n t r o v e r s i a l  example - which,
in  h i s  view, i s  a p a r a l l e l  case t o  the  marr iage  p a r t n e r s  - t h a t
o f  the  supposed ly  v o l u n t a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  worker and
the  owner o f  c a p i t a l .
Z i s  faced  with  working o r  s t a r v i n g ;  the  
cho ices  and a c t i o n s  o f  a l l  o t h e r  persons  
do no t  add up to  p r o v id i n g  Z with  some 
o t h e r  o p t i o n  . . .  Does Z choose to  work 
v o l u n t a r i l y ?  . . .  Z does choose v o l u n t a r i l y  
i f  the  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  A through Y each 
a c t e d - v o l u n t a r i l y  and w i th i n  t h e i r  r i g h t s . 26
Nozick a n t i c i p a t e s  th e  o b j e c t i o n  to  h i s  own view ' . . . t h a t  some
a c t i o n s  ( f o r  example,  workers a c c e p t i n g  a wage p o s i t i o n )  a r e  not
r e a l l y  v o lu n t a r y  because  one p a r t y  face s  s e v e r e l y  l i m i t e d  o p t i o n s ,
27with  a l l  the  o t h e r s  b e in g  much worse than  the  one he c h o o s e s ' .  
Hence, on an a l t e r n a t e  view o f  r i g h t s ,  the  worker who must accep t  
the  low wages o r  u n h e a l th y  c o n d i t i o n s  d i c t a t e d  by h i s  employer 
(o r  s t a r v e ) ,  has h i s  r i g h t s  i n f r i n g e d .
But f o r  Nozick, j u s t  as  in  th e  case  o f  th e  m a r r i a g e s ,  the
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employer  has  th e  r i g h t  to  choose h i s  employees and employ them under 
whatever  c o n d i t i o n s  he chooses ,  p rov ided  t h a t  he does n o t  i n f r i n g e  
the  r i g h t s  o f  o t h e r s  in  s o - d o in g ,  and p rov ided  t h a t  h i s  employees 
a re  a l lowed th e  cho ice  to  work f o r  whoever i s  w i l l i n g  to  employ 
them. Hence th e  employer who makes an o f f e r  o f  x wages to  p r o s p e c t i v e  
workers i s  n o t  f o r c i n g  anyone to  work f o r  him under th o s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
i s  no t  i n f r i n g i n g  the  w o r k e r ’s r i g h t  n o t  to  be coerced  in  th e  
cho ice  o f  h i s  employment. But i f  some agency fo rced  the  employer 
to  gua ran tee  minimum wages o r  some s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  demanded 
by w orke rs ,  then  t h e  em p loye r ’s r i g h t  t o  employ under h i s  own 
c o n d i t i o n s  would be i n f r i n g e d .
Nozick concedes t h a t  th e  a c t i o n s  o f  many workers  and 
employers may r a d i c a l l y  a l t e r  th e  cho ice  environment  o f  o t h e r s  and 
d r a s t i c a l l y  l i m i t  t h e i r  a v a i l a b l e  o p t i o n s .  But ,  f o r  Nozick,  who 
i s  to  say  t h a t  Z i s  f o r c e d  to  employ Z ' , o r  t h a t  Z’ i s  f o rc e d  to 
work f o r  Z, j u s t  as th e  Z and Z’ o f  th e  e a r l i e r  example were not  
fo rced  t o  marry? The i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  i n t e r f e r i n g  with  r i g h t f u l ,  
v o lu n t a r y  p r o c e s s e s  j u s t  as t h e s e  would,  f o r  Nozick,  be t h a t  
A and A' had no r i g h t  to  marry one a n o t h e r ,  f o r  by so doing they  
were ' i n t e r f e r i n g '  w i th  the  r i g h t s  o f  o t h e r s .  And Nozick c e r t a i n l y  
cannot  acc ep t  t h i s ,  g iven h i s  view o f  r i g h t s .
N oz ick’s c o n c lu s io n s  about  r i g h t s  and cho ices  in vo lve  two 
c e n t r a l  c l a im s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no gene ra l  p o s i t i v e  
r i g h t s  and t h e r e f o r e  no p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s .  The second i s  a 
p r o p o s i t i o n  about  what ’v o l u n t a r y ’ a c t u a l l y  means. He c la ims t h a t
[w jh e th e r  a p e r s o n ' s  a c t i o n s  a re  v o l u n t a r y
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depends on what i t  i s  t h a t  l i m i t s  h i s  
a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I f  f a c t s  o f  n a t u r e  do so ,  
the  a c t i o n s  a re  v o l u n t a r y .  (I may vo lu n ­
t a r i l y  walk t o  someplace I would p r e f e r  
to  f l y  to  u n a id e d . )  O ther  p e o p l e ' s  a c t i o n s  
p la c e  l i m i t s  on o n e ' s  a v a i l a b l e  o p p o r tu n ­
i t i e s .  Whether t h i s  makes o n e ' s  r e s u l t i n g  
a c t i o n  n o n - v o lu n t a r y  depends upon whether  
th e se  o t h e r s  had the  r i g h t  t o  a c t  as they  
did . . . 2 8
A p e r s o n ' s  cho ice  among d i f f e r i n g  degrees  
o f  u n p a l a t a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  no t  r endered  
n o n -v o lu n ta ry  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  o t h e r s  
v o l u n t a r i l y  chose and a c t e d  w i th in  t h e i r  
r i g h t s  in  a way t h a t  d id  no t  p ro v id e  him 
with  a more p a l a t a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e . ^
N oz ick ' s  whole th e o ry  o f  r i g h t s  i s  dependent  upon th e s e  d i s t i n c t i o n s .
His c r i t e r i a  f o r  l e g i t i m a t e  a c t i o n  and h i s  d i s m i s s a l  o f  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n
t h a t  the  i n d i v i d u a l  faced  with  few o r  u n d e s i r a b l e  o p t io n s  has h i s
r i g h t s  i n f r i n g e d  a re  t i e d  t o  N oz ick ' s  view o f  f r e e  ch o ice .
Again,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' r i g h t '  and ' c a p a b i l i t y '  i s
c r u c i a l  f o r  Nozick.  That I can do c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  b e a r s  no r e l a t i o n
to  whether  I have a r i g h t  to  do them, and v i c e - v e r s a .  S i m i l a r l y ,
th e  a c t i o n s  o f  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  which,  l i k e  n a t u r e  o r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,
r e s t r i c t  o p t i o n s ,  narrow c h o i c e s ,  and hence i n t e r f e r e  w i th  i n d i v i d u a l
l i v e s  do no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  be long  to  t h a t  c l a s s  o f  a c t i o n s  which may
30p r o p e r l y  be termed ' r i g h t s - i n f r i n g e m e n t ' .
In N ozick 's  t h e o r y ,  one has  the  r i g h t  only  to  a c q u i r e  and 
r e t a i n  those  p o s s e s s i o n s  t h a t  do n o t  r i g h t f u l l y  be long  to  a n o th e r .  
I on ly  have a r i g h t  to  them i f  someone e l s e  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  give 
them to  me, o r  s e l l  them, o r  i f  I f i n d  them and no one e l s e  i s  
e n t i t l e d  to  them. I do have a r i g h t  no t  to  have th e  p r o p e r t y  
which I l e g i t i m a t e l y  p o s s e s s  ( t h a t  i s ,  th rough  n o t  i n f r i n g i n g
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t h e  r i g h t s  o f  o th e r s )  e i t h e r  s t o l e n ,  damaged, o r  i n t e r f e r e d  with
31in  ways to  which I have n o t  consen ted .
Whereas c a p a b i l i t y ,  d e s i r e ,  want and need b e a r  no r e l a t i o n  
to  Nozickean r i g h t s ,  consen t  and cho ice  a re  c e n t r a l  t o  them.
The impor tance  o f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  l e ad s  Nozick t o  the  s o c i a l  
maxim:
[f]rom each acc o rd in g  to  what he chooses 
t o  do,  to each a c c o rd in g  to  what he makes 
f o r  h i m s e l f  (perhaps  with  th e  c o n t r a c t e d  a id  
o f  o th e r s )  and what o t h e r s  choose to  do 
f o r  him and choose to  give him o f  what 
t h e y 'v e  been given p r e v i o u s l y  (under  t h i s  
maxim) and h a v e n ' t  y e t  expended o r  t r a n s ­
f e r r e d  . . .  From each as th e y  choose ,  to  
each as they  a r e  c h o s e n . 52
N ozick ' s  t h e o ry  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n ,  th e n ,  i s  con­
d i t i o n a l  on h i s  s p e c i f i c  c la ims  about  r i g h t s  and co n sen t .  For 
i n s t a n c e ,  exchanges a r e  v o l u n t a r y  only  i f  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  a re  
met.  Although th e se  c o n d i t i o n s  a re  s t r i n g e n t  and o f  u n i v e r s a l  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y , 55 th e y  e xhaus t  the  range o f  a c t i o n s  which p r o p e r ly  
count  as ' r i g h t s - i n f r i n g e m e n t ' .  Hence such i s s u e s  as th e  range 
o r  the  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  cho ices  c o n f r o n t i n g  an i n d i v i d u a l ,  what ­
e v e r  t h e i r  e f f e c t  on th e  outcome o f  h i s  a c t i o n  o r  on h i s  m a te r i a l  
p red ic am en t ,  a re  o f  no consequence to  h i s  Nozickean r i g h t s .  I f  
he has  consented  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  a r rangem en t ,  th e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  
the  a c t i o n s  o f  o t h e r s  in v o lv ed  in  th e  ar rangem ent cannot  be q u e s t i o n e d .
Nor can i t  be a rgued ,  on N oz ick ' s  view, t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  needs
34o r  d e s i r e s  n e c e s s i t a t e  p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s  in  o t h e r s .
IV.FREEDOM, RIGHTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL.
To t h i s  p o i n t  I have a t tem p ted  to  o u t l i n e  and e x p l a in  the
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i n i t i a l  p r i n c i p l e s  appea led  to  by Hayek and Nozick in  the  con­
s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  normat ive  t h e o r i e s  o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .  The 
remainder  o f  th e  c h a p t e r  w i l l  e x p lo re  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i f  any,  
between Hayek' s freedom and Nozick*s r i g h t s .  The fo l low ing  c h a p t e r  
w i l l  examine th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  en forcement o f  freedom and 
r i g h t s  f o r  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  i n d i v i d u a l  and government.
I t  has been e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  Hayek’s freedom and N ozick’s 
r i g h t s  a re  s p e c i f i c  in  c o n te n t  and narrow in  meaning,  to  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  they r e f e r  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  k in d  o f  i n f l u e n c e  a s s e r t e d  in 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  I t  i s  prima f a c i e  p l a u s i b l e  t o  assume 
t h a t  the  c l a s s  o f  a c t i o n s  which r e n d e r s  an i n d i v i d u a l  ' u n f r e e ' 
in  Hayek's  sense a l s o  i n f r i n g e s  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l ’s Nozickean r i g h t s .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  those  i n f l u e n c e s  deemed by Hayek t o  be i r r e l e v a n t  to  
freedom ( n a t u r a l  f a c t o r s ,  ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' ,  i n d i v i d u a l  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  
and the  n o n -c o e rc iv e  a c t i o n s  o f  o th e r s )  appea r  a l s o  to  be excluded  
by N oz ick ' s  r i g h t s .  Thus, f o r  both  Hayek and Nozick,  th e  sacked 
employee has  no cause f o r  l e g i t i m a t e  compla in t  a g a i n s t  e i t h e r  
h i s  employer o r  the  economic system to  which he i s  s u b j e c t .
Desp i te  Hayek 's  use o f  the  te rm ' c o e r c i o n '  and N oz ick ' s
concern w i th  ' a g g r e s s i o n ' ,  t h e r e  appears  to  be a c lo se  s i m i l a r i t y  
35between them. What f o r  Nozick i s  a moral s i d e  c o n s t r a i n t  upon 
a c t i o n  i s  fo r  Hayek a c o n d i t i o n  o f  freedom. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
conceive o f  a case o f  the  d i c t a t i o n  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a c t i o n  by 
th e  w i l l  o f  an o th e r  which would no t  a l s o  c o n s t i t u t e  a v i o l a t i o n
36o f  ' . . .  p e r s o n s '  r i g h t s  n o t  t o  be fo rc e d  to  do c e r t a i n  t h i n g s ' . "
For example,  Noz ick ' s  th e o ry  o f  r i g h t s  en forcement e x p l i c i t l y
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i n c lu d e s  f r a u d !*^  And a c c o rd in g  to  Hayek,
[ t j h e r e  rem a ins ,  however,  ore o t h e r  k in d  o f  
harmful  a c t i o n  which i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  though t  
d e s i r a b l e  to  p r e v e n t  and which a t  f i r s t  may 
seem d i s t i n c t .  This  i s  f raud  and d e c e p t io n .
Yet ,  though i t  would be s t r a i n i n g  th e  mean­
ing o f  words to  c a l l  them ’’c o e r c i o n " ,  on 
examinat ion  i t  appea rs  t h a t  the  r e a s o n s  
why we want to  p r e v e n t  them are  th e  same 
as th o se  a p p ly in g  to  c o e r c i o n . ^
Hence Hayek and Nozick have e s s e n t i a l l y  s i m i l a r  conce rns .  The
reasons  f o r  them em phasi s ing  f r au d  i s  t h a t  i t  can be seen to  be
e q u a l ly  an i n s t a n c e  o f  unfreedom and a v i o l a t i o n  o f  r i g h t s .  Though
i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  n e i t h e r  c o e rc io n  no r  a g g r e s s io n  in  the  u sua l  s e n s e ,
f raud  does have the  e f f e c t  o f  de t e rm in in g  an i n d i v i d u a l ’s a c t i v e
cho ice .  Thus a l though  Nozick has  argued  e l sew here  t h a t  coe rc ion  i s
39n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  unfreedom, i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  h i s  
own concep t  o f  r i g h t s  i s  dependent  on an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  
i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  t h a t  i s  ak in  to  Hayek’s p r i n c i p l e  o f  freedom.
And the  ranges  o f  a c t i o n s  in c lu d e d  and exc luded  by bo th  a re  o v e r ­
la pp ing .
The c lo se  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  s u b s t a n c e  o f  Hayek' s 
freedom and Nozick ' s  r i g h t s  r e s t s  on,  and i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n 3the  c r u c i a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n  th ey  bo th  make between freedom o r  r i g h t s  and c a p a b i l i t y ,  
between a u t h o r s h i p  o f  cho ice  (consen t )  and env ironment o f  cho ice .
In d e f i n i n g  l e g i t i m a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n ,  th e  c r i t e r i o n  appea led  
to  by Hayek and Nozick i s  t h a t  o f  who ch o o s es ,  r a t h e r  than  o f  the  
range  o f  o p t io n s  t h a t  i s  a v a i l a b l e .  Thus f o r  Nozick,  ’ . . . c o n s e n t  
opens th e  b o r d e r  f o r  c r o s s i n g s ' and f o r  Hayek, ' [WJhether 
he [ the i n d i v i d u a l ]  i s  f r e e  o r  n o t  does n o t  depend on t h e  range 
o f  cho ice  bu t  on w hether  he can expec t  to  shape h i s  course  o f  a c t i o n
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in  accordance  with  h i s  p r e s e n t  i n t e n t i o n s ’ . The i n d i v i d u a l  who, 
f o r  Nozick,  v o l u n t a r i l y  consen ts  i s  a l s o  Hayek 's  f r e e  choose r .  And 
whether  a Nozickean i n d v i d u a l ’s a c t i o n  i s  v o lu n t a r y  depends upon 
whether  o r  no t  h i s  r i g h t s  have been i n f r i n g e d .  Hence th e  connec t ion  
between the  Hayekian p r i n c i p l e  o f  freedom o f  choice  and Nozickean 
r i g h t s  i s  a c lo s e  one.  Not only  do t h e  same k inds  o f  a c t i o n  t h a t  
de te rmine  l e g i t i m a t e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  come under  the  common 
r u b r i c  o f  freedom o r  r i g h t s ;  t h e  grounds f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between 
d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  i n f l u e n c e  upon i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  a r e  a l s o  
commonly a r r i v e d  a t .
41
There i s  an im p o r ta n t  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  s t r e s s e d  
by Hayek and Nozick between consen t  and c h o ic e -e n v i ro n m e n t ,  one 
which h i g h l i g h t s  the  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between freedom and r i g h t s .
I t  i s  t h a t  n e i t h e r  va lu e  a c t u a l l y  g u a ra n t e e s  any th ing  s p e c i f i c  o r  
p o s i t i v e  f o r  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  in  the  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  h i s  g o a l s .  'Being 
f r e e ' ,  o r  ' h av in g  a r i g h t ' ,  i s  a p u r e l y  n e g a t i v e  r e l a t i o n  between 
an i n d i v i d u a l  and h i s  f e l l o w s .  I t  does no t  c o n fe r  gene ra l  o b l i g a t i o n s  
( o t h e r  than  those  d e r i v e d  from v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s ) , n o r  does i t  
b e a r  any d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n  to  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n .
According t o  Hayek,
[ i ] t  i s  o f t e n  o b j e c t e d  t h a t  our  concept  o f  
l i b e r t y i s  mere ly  n e g a t i v e .  This  i s  t r u e  in 
t h e  sense  t h a t  peace i s  a l s o  a n e g a t i v e  con­
cept  o r  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  o r  q u i e t  o r  the  absence 
o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  impediment o r  e v i l  i s  nega ­
t i v e .  I t  i s  t o  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  concep ts  t h a t  
l i b e r t y  b e lo n g s :  i t  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  absence o f  
a p a r t i c u l a r  o b s t a c l e  - coe rc io n  by o t h e r  
men. I t  beeomes p o s i t i v e  on ly  th rough  what 
we make o f  i t .  I t  does n o t  a s s u r e  us o f  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  b u t  l e a v e s  i t  to
us to  dec ide  what use we s h a l l  make o f  the  
c i rc u m s tan c es  in  which we f i n d  o u r s e l v e s . 42
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Hayekian freedom can t h e r e f o r e  be a c c u r a t e l y  termed ’n e g a t i v e '  
in  th e  sense  t h a t  i t  does no t  g u a ran tee  the  i n d i v i d u a l  s p e c i f i c  
goods o r  b e n e f i t s ,  a i d s  in  th e  a b i l i t y  to  s a t i s f y  w an ts ,  easy 
access  to  th e  achievem ent o f  o n e ' s  a m b i t i o n s ,  o r  even f a v o u ra b l e  
c i rc u m s tan c es .  V o lun ta ry  exchanges in  the  f r e e  s o c i e t y  a re  e n t i r e l y  
dependent  on th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a b i l i t y  to  e l i c i t  co o p e ra t io n  from 
o th e r s  - in o t h e r  words,  on market  f o r c e s .  The enforcement o f  
Hayek's  freedom does n o t  p ro v id e  any th i n g , beyond th e  knowledge 
t h a t  o n e ' s  p l a n s  w i l l  no t  be i n t e r f e r e d  w i th  by the  v i o l e n c e  o r  
co e rc iv e  t h r e a t s  o f  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  g roups ,  o r  by th e  s t a t e .  
Hayekian freedom i s  more a p t l y  d e s c r ib e d  as ' f reedom from' r a t h e r  
than  ' f reedom t o ' ,  i f  t h e  ' f rom '  and ' t o '  a r e  taken  to  r e f e r  to  
s p e c i f i c  t h i n g s .
The claims made by p h i l o s o p h e r s  o f  p o s i t i v e  freedom such as
43T.H. Green and Bosanquet ,  and by th e  new w e l f a r e  s t a t e  l i b e r a l s
44such as Hobhouse, e n j o in  such n o t i o n s  as s e l f - m a s t e r y ,  ( i n c l u d in g
c o n t ro l  o f  o n e ' s  ' i n n e r - s e l f '  and c o n t ro l  o v e r  n a t u r e ) ,  s e l f -  
45r e a l i s a t i o n ,  s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t ,  and sometimes even th e  p u r s u i t  o f  
a common, r a t i o n a l ,  c o l l e c t i v e  pu rpose .
For i n s t a n c e ,  acc o rd in g  to  A.J.M. Milne ,  th e  e s s e n t i a l s  o f  
t h e  p o s i t i v e  t h e o ry
. . .  may be summed up i n  the  p r o p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  r a t i o n a l  moral conduc t ,  s e l f - r e a l i s ­
a t i o n  and freedom a r e  c o - e x t e n s i v e .  They 
a re  d i f f e r e n t  b u t  complementary a s p e c t s
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o f  a s i n g l e  id e a :  t h a t  o f  a s o c i e t y  devoted 
to  th e  harmonious development by a l l  i t s  
members o f  t h e i r  v a r io u s  g i f t s  and c a p a c i t i e s .46
C l e a r l y ,  the  l o g i c  o f  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  does no t  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  Hayekian
n o n -co e rc io n  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t ,  no r  even a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n  o f
freedom. Whether t h e s e  t h i n k e r s  a re  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as t h e o r i s t s  o f
47p o s i t i v e  freedom, fo l l o w in g  B e r l i n ,  o r  as C a r t e s i a n  r a t i o n a l i s t s  
o r  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t s ,  fo l l o w in g  Hayek ,^  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  c l e a r :  
freedom i s  taken by some to  in c lu d e  t h i n g s  anathema t o  H ayek 's 
c o n c e p t io n ,  and to  exclude  o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  a re  c e n t r a l  f o r  
Hayek. The m in im isa t ion  o f  e x t e r n a l ,  human co e rc iv e  r e s t r a i n t s  
upon a c t i o n  - f o r  Hayek the  only  t a s k  o f  the  f r e e  s o c i e t y  - forms 
only  a small  p a r t  o f  th e  t h e o r i e s  o f  freedom advoca ted  by o t h e r s .
S i m i l a r l y ,  Nozickean r i g h t s  a re  c l e a r l y  n e g a t i v e .  The e a r l i e r
summary o f  the  o t h e r  k inds  o f  r i g h t s  c la im s  t h a t  p h i l o s o p h e r s  and
ideo logues  have made i n d i c a t e d  t h e  d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s  o f  N oz ick ' s
approach to  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  r i g h t s .  J u s t  as H ayek 's p r i n c i p l e  o f
freedom does no t  g u a ran tee  an y th in g  p o s i t i v e  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,
and i s  t h e r e f o r e  an ' o p p o r t u n i t y - c o n c e p t ' r a t h e r  than  an ' e x e r c i s e -
49conce p t '  in  Char les  T a y l o r ' s  t e rm in o lo g y ,  so N o z ick ' s  r i g h t s  
do no t  en su re  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  r each  the  goals  f o r  which 
(Nozick admits )  they a re  s t r i v i n g .  As I have a rgued ,  Nozick claims  
t h a t  we have r i g h t s  to  l i f e ,  l i b e r t y ,  h e a l t h  and p o s s e s s io n s  
( f o l l o w i n g  L o c k e ) b u t  th e y  a re  n o t  r i g h t s  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  
k in d  o f  l i f e  ( the  k in d  o f  l i f e  t h a t  we n e c e s s a r i l y  want)  o r  to  
a p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e  o f  h e a l t h ,  o r  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  p i e c e  o f  p r o p e r t y .  
Such r e s u l t s  can on ly  acc rue  from l e g i t i m a t e  v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s .  
Hence,Hugh L a F o l l e t t e  has  c la im ed ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  everyone
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in N ozick’s Utopia may have a r i g h t  to  p r o p e r t y  w i th o u t  anyone a c t u a l l y  
51owning any.
Advocates o f  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s ,  w he the r  gene ra l  o r  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
pursue  va lues  o f  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  and t h e  achievement  o f  human 
pu rp o s es .  They emphasise an i n d i v i d u a l ’s r i g h t  to  be g iven p a r t i c u l a r  
t h i n g s  and a concomitant  o b l i g a t i o n  on the  p a r t  o f  o t h e r s  t o  prov ide  
t h e s e  t h i n g s .  This i s  c l e a r l y  no t  th e  case  in  N oz ick ' s  t h e o ry .
The p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  t h e o r i s t  can e nv i sage  a s t a t e  very  d i f f e r e n t  
t o  t h a t  al lowed by t h e  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  t h e o r i s t .  The p r i n c i p a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t h a t  th e  l a t t e r ,  l i k e  Nozick,  s ees  no c i rcum s tances  
in  which o n e ' s  s o - c a l l e d  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  ( to  w e l f a r e ,  f o r  example) 
can o v e r r i d e  a n o t h e r ’s n e g a t iv e  r i g h t  n o t  t o  be fo rced  to  do c e r t a i n  
t h i n g s ,  whereas the  former  does al low f o r  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and 
i s  no t  w or r ied  by i t .
The t h e o r i s t  o f  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  may ag ree  wi th  N o z ick ' s  claim:
[ t ] h a t  i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  s im u l t a n e o u s l y  and 
c o n t i n u a l l y  to  r e a l i s e  a l l  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
goods i s  a r e g r e t t a b l e  f a c t  about  t h e  human 
c o n d i t i o n  . . . 5 2
However, t h e  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  t h e o r i s t  would s t i l l  m a in ta in  t h a t  the 
p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  can move some way towards e n s u r in g  t h a t  as many 
i n d i v i d u a l s  as p o s s i b l e  have meaningfu l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  s a t i s f y  
t h e i r  wants and f u l f i l  t h e i r  p u rp o s e s .  Moreover,  th e  very  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  would c o n s t i t u t e  an im p e ra t i v e  t o  p o s i t i v e
s o c i a l  a c t i o n .
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Nozick, effectively, claims that any positive rights or obligations 
that are not consensually arrived at are spurious, and dangerous 
to the enforcement of our inalienable negative rights, just as 
Hayek claims that to allow non-voluntary actions under the guise 
of an obligation to promote ’effective power’ would destroy freedom.
Hence Hayek's freedom resembles Nozick’s rights in fundamental 
ways. Both concepts convey legitimacy to individual actions in 
interpersonal relations; they are specific, stringent and universally 
applicable; they are concerned with only one class of possible 
interferences with human lives; they make similar distinctions 
between voluntary consent and capability for action; they have 
common criteria for judging acceptable constraints upon behaviour; 
and most importantly, both freedom and rights explicitly avoid 
appealing to any notion of self-realisation that would engender 
positive obligations. In other words, ’being free’ in Hayek's 
sense confers similar entitlements on an individual as does Nozick’s 
'having rights' .
Essentially, these entitlements form the basis of libertarian 
individualism. They amount to a sense of individual autonomy, 
not in the idealist sense of rational self-control or independent 
determination of one’s life, but autonomy in Murray Rothbard’s 
sense of ’self-ownership’.*^ The ’control’ achieved by the individual 
over his life-plans is that (and only that) determined by the extent 
to which he (literally) makes his own decisions. Choice is defined 
as ’following a will to action’, and Hayek and Nozick only recognise 
autonomous wills and their derivatives. Thus for Hayek's coerced
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individual, the only comprehensive design that his actions
• 54fit into is that of another mind, and according to Nozick,
’ [t]o use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and 
take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his 
is the only life he has'.^
It is this common appeal to individual autonomy that makes 
Hayek's principle of freedom and Nozick’s conception of rights 
so distinctive; it also directs them towards particular political 
conclusions. These will be the subject of Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2 . THE NON-INTERVENTIONIST POLITICAL ORDER.
I . INTRODUCTION.
Having f i r s t l y  o u t l i n e d  and c h a r a c t e r i s e d  the  p r i n c i p l e s  
appea led  t o  by Hayek and Nozick in  c o n s t r u c t i n g  t h e i r  normat ive  
t h e o r i e s  o f  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  and secondly  hav ing  demonst ra ted  the  
c lo s e n e s s  o f  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between them, I want in  t h i s  c h a p te r  
to  examine t h e i r  s t r i c t l y  p o l i t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  In o t h e r  words,  
a cc o rd ing  to  th e  d i c t a t e s  o f  the  n o n - in f r in g e m e n t  o f  freedom or  
r i g h t s ,  what i s  the  p r o p e r  r o l e  o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  in  the  l i f e  
o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l ?  I w i l l  a rgue  t h a t  Hayek and Nozick have s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
s i m i l a r  g en e ra l  views as to  what i s  to  count as l e g i t i m a t e  and 
i l l e g i t i m a t e  s t a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  th e  l i v e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and 
t h a t  t h e s e  views a re  c l o s e l y  t i e d  to  t h e i r  commitment to  freedom 
and r i g h t s .
1 1 . H A Y E K ’ S  L I B E R A L  O R D E R .
Hayek’s e x p l i c i t  c l a im  i s  t h a t  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s c r i p t i o n  i s
a ’C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  L i b e r t y ’ . His s t a t e d  concern a t  th e  o u t s e t  i s
with  ’ . . .  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n  in  men in  which coe rc ion  o f  some by o th e r s
i s  reduced as much as p o s s i b l e  in  s o c i e t y ' . *  In h i s  I n t r o d u c t i o n ,
he sees  h i s  p r i n c i p a l  t a s k  as an adequa te  r e s t a t e m e n t  o f  th e  va lue  
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o f  freedom. He i s  concerned  ' . . .  w i th  p r i n c i p l e s  which c la im  
u n i v e r s a l  v a l i d i t y ’ .^ His emphasis  i s  on ' . . .  t h e  p o s i t i v e  t a sk
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o f  improving our  i n s t i t u t i o n s ’ . C l e a r l y ,  th e n ,  Hayek poses  the  
problem o f  r educ ing  co e rc io n  as a t a s k  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  Hence 
i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and fu n c t i o n s  advocated  
by Hayek w i l l  be c o n s i s t e n t  with  th e  aim o f  minim is ing  c o e rc io n ,
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and w i l l  no t  be concerned  with  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  ends which,  he a rgues ,  
i n t e r f e r e  w ith  t h i s  aim.
Hayek 's most s u c c i n c t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  aims occurs  
in  h i s  es say  'The P r i n c i p l e s  o f  A L i b e r a l  S o c i a l  O r d e r ' .  He s t a t e s  
t h a t
[ t ] h e  c e n t r a l  concept  o f  l i b e r a l i s m  i s  t h a t  
under  the  enforcement o f  u n i v e r s a l  r u l e s  o f  
j u s t  conduc t ,  p r o t e c t i n g  a r e c o g n i z a b l e  
p r i v a t e  domain o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a spon taneous  
o r d e r  o f  human a c t i v i t i e s  o f  much g r e a t e r  
com plexity  w i l l  form i t s e l f  than  could  
e v e r  be produced  by d e l i b e r a t e  a r r an g em en t ,  
and t h a t  in  consequence th e  c o e r c iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  government shou ld  be l i m i t e d  to  t h e  e n ­
forcement o f  such r u l e s  . . . 5
Hayek, th e n ,  e x p l i c i t l y  d e f i n e s  the  r o l e  o f  th e  s t a t e  as t h a t  o f  
p r o t e c t i n g  th e  p r i v a t e  sphe re  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  and more im p o r t a n t l y ,  
c la ims t h a t  t h i s  shou ld  be i t s  on ly  c o e rc iv e  r o l e ,  remembering 
t h a t  ' [ t ] r u e  coe rc ion  occu r s  when . . .  t h e  s t a t e  t h r e a t e n s  t o  i n f l i c t  
punishment and to  employ p h y s i c a l  f o r c e  t o  make us obey i t s  commands’ . 
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  th e  t a s k  o f  th e  s t a t e  i n  r e g u l a t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  
a c t i v i t y  i s  to  fo rm u la te  r u l e s  t h a t  p r o t e c t  freedom and to  use i t s  
c o e rc iv e  power to  e n fo rc e  them.
For Hayek, th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  by s o c i e t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
p r i v a t e  domain ( t h e  a r e a  in  which he may p r o p e r l y  exec u te  h i s  f r e e  
cho ices )  i s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
freedom.
Since  c o e rc io n  i s  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
d a t a  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  a c t i o n  by a n o t h e r ,  i t  
can be p r e v e n te d  only  by e n a b l in g  th e  i n d i v i d ­
ua l  to  s e c u re  f o r  h i m s e l f  some p r i v a t e  s p h e re  
where he i s  p r o t e c t e d  a g a i n s t  such i n t e r ­
f e r e n c e .  The a s s u ra n c e  t h a t  he can count  on
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certain facts not being deliberately shaped 
by another can be given to him only by some 
authority that has the necessary power.^
Hence the rationale for the state's protective role derives from
an important concern of Hayek's definition of freedom: the need
for an individual to know as many of the facts about a decision
or action as are necessary for it to be-properly called his action.
What coercion does is to control the data which the individual
himself normally controls in making his purposive choices.
For Hayek, society must have some definitional framework 
whereby it can give meaning to tue protection of individuals 
against coercion. In order for individuals to be genuinely free, 
they require the knowledge that certain facts are constant. On 
Hayek's account, what is needed is a commonly defined and accepted 
social recognition of what constitutes coercion towards individuals 
It is the knowledge that there is guaranteed by society a defined 
and protected private domain for all that gives Hayekian freedom 
social and political meaning.
But for Hayek, the content of the individual's private domain
is not simply a matter of initiative on the part of the state.
It is determined by adherence to general rules, by respecting the
individual's right to have a voice in his own protected sphere,
and by accepting the need for particular forms of protection
such as private property rights and the enforcibility of voluntary 
8contracts.
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The character of Hayek's 'abstract and general rules' is 
embodied in his theory of the rule of law. This will be examined 
in detail in the following chapter. It is sufficient to note here 
that Hayek's view of the proper role of the state in determining 
the content of the private sphere is limited by the imperatives 
of the principle of freedom. Hence the universal principle of 
individual free choice dictates what the state may enact through 
legislation in the area of the private domain. The state's specific 
role is to enforce the general rules whose content is determined 
by the demands of freedom.
Despite the somewhat indeterminate nature of Hayek's private
9sphere, he does specify some particular substantial content
for its adequate demarcation. The first essential element of his
view is the delineation of property and its protection by the state.
We are rarely in a position to carry out a 
coherent plan of action unless we are cer­
tain of our exclusive control of some 
material objects; and where we do not con­
trol them, it is necessary that we know 
who does if we are to collaborate with 
others. The recognition of property is 
clearly the first step in the delimitation 
of the private sphere which protects us 
against coercion; and it has long been 
recognised that "a people averse to the 
institution of private property is without 
the first element of freedom"... 10
According to Hayek, individuals require some property in order to
be able to make particular decisions and choices. Hence recognition
of it in the definition of the private domain is required by the
principle of freedom. However, this does not imply that governments
are compelled to provide property for any individual, based on
whatever criterion - need, desert, distributive justice, equality.
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Rather  i t  means t h a t  governments ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  s a f e g u a rd  freedom,
must e n fo rc e  th e  r i g h t  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  p r o p e r t y  l e g i t i m a t e l y
po s se s s e d  - t h a t  i s ,  through v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t .  Hence,
[ t j h a t  o t h e r  p e o p l e ’ s p r o p e r t y  can be 
s e r v i c e a b l e  i n  t h e  achievement o f  our  aims 
i s  due mainly t o  th e  e n f o r c i b i 1i t y  o f  con­
t r a c t s .  The whole network o f  r i g h t s  c r e ­
a ted  by c o n t r a c t s  i s  an im p o r tan t  p a r t  o f  
our  own p r o t e c t e d  s p h e r e ,  as much the  b a s i s  
o f  our  p l a n s ,  as any p r o p e r t y  o f  ou r  own.H
The s t a t e ,  t h e n ,  has an o b l i g a t i o n  to  r e s p e c t  and e n fo rc e  the
v o lu n t a r y  cho ices  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  But f o r  Hayek, to  ach ieve  h i s
s t a t e d  aim o f  reduc ing  co e rc io n  as much as i s  p o s s i b l e  i n  s o c i e t y ,
t h i s  i s  a l l  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  need do. He concludes  t h a t
. . .  i t  seems t h a t  freedom demands no more 
than  t h a t  c o e rc io n  and v i o l e n c e ,  f raud  and 
d e c e p t io n ,  be p r e v e n t e d ,  except  f o r  the  
use o f  coe rc ion  by government f o r  th e  s o l e  
purpose o f  e n f o r c i n g  known r u l e s  i n t e n d e d  
to  secu re  th e  b e s t  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which 
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  may give h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  a 
c o h e r e n t ,  r a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n . 12
Hayek’ s r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  domain o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  
and the  im p e ra t iv e  t h a t  th e  s t a t e  g u a ran tee  i t s  p r o t e c t i o n ,  f u l f i l  
t h e  requ i re m en ts  f o r  freedom to  t h r i v e  in  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .
They exhaus t  the  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which the  s t a t e  may i n t e r v e n e  
i n  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  f r e e  c h o i c e s .  The s t a t e ' s  on ly  c o e rc iv e  f u n c t i o n ,  
on t h i s  view, i s  the  enforcement o f  l e g i t i m a t e  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s  
in th e  f r e e  market .
The c l o s e  connec t ion  between th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
freedom and Hayek' s no rm at ive  t h e o ry  o f  t h e  s t a t e  has  s p e c i f i c  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  the  argument t h a t  th e  s t a t e  ought  to  p rov ide  
p o s i t i v e  goods o r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  Simply,  t h i s
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i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  by H ayek 's th e o ry  o f  freedom. Nor i s  i t  a c c e p ta b l e
to  him as i t  would, he a rg u e s ,  in vo lve  th e  s t a t e  i n  th e  d e t e rm in a t io n
o f  what the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  cho ices  w i l l  b e .  Hayek' s r e j e c t i o n  o f
any n e c e s s a r y  connec t ion  between freedom and s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n
p r e c l u d e s  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  in  the  achievement  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
13g o a l s .  For Hayek, th e  c o e rc iv e  s t a t e  must remain a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
one.  Hence,
[ g j e n e r a l l y  sp e a k in g ,  t h i s  means t h a t  the  
m o r a l i t y  o f  a c t i o n  w i t h i n  the  p r i v a t e  sphere  
i s  n o t  a p r o p e r  o b j e c t  f o r  c o e r c iv e  c o n t r o l  
by the  s t a t e . 14
S i m i l a r l y ,
[ e j q u a l i t y  o f  the  g e n e ra l  r u l e s  o f  law and 
conduct  . . .  i s  the  on ly  k ind  o f  e q u a l i t y  
conducive t o  l i b e r t y  and th e  on ly  e q u a l i t y  
which we can secu re  w i th o u t  d e s t r o y i n g  
l i b e r t y .  Not on ly  has  l i b e r t y  n o th i n g  to  
do with  any o t h e r  s o r t  o f  e q u a l i t y ,  b u t  
i t  i s  even bound to  produce i n e q u a l i t y  
in  many r e s p e c t s . ^
I t  fo l low s  t h a t  the  Hayekian l i b e r a l  o r d e r  has  no r i g h t  to  d i c t a t e  
i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l s ,  can make no moral claims about  such g o a l s ,  and 
can in no way o r d e r  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s .  I t  need  n o t  p ro v id e  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  d e te rm in in g  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n s ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e  i n  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  and must n o t  fo rm u la te  
i t s  own h i e r a r c h y  o f  ends .  Moreover, t h e  s t a t e  cannot  make ju d g e ­
ments about  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  ' j u s t i c e '  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  (n o n -co e rc iv e )  
human a c t i o n s  which a f f e c t  th e  l i v e s  o f  o t h e r s ,  even i f  th e  e f f e c t s  
a re  d e t r i m e n t a l .  I t  has  no p l a c e  in  a m e l i o r a t i n g  env i ronm enta l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  upon a c t i o n .  I t  i s  n o t  to  be t h e  e n f o r c e r  o f  a 'common 
g o o d ' ,  s i n c e  ' [ a ]  f r e e  s o c i e t y  i s  a p l u r a l i s t i c  s o c i e t y  w i th o u t  
a common h i e r a r c h y  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  e n d s ' .
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A p l u r a l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t s  and an i n d i v i d u a t i o n  o f  ends c h a r a c t e r i s e
H ayek ' s o r d e r .  There a re  no ' s o c i e t a l  g o a l s '  as such because
i n d i v i d u a l s  do n o t  ag ree  (nor  should  they  be fo r c e d  to )  on c o l l e c t i v e
17ends .  Hayek' s  o r d e r ,  the  ' c a t a l l a x y ' ,  i s  p o p u la t e d  by i n d i v i d u a l s
w i th  no knowledge o f  ends o t h e r  than t h e i r  own and those  with
whom they  make v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t u a l  agreements .  Moerover, t h i s  i s
. . . i t s  g r e a t  m e r i t  which makes i n d i v i d u a l  
freedom and a l l  i t  v a lu e s  p o s s i b l e  . . .  I t  
i s  indeed  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  such a c t s  o f  
exchange t h a t  they  s e rv e  d i f f e r e n t  and 
inde penden t  purposes  o f  each p a r t n e r  in  
th e  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  and t h a t  th e y  thus  a s s i s t  
t h e  p a r t i e s  as means f o r  d i f f e r e n t  ends .
Any s o c i a l  o r d e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  which does n o t  r e c o g n i s e  man's p l u r a l i t y
o f  ends ,  does n o t ,  on Hayek's  view, uphold freedom. And, accord ing
to  Hayek, p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  t h a t  a t t e m p t  t o  d e f in e  and pursue
common g oa l s  can on ly  do so by i s s u i n g  s p e c i f i c  commands, n o t  through 
19g en e ra l  r u l e s .  Such o r d e r s  a r e  s a i d  t o  t r e a t  peop le  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y ,  
e n f o r c e  c o l l e c t i v e  g o a l s  th rough  c o e rc iv e  means,  and hence undermine 
i n d i v i d u a l  freedom.
For Hayek, ' [ t ] h e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o f  the  c o e r c iv e  power o f
government w i th  ou r  l i v e s  i s  most d i s t u r b i n g  when i t  i s  n e i t h e r
?0a v o id a b le  n o r  p r e d i c t a b l e ' . “ I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  whe ther  t h e  govern­
m e n t ' s  coe rc io n  a c t u a l l y  i n t e r f e r e s  w i th  ou r  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ices  
and the  fo rm u l a t io n  o f  ou r  g o a l s  and l i f e - p l a n s .  I f  i t  does so,
the  s t a t e ' s  l e g i t i m a t e  r o l e  in  the  l i f e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s
21b e i n g  unduly  ex tended .
Hayek 's  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  s t a t e ' s  c o e rc iv e  fu n c t i o n  in  the  
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s  i s  as e x p l i c i t  and s p e c i f i c  as h i s
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definition of freedom, and is directly related to it. However,
[t]he problem of the limit of coercion is 
not the same as that concerning the proper 
function of government. The coercive activi­
ties of government are by no means its only 
tasks.22
Hayek argues, contrary to the American libertarians John
Hospers and Murray Rothbard,“  ^that not all government activity
is necessarily coercive of individuals. Hayek is clear in his
distinction: it is the coercive activity of the state that must
be curtailed. As one Hayek scholar, N.P. Barry, notes,
... it is not what governments do that is 
important, although Hayek does believe that 
most western governments do far too much, 
but the methods they employ in whatever it 
is that they do. The principle, therefore, 
that determines the legitimacy of state 
action is the principle of the rule of
1 aw.2 4
Government’s service functions need not be coercive, though Hayek 
does admit that they are often coercively enforced through taxation. 
In his view these functions may be justified either becuase they 
reinforce the market order, or they provide competition in the 
market place, or they render services not covered by private enter­
prise. Moreover, as long as they are not monopolistic, they need 
not dictate individual choices. For Hayek, the non-coercive 
’service' role of the state does not violate the principle of freedom
which dictates the proper function of government in the liberal
a 25 order.
In sum, the political imperative of Hayek's commitment to 
freedom is that the state must protect freedom and never infringe it
2 6in  im p o r ta n t  w ays .“ This in v o lv e s  l e a v in g  the  i n d i v i d u a l  a p r i v a t e  
domain i n  which h i s  f r e e  cho ices  a re  beyond the  reach  o f  government 
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The p r i n c i p l e  o f  freedom, th e n ,  has c l e a r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
fo r  the p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  and i t s  t r e a tm e n t  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l .
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I I I . NOZICK' S MINIMAL STATE.
Textual  a n a l y s i s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  N oz ick ' s  commitment to  i n d i v i d u a l  
r i g h t s  ( t h a t  a re  c l o s e l y  a l l i e d  t o  Hayekian freedom) a l s o  engenders 
p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s .  The i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  N oz ick 's  
adherence to  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  i s  t h a t  the  s t a t e  i s  s e v e r e l y  l i m i t e d  
in  the  p r o p e r  range  o f  i t s  c o e rc iv e  a c t i v i t y .
R e f e r r i n g  to  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  r i g h t s  by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  Nozick 
c o n c l u d e s ,
[s ]o  s t r o n g  and f a r - r e a c h i n g  a re  t h e s e  r i g h t s  
t h a t  they  r a i s e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  what ,  i f  
a n y t h in g ,  t h e  s t a t e  and i t s  o f f i c i a l s  may 
do. How much room do i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  leave 
fcr th e  s t a t e ?
. . .  a minimal s t a t e ,  l i m i t e d  to  the  narrow 
fu n c t i o n s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  f o r c e ,  t h e f t ,  
f r a u d ,  enforcem ent  o f  c o n t r a c t s ,  and so on, 
i s  j u s t i f i e d ; . . .  any more e x t e n s i v e  s t a t e  
w i l l  v i o l a t e  p e r s o n s '  r i g h t s  n o t  t o  be 
fo rced  to  do c e r t a i n  t h i n g s ,  and i s  un­
j u s t i f i e d  . . .
The i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  p remise  i s ,  t h e n ,  the  b a s i s  o f  N oz ick ' s  
claims  about  the  l e g i t i m a t e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  the  s t a t e .  In f a c t ,  h i s  
p r i n c i p a l  p o l i t i c a l  c l a im  i s  t h a t  our  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  r i g h t s  makes 
i t  im p e ra t iv e  f o r  th e  s t a t e  t o  e n f o r c e ,  b u t  n e v e r  to  v io la te_ , them.
For Nozick,  a l l  moral and p o l i t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  a re  r e d u c i b l e  
to  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a c t i o n s  upon our  r i g h t s .  Only a minimal s t a t e ,  
as d e f in e d ,  can be m ora l ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  because  i t  p r o t e c t s  i n d i v i d u a l
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rights and goes no further.
For Nozick, what the state may legitimately do to individuals 
derives from what individuals may do to one another without in­
fringing rights.
What persons may and may not do to one 
another limits what they may do through 
the apparatus of a state, or do to estab­
lish such an apparatus. The moral pro­
hibitions it is permissible to enforce 
are the source of whatever legitimacy 
the state's fundamental coercive power 
has. (Fundamental coercive power is 
power not resting upon any consent of 
the person to whom it is applied.)^
Hence Nozick's view of the state simply reflects his conception
of rights: states may not coerce individuals except to enforce
rights, and, more fundamentally, the very legitimacy of the state
derives from individuals actually having rights. The state may
not coerce us, therefore, because we may not coerce one another.
As Nozick claims, 'Moral philosophy sets the background for, and
29boundaries of, political philosophy'.
Initially, Nozick takes seriously the anarchist claim that
no state is justified (on moral grounds) in interfering coercively
in individual free choices in any circumstances, even if it is to
protect the individual's right to make such choices. Hence,
[t]he fundamental question of political 
philosophy, one that precedes questions 
about how the state should be organised, 
is whether there should be any state at 
all.30
However, in attempting to establish the proper role for the state 
in the life of the individual, Nozick argues against the anarchist
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p o s i t i o n  t h a t  no s t a t e  can avoid  i n f r i n g i n g  moral autonomy. ^
He c la ims t h a t  a m ora l ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  s t a t e  can a r i s e  n a t u r a l l y ,
and w i th o u t  anyone i n t e n d i n g  i t  ( th rough what he c a l l s  an ' i n v i s i b l e -  
32hand '  p r o c e s s  ) .  This  'minimal s t a t e '  does n o t  i n f r i n g e  anyone 's
r i g h t s  because  i n d i v i d u a l s  consen t  t o  i t .  In e f f e c t ,  th ey  'back 
33i n '  t o  i t .
Nozick d e s c r i b e s  how such a s t a t e  could a r i s e .  I n d i v i d u a l s ,  he 
a rg u e s ,  in  a Lockean- type s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e ,  a s t a t e l e s s  s o c i e t y ,  
have t h e  r i g h t  to  p r o t e c t  themse lves  a g a i n s t  t h e  a g g r e s s io n  o f  
o t h e r s .  But ,  fo l l o w in g  Locke,  i t  i s  in c o n v e n ie n t  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
in t h e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  to  be always e x a c t i n g  punishment and compen­
s a t i o n ,  and p r o t e c t i n g  th e m se lv es .
Thus p r i v a t e  and p e r s o n a l  en forcement o f  
o n e ' s  r i g h t s  . . .  l e ad s  t o  feu d s ,  t o  an end­
l e s s  s e r i e s  o f  a c t s  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n  and 
e x a c t i o n s  o f  compensa tion.  And t h e r e  i s  
no f i rm  way t o  s e t t l e  such a d i s p u t e ,  to  
end i t  and t o  have bo th  p a r t i e s  know i t  i s  
ended.  Even i f  one p a r t y  says h e ' l l  s top  
h i s  a c t s  o f  r e t a l i a t i o n ,  th e  o t h e r  can 
r e s t  secu re  only  i f  he knows the  f i r s t  
s t i l l  does n o t  f e e l  e n t i t l e d  t o  ga in  r e ­
compense o r  t o  e x a c t  r e t r i b u t i o n  . . .  Also ,  
i n  a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  a person  may lack  t h e  
power to  e n fo rc e  h i s  r i g h t s ;  he may be un­
a b l e  to  punish  o r  e x a c t  compensation from 
a s t r o n g e r  a d v e r s a ry  who has v i o l a t e d  
them . . . 3 4
In o t h e r  words,  Nozick r e c o g n i s e s  the  need to  gua ran tee  th e  
i n d i v i d u a l  s e c u r i t y  in  h i s  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  r i g h t s .  Our p o s s e s s io n  
o f  r i g h t s  makes i t  im p e ra t i v e  t h a t  they  be e n f o r c e d ,  and p r i v a t e  
en forcement i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  f o r  Nozick on s e v e r a l  g ro u n d s . ^
I n d i v i d u a l s ,  cogn izan t  o f  t h e s e  ' i n c o n v e n i e n c e s ' ,  may form
34.
or join 'protective associations' to have their rights enforced.
36These institutions for Nozick resemble insurance companies. The 
process of forming these associations can lead, through market 
considerations of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, to the formation 
of a dominant protective association. This safeguards the rights 
of most individuals within a geographical area.
However, such a dominant agency which emerges without, Nozick 
argues, infringing anyone's rights is still not a state: it lacks 
a monopoly on the use of force and it does not protect everyone
within its territorial domain
, 38 state'.
37 Nozick terms it the 'ultraminimal
It can become a state through its unique power position
39of a 'de facto monopoly' in which the punishment procedures of 
'independents' not covered by the dominant association towards 
those covered may be judged to be risky or dangerous - that is, 
they may violate the rights of those covered by the dominant
40association. The latter has the right to prohibit such punishments.
In which case, it also has an obligation to supply the independent with
41protectve services against its client.
Hence Nozick claims to have demonstrated how a state (formerly 
the dominant protective association) with the dual characteristics 
of a monopoly of force and an all-inclusive enforcement of rights 
over a geographical area, can be derived from the individual's 
right to protection against rights-infringement, without anyone's
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r i g h t s  be in g  v i o l a t e d .
The r i g h t s  p o s s e s s e d  by the  s t a t e  a re  
a l r e a d y  p o s s e s s e d  bv each i n d i v i d u a l  in 
a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e .  ^
N oz ick 's  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  how a m ora l ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  s t a t e  can 
a r i s e  s e rv e s  as a d e s c r i p t i o n  f c r h i s  own p r e s c r i b e d  s o c i a l  o r d e r .
His d e r i v a t i o n  has as i t s  p remise  th e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  r i g h t s  by i n d i ­
v i d u a l s .  The n a t u r e  o f  th e s e  r i g h t s ,  which a re  n e g a t iv e  and a b s o l u t e ,
to  u n c o e rc iv e ,  autonomous a c t i v i t y ,  d i c t a t e s  th e  fu n c t i o n s  o f  a
43m ora l ly  j u s t i f i e d  s t a t e .
N oz ick ' s  p r e f e r r e d  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r ,  t h e n ,  r e f l e c t s  the  kinds
o f  r i g h t s  t h a t  we a r e  s a i d  to  p o s s e s s .  Law enforcement - t h a t  i s ,
th e  s e t t l i n g  o f  d i s p u t e s  and t h e  punishment  o f  a g g re s s io n  - i s  the
only  p r o p e r  a c t i v i t y  i n  which a s t a t e  may l e g i t i m a t e l y  engage.
The minimal s t a t e  can on ly  be j u s t i f i e d  by an appea l  to  n e g a t iv e
r i g h t s :  N o z ick ' s  o r d e r  does n o t  ge t  invo lved  in  g u a ra n t e e s  o t h e r
th an  those  o f  p e r s o n a l  s e c u r i t y .  The only  r i g h t s  to  be en fo rced
44by th e  s t a t e  a re  p r o c e d u r a l  r i g h t s .
Nozick d e s c r i b e s  h i s  minimal s t a t e  as  a ' f ramework f o r  
45u t o p i a ' , which c o n s i s t s  ' . . .  o f  many d i f f e r e n t  and d iv e rg e n t
communit ies  in  which p eop le  lead  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  l i v e s  under
46d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s ’ . His e s s e n t i a l l y  p l u r a l i s t  assumption i s
t h a t  peop le  a re  d i f f e r e n t  and t h e i r  d e s i r e s  and goa ls  complex.
The b e s t  p o s s i b l e  wor ld  f o r  a l l  o f  us can n e v e r  be more than  the
47b e s t  p o s s i b l e  world f o r  each o f  us .
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Utopia  i s  a framework f o r  u t o p i a s ,  a p l a c e  
where p eop le  a re  a t  l i b e r t y  to  j o i n  t o g e t h e r  
v o l u n t a r i l y  t o  pu rsue  and a t t e m p t  to  r e a l i s e  
t h e i r  own v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  good l i f e  in  the  
i d e a l  community b u t  where no one can impose 
h i s  own u to p ia n  v i s i o n  upon o t h e r s .
U top ia ,  i n  N o z ick ' s  view, w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  d iv e r s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
p r a c t i c e s  and communit ies  a r r i v e d  a t  in d e p e n d e n t l y ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  
o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  concep t ion  o f  what th e  wor ld should  
look l i k e .
Nozick d i s t i n g u i s h e s  ' f i l t e r  p r o c e s s e s '  from 'd e s i g n  d e v i c e s '
49i n  h i s  account  o f  t h e  minimal s t a t e .  The former d e s c r i b e  the  
spon taneous  p ro c e s s e s  by which i n d i v i d u a l s  t r y  ou t  d i f f e r e n t  
schemes and a t tem pt  t o  r e a l i s e  v a r io u s  v i s i o n s ,  in d e p e n d e n t ly  
o f  the  p l a n s  o f  o t h e r s .  Design d e v i c e s ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand,  in vo lve  
t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  one b e s t  s o c i e t y  by some p la n n in g  mechanism, 
and are  t h e r e f o r e  t o  be r e j e c t e d  as the y  a t tem p t  t o  impose th e  
c o n s t r u c t e d  v i s i o n  upon o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  F i l t e r  d ev ice s  a re  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  N o z ick ' s  s t a t e  s in c e  th ey  i n f r i n g e  no o n e ' s  
r i g h t s .
N o z ick ' s  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  i s  a ' f r e e  s o c i e t y ' . ^  ' I t  i s  what 
grows spo n tan eo u s ly  from t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ices  o f  many peop le  over  
a long p e r i o d  o f  t ime . . . ' ^  The sugges ted  d i v e r s i t y  o f  N oz ick ' s  
framework i n c l i n e s  him n o t  to  a t tem p t  t o  d e s c r i b e  the  shape o r  
co n ten t  o f  such a s o c i e t y ,  as t h i s  can only  be developed over  
t ime by i n d i v i d u a l s  choos ing  t h e i r  own goa ls  in  u n p r e d i c t a b l e  ways.
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N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Nozick does c la im  t h a t  h i s  own view o f  u t o p i a
n e c e s s i t a t e s  a s p e c i f i c  p o l i t i c a l  commitment t o  t h e  minimal s t a t e
wi th  i t s  na r row ly  s p e c i f i e d  f u n c t i o n s .  He conc ludes  t h a t :
[ t ] h e  minimal s t a t e  t r e a t s  us as i n v i o l a t e  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  who may no t  be used in  c e r t a i n  
ways by o t h e r s  as means o r  t o o l s  o r  i n s t r u ­
ments o r  r e s o u r c e s ;  i t  t r e a t s  us as p e rsons  
hav ing  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  with  the  d i g n i t y  
t h i s  c o n s t i t u t e s .  T r e a t in g  us w i th  r e s p e c t  
by r e s p e c t i n g  ou r  r i g h t s ,  i t  a l low s  u s ,  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  w i th  whom we choose ,  to  
choose ou r  l i f e  and to  r e a l i s e  our ends and 
our  concep t ion  o f  o u r s e l v e s ,  i n s o f a r  as we 
can,  a ided  by t h e  v o lu n t a r y  c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  
o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  p o s s e s s i n g  th e  same d i g n i t y .
C l e a r l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a r o l e  f o r  a s t a t e  in  N o z ic k ' s  r i g h t s - r e s p e c t i n g
f r e e  s o c i e t y .  Moreover,  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s
e x p l i c i t l y  d e f in e d .  The l e g i t i m a t e  s t a t e  must p r o t e c t  i n d i v i d u a l
r i g h t s ,  and only  th o s e  r i g h t s  s p e c i f i e d  by Nozick.  Hence any
i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  which does n o t  invo lve  a g g r e s s io n  a g a i n s t
an o th e rp e r s o n  i s  r e g a rd e d  by Nozick as l e g i t i m a t e ,  and t h e  s t a t e
has  no r i g h t  t o  i n t e r v e n e ,  however d e t r i m e n t a l  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s
a c t i o n s  may be to  t h e  pu rposes  o f  a n o th e r .  I t  i s  on ly  when b reaches
o f  consen t  which v i o l a t e  an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s r i g h t s  occu r  t h a t  the  s t a t e
must a c t .  Moreover,  th e  s t a t e  cannot  coe rce  us in  our  v o lu n t a r y
c h o ic e s ,  e i t h e r  by d i c t a t i n g  i t s  own goa ls  o r  by p r e s c r i b i n g  ou rs :
. . . t h e  s t a t e  may no t  use i t s-  c o e r c iv e  
a p p a ra tu s  f o r  th e  purpose  o f  g e t t i n g  some 
c i t i z e n s  to  a id  o t h e r s ,  o r  in  o r d e r  t o  
p r o h i b i t  a c t i v i t i e s  to  peop le  f o r  t h e i r  
own good o r  p r o t e c t i o n .53
Thus N o z ic k ' s  s t a t e  i s  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  one.  On t h i s  view,
54our  e n t i t l e m e n t s  a re  d e r iv e d  from v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s  and no t  
by t h e  s t a t e ' s  d e t e rm in in g  o f  what i s  a ' j u s t '  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
R.A. Rodewald c la im s  t h a t  i t  i s  N oz ick ' s  c o n t e n t i o n
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... that the enforcement of any theory of 
rights which is incompatible with his own 
will require 'continuous interference with 
people's lives'.^5
For Nozick, 'patterned' principles of distribution seek to achieve 
a particular result such as substantive equality or the meeting 
of welfare needs. In other words, the result would be a society 
with a particular shape. This he contrasts with his own entitlement 
theory, which rests upon 'historical' principles.^  That is,
'... whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came 
about'.^
Nozick uses the Wilt Chamberlain basketball example to
illustrate how liberty upsets patterns. Suppose there is a patterned
(or end-state) principle of equality of income operative in society.
Next, some of the residents agree to give a portion of their
income to watch Wilt Chamberlain playing basketball. In the process
he will receive a more than equal share, thereby upsetting the
pattern. However, the resultant inequality in this example comes
about through the voluntary decisions of those who were acting
within their Nozickean rights. They consent to the transfer.
For the state to uphold the pattern of equal distribution (or any
enforced pattern), it would necessarily, have to impose limits
on what individuals can do with their earnings, and on what
others can earn through free contracts. The rightful, free actions
of individuals alter the shape of a patterned society, and to
prevent this, Nozick suggests, a central agency would have to
5 8interfere coercively with individual lives.
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Since  the  t a sk  o f  the  s t a t e  i s  t o  uphold  r i g h t f u l  p r a c t i c e s ,
i t  need  n o t  encompass such concerns  as the  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y
o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p a t t e r n  o f  economic d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h e r e i n .  Hence
N o z ic k ' s  t h e o ry  en v i sa g e s  and l e g i t i m i s e s  an e x t e n s i v e  system o f
59p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s .
Riva l  t h e o r i e s  a t t em p t  t o  j u s t i f y  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  
on a v a r i e t y  o f  grounds .  To do so they  must e i t h e r  m a in ta in  t h a t  
Nozickean r i g h t s  a re  n o t  t h e  only r i g h t s  t h a t  we p o s s e s s ,  o r  t h a t  
an e x t e n s i v e  s t a t e  (which d i c t a t e s  goa ls )  does n o t  v i o l a t e  our  
n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s . ^  Nozick r e j e c t s  both  o f  t h e s e  arguments by a t t e m p t ­
ing  t o  f i r s t l y  e s t a b l i s h  th e  a b s o lu t e n e s s  o f  h i s  own r i g h t s ,  and 
the n  to  m a in ta in  t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  c once p t ions  o f  j u s t i c e ,  and 
o t h e r  arguments f o r  e x t e n s i v e  s t a t e  a c t i v i t y  o f  a c o e rc iv e  n a t u r e ,  
n e c e s s a r i l y  v i o l a t e  our  on ly  genuine r i g h t s .  N oz ick ’s e x c lu s io n  
o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e r e  be in g  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  to  r e c e iv e  
p a r t i c u l a r  b e n e f i t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  h i s  r e j e c t i o n  o f  
c o e r c iv e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  o f  a r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  k in d .  For,  on N ozick’s 
acc o u n t ,  the  only  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  t h a t  we p o s s e s s  a re  th o se  
gu a ran teed  t o  us by o t h e r s  in  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s .  Hence, ' . . .  
i t  i s  on ly  c o e rc iv e  r o u t e s  towards  t h e s e  goa ls  t h a t  a re  exc luded ,  
w h i le  v o lu n t a r y  ones r e m a i n ' . ^  I f  a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  consen ted  to  
c o l l e c t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  in  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  p a t t e r n  
o r  p u rp o s e ,  i t  would be l e g i t i m a t e .
Thus Nozick can c la im  t h a t  c o e r c i v e l y  e n fo rc e d  t a x a t i o n
6 2i s  on a p a r  w i th  fo rc e d  l a b o u r ;  ~ he can r e j e c t  w e l f a r e  s t a t e
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practices and any enforced distribution of wealth; he can dismiss 
claims in support of substantive equality or equality of oppor­
tunity (including Bernard Williams' arguments about medical care^) ; 
and he can exclude from the legitimate range of activities engaged 
in by the state the guarantee of self-esteem, meaningful work, 
worker access to the means of production and compulsory philanthropy.
In sum, an analysis of the nature of Nozick's political order 
confirms the primacy in his thought of enforcing certain rights. 
Rights are the criteria by which he judges the acceptability 
of political institutions and states. The just state must protect 
these rights, it need do no more, and if it does, it must do 
so without infringing rights. Coercive state action which dictates 
individual goals is not acceptable. According to Nozick, both 
our possession of rights, and the kind of rights that we possess, 
shape the proper ends of political life.
IV.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
The chief conclusions to emerge from a textual examination 
of Hayek and Nozick are that, firstly, they appeal to universal 
principles in order to legitimise, certain kinds of social relations; 
secondly, these principles - freedom and rights - are closely 
related through shared characteristics and common distinctions; 
thirdly, the principles appealed to have specific implications 
for political life and, in particular, for the prescribed relation­
ship between individual and state; and finally, Hayek and Nozick 
reach the same general political conclusion as to the nature of 
this relationship - the only legitimate political order is a
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' n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t '  one.
What i s  the  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  o rde r?  Hayek and 
Nozick argue t h a t  ou r  p o s s e s s io n  o f  freedom o r  r i g h t s  makes i t  
im p e ra t i v e  f o r  the  s t a t e  t o  a c t  in  s p e c i f i c  ways w i th  r e g a rd  
to  i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e  ch o ice .  V olun ta ry  c ho ices  a r e ,  on t h i s  view, 
l e g i t i m a t e  i f  they  do n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i th  o t h e r s  in  c e r t a i n  ways.
The fu n c t i o n  o f  th e  c o e rc iv e  arm o f  th e  s t a t e  i s  to  uphold  v o lu n t a r y ,  
l e g i t i m a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n .  Hence th e  f i r s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  the  o b l i g a t i o n  to  p r o t e c t  
freedom and en fo rce  r i g h t s .  This i n v o lv e s  t h e  punishment o f  those  
who i n f r i n g e  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s ,  and th e  l a y i n g  down o f  r u l e s  which 
d e f i n e  l e g i t i m a t e  a c t i o n .  The s t a t e  must pun ish  f o r c e ,  t h e f t ,  
f r au d  and b reac hes  o f  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t ,  and must p r o t e c t  p r o p e r ty  
r i g h t s .
Secondly ,  f o r  Hayek and Nozick,  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  need do 
no more than  t h i s .  T h e re i s  no i m p e r a t i v e ,  i t  i s  a rgued ,  to  gua ran tee  
i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  or  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ,  f o r  such ends 
a re  no t  s t i p u l a t e d  by th e  c o nce p t ions  o f  freedom and r i g h t s  advanced 
by Hayek and Nozick. These p r i n c i p l e s  do n o t  demand t h a t  c o n s t r a i n t s  
upon a c t i o n  o t h e r  than ' c o e r c i o n '  o r  ' a g g r e s s i o n '  be a m e l io r a te d  
by the  s t a t e .  For Hayek, such c o n s t r a i n t s  a re  no t  r e l e v a n t  to  the 
p u r s u i t  o f  freedom, w h i le  f o r  Nozick,  t h e r e  a re  no g en e ra l  p o s i t i v e  
r i g h t s .  Hence the  co e rc iv e  r o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i s  a s t r i c t l y  l i m i t e d  
o n e .
T h i r d ly ,  Hayek and Nozick conclude t h a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r
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roust not pursue individual goal-satisfaction where this activity 
involves coercing people. There is an imperative not to force 
individuals to do specific things, including providing welfare for 
others. Since we as individuals may not interfere with other 
individuals in certain ways, the state may certainly not do so.
The libertarian criterion for judging legitimate state action is 
whether or not it dictates people's goals and choices. This third 
condition implies that the state must not define its own collective 
goals if this means coercing individuals; hence, on this account, 
the pursuit of patterned principles of distribution or a common 
hierarchy of ends is precluded because individuals have different 
goals, and to alter these in any coercive way would necessarily 
involve illegitimate state interference.
These, then, are the principle characteristics of the non­
interventionist political order favoured by Hayek and Nozick.
They have been shown to be specifically and clearly defined, and 
to have purely negative implications for the individual's pursuit 
of goal-satisfaction. How these aspects of the non-interventionist 
order are related to the notion of justice is the subject of the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. JUSTICE AND THE POLITICAL ORDER.
1 - INTRODUCTION.
In Chapter I principles were discovered in the thought of 
Hayek and Nozick which determine the role of the state in the life 
of the individual. It was argued in Chapter 2 that, in order 
to protect freedom and enforce rights, the non-interventionist 
political order must not interfere coercively in the free choices 
of individuals.
However, freedom and rights are not the only principles 
appealed to by Hayek and Nozick, though they are the main ones.
In attempting to define ’legitimacy’ in social relations generally, 
and in political principles in particular, Hayek and Nozick address 
the question of justice. This chapter attempts to make explicit 
their answers to the question 'what is justice?', in order to determine 
the relationship, if any, between Hayek's concept of justice and 
Nozick's, and to demonstrate the close conncetion between justice 
and the principles of freedom and rights.
It will be discovered that the implications of the 'non- 
interventionist' theory of justice are sufficiently important 
for the role of the state in the life of the individual to warrant 
particular attention. Equally, such a theory is sufficiently dis­
tinctive to demand separate treatment from the concepts of freedom 
and rights analysed in Chapter I.
I will argue that Hayek's theory of the rule of law and
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N ozick ’s e n t i t l e m e n t  t h e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e  r e i n f o r c e  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
c onc lu s ion  t h a t  freedom and r i g h t s  demand a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r .  In o t h e r  words,  the  f r e e  s o c i e t y  in  which r i g h t s  
a re  r e s p e c t e d  and in  which th e  c o e rc iv e  f u n c t i o n  o f  the  s t a t e  i s  
s e v e r e l y  l i m i t e d  i s ,  on t h i s  v iew,  a l s o  a j u s t  s o c i e t y .  I t  i s  a 
market  o r d e r  in  which the  v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a lone  de termine  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  i n  s o c i e t y .  This 
l eaves  no room f o r  t h e  s t a t e  to  de te rm ine  what i s  ' s o c i a l l y  j u s t * .  
This  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  im p e r a t i v e  adhered t o  by Hayek and 
Nozick i s  a d i s t i n c t i v e  and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  c l a im  t h a t  has been 
ch a l len g e d  by d e fen d e rs  o f  v a r io u s  forms o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  
such as the  w e l f a r e  s t a t e .  The l a t t e r  argue t h a t  governments have 
a s p e c i f i c  and p o s i t i v e  r o l e  to  p la y  in  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  
among i n d i v i d u a l s .  Such a ' d i s t r i b u t i v e '  r o l e  i s  r e j e c t e d  by Hayek 
and Nozick.  The v o lu n t a r y  c h o ices  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o n s t i t u t e  f o r  
them the  ends o f  j u s t i c e  to  be pursued  by t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  p o l i t i c a l  
o r d e r .  On t h i s  a c c o u n t ,  j u s t i c e  concerns  what i n d i v i d u a l s  do,  
n o t  what happens to  them.
I I . HAYEK'S RULE OF LAW.
I demonst ra ted  in  the  p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r  t h a t  th e  co e rc iv e  
fu n c t io n  o f  government in  Hayek' s l i b e r a l  o r d e r  i s  con f ined  
t o  e n f o r c i n g  those  r u l e s  o f  j u s t  i n d i v i d u a l  conduct  which p r o t e c t  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p r i v a t e  domain. I t  i s  by t h e  r u l e  o f  law t h a t  
s o c i e t y ' s  r e c o g n i t i o n  and d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  sphere  i s  
ach ieved and e n f o r c e d . F o r  Hayek, l i b e r t y  and law are  synonymous.
He quote s  app rov ing ly  a n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r German l e g a l  p h i l o s o p h e r ,  
F.C. von Savigny:
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The rule whereby the indivisible border 
line is fixed within which the being and 
activity of each individual obtain a 
secure and free sphere is the law.*
Hayek conceives of laws as 'abstract rules' and deliberately
2distinguishes them from 'commands', w'hich, he claims, are specific.
The latter are said by Hayek to be arbitrary, since they distinguish
between individuals and force them to do particular things,
thereby breaching their voluntary consent. According to Hayek,
commands reflect a will that is independent of, if not contrary
to, the will of the particular individual. A law, however, on the
Hayekian conception, is
... a general rule that everybody obeys, 
unlike a command proper, [and it] does not 
necessarily presuppose a person who has 
issued it. It also differs from a command 
by its generality and abstractness.^
Or, as N.P. Barry points out,
[a] command is an instruction emanating 
from a determinate source and addressed 
to a specific purpose while a law is 
highly general in form, does not presuppose 
a definite source, and does not specify a 
particular action but merely forbids a 
range of actions.4
Laws then, are independent of individual purposes, and do not 
embody a particular purpose themselves. They do not deliberately 
bestow benefits on specified individuals or classes; rather they 
are universal in their application and in their guarantee of 
equality.^
Hayek insists on the consistency between legitimate laws and 
freedom, in claiming that '... when we obey laws, in the sense 
of general rules laid down irrespective of their application to us,
4 6 .
we a re  no t  s u b j e c t  to  ano the rm an 's  w i l l  and a re  t h e r e f o r e  f r e e ' . ^
Moreover,  laws f o r  Hayek can a c t u a l l y  promote freedom f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,
and no t  s imply no t  c u r t a i l  i t .  Laws p ro v id e  a d d i t i o n a l  in fo rm a t io n
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f o r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  in  the o r d e r i n g  o f  h i s  a c t i o n s .
I f  i n d i v i d u a l s  know in  advance t h a t  Hayek 's  gene ra l  r u l e s  w i l l  
apply  u n i v e r s a l l y  to  a l l  l i k e  c a s e s ,  w i l l  be a b s t r a c t  i n  t h a t  they 
w i l l  no t  s e rv e  the  l a w g i v e r ' s  ( th e  s t a t e ' s )  own i n t e r e s t s ,  and w i l l  
n o t  fo rce  i n d i v i d u a l s  to  do s p e c i f i c  t h i n g s ,  then those  i n d i v i d u a l s  
may s t i l l  make t h e i r  own v o l u n t a r y  cho ices  w i th o u t  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  
a r b i t r a r y  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  P rovided  they  do n o t  coerce  o t h e r s ,  they 
w i l l  be ab le  to  count  on the  l a w ' s  p r o t e c t i o n .
Hayek's  l e g i t i m a t e  laws a r e ,  f o r  him, e q u i v a l e n t  to  the
g
l i m i t a t i o n s  upon human a c t i o n  imposed by t h e  laws o f  n a t u r e .
Even though we cannot  f l y ,  we need n o t  f e e l  c o e r c i v e l y  c o n s t r a i n e d  
by th e  f a c t ,  and can s t i l l  f o rm u la te  ou r  own p la n s  w i th  t h i s  know­
ledge  in mind. I t  may mean t h a t  our  range o f  choice  i s  l i m i t e d  - 
we have to  r e l y  on mechancial  means o f  a i r  t r a n s p o r t  - b u t ,  he 
a rg u e s ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  ou r  c h o ic e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  k inds  o f  s t a t e  laws 
advoca ted  by Hayek do n o t  l i m i t  o u r  choos ing  to  the  e x t e n t  o f  f o r c in g
p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  p ro v id e  ' . . .  f i x e d  f e a t u r e s  in  the
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envi ronment  . . . '  in  which we a c t .
Hayekian laws a re  t h e r e f o r e  u n l i k e  commands. They supposedly  
uphold i n d i v i d u a l  freedom, and do no more than  t h i s .  On t h i s  view, 
the  law i s  only  co e rc iv e  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f
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freedom involves 
But Hayek argues 
seek to infringe
+ K  1 1 0the 1 aw.
the threat of punishment in order to be effective, 
that such a threat affects only those who would 
freedom, so individuals need never be coerced by
For Hayek, then, the rule of law is a condition of freedom, 
and the only legitimate laws are those which uphold freedom. Their 
chief characteristics are generality, abstractness, and equal 
and universal applicability. (The latter includes the law-makers 
as well). ’Law’, in Hayek’s terms, is not the same as ’legislation’ 
- the latter is made whereas the former is discovered.^ Specific 
commands which discriminate among different individuals are incon­
sistent with Hayek’s rule of law, and therefore with freedom. For 
they involve the assignment, by government, of particular tasks 
to particular individuals regardless of the dictates of their 
own free choices. And according to Michael Polanyi,
[wjhen order is achieved among human beings 
by allowing them to interact with each 
other on their own initiative - subject only 
to the laws which universally apply to all 
of them - we have a system of spontaneous 
order in society ... The actions of such 
individuals are said to be free, for they 
are not determined by any specific command, 
whether of a superior or a public authority; 
the compulsion to which they are subject 
is impersonal and general
Hayek’s theory of justice revolves around his conception 
of the rule of law. The general rules of just individual conduct 
that are characteristic of his idealised interpersonal and govern­
mental relations are embodied in the dictates of law. This law 
is, according to Hayek, the product of undesigned, evolutionary
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growth r a t h e r  than  o f  c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  r a t i o n a l i s m .
However, Hayek g ives  f u r t h e r  c o n t e n t  and meaning to  h i s  
p r e s c r i b e d  r u l e s  o f  j u s t  conduct  in  ’The P r i n c i p l e s  o f  A L ib e ra l  
S oc ia l  O r d e r ' , in  which he s t a t e s  h i s  f o u r  c e n t r a l  p r e c e p t s  o f  
j u s t i c e .  F i r s t l y ,
. . .  t h a t  j u s t i c e  can be m e an in g fu l ly  
a t t r i b u t e d  on ly  t o  human a c t i o n  and not  
to  any s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  as such w i th o u t  
r e f e r e n c e  to  the  q u e s t i o n  w hether  i t  has 
been ,  o r  could  have been ,  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
b rough t  about by somebody. . .  ^
In o t h e r  words,  n e i t h e r  th e  law o f  n a t u r e  n o r  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
re s o u rc e s  in  a market  economy ( c a t a l l a x y )  i s  s u s c e p t i b l e  to  
the  d e s c r i p t i o n  ’ j u s t '  o r  ' u n j u s t ' .  N a tu re ,  on t h i s  view, i s  no t  
u n j u s t .  The t r e a tm e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  by a cyclone may be u n f o r t u n a t e  
o r  t r a g i c ,  b u t  can n ev e r  be a c c u r a t e l y  d e s c r i b e d  as ' u n j u s t ' .
.And the  t r e a tm e n t  o f  t h e  poo r  o r  the  unemployed by the  market o rd e r  
may be s i m i l a r l y  u n f o r t u n a t e ,  unequal  o r  l o p s id e d .  But f o r  Hayek, 
n e i t h e r  ' s y s t e m s ' ,  n o r  the  un in tended  consequences  o f  n o n -c o e rc iv e  
( t h a t  i s ,  j u s t )  human a c t i o n ,  can be c a l l e d  u n j u s t .  P rocesses  
t h a t  a re  impersonal  and g e n e ra l  a re  u n j u s t  on ly  to  th e  e x t e n t
14t h a t  they  invo lve  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n s  t h a t  a re  c o e rc iv e .
Hayek 's second axiom o f  j u s t i c e  i s  t h a t
. . . t h e  r u l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  have e s s e n t i a l l y  
the  n a t u r e  o f  p r o h i b i t i o n s ,  o r  in  o t h e r  
words,  t h a t  i n j u s t i c e  i s  r e a l l y  t h e  pr im ary  
concept  and th e  aim o f  r u l e s  o f  j u s t  con­
duct  i s  to  p r e v e n t  u n j u s t  a c t i o n  . . . ^
This r e i n f o r c e s  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between n e g a t i v e  g en e ra l  r u l e s
and p a r t i c u l a r  p o s i t i v e  commands. I f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  to  be al lowed
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t o  use t h e i r  own knowledge f o r  t h e i r  own p u rp o s e s ,  th en  only 
r u l e s  which t e l l  them what they  must n o t  do can ,  f o r  Hayek, avoid 
be in g  c o e r c i v e .  A ’ j u s t  s i t u a t i o n '  i s  r e d u c i b l e  to  th e  absence o f  
i n j u s t i c e ,  o f  co e rc iv e  human a c t i o n .  This  i s  c l a r i f i e d  in  Hayek’s t h i r d  
p r e c e p t :
. . .  t h a t  the  i n j u s t i c e  to  be p r e v e n t e d  i s  
t h e  in f r i n g e m e n t  o f  the  p r o t e c t e d  domain 
o f  o n e ' s  f e l low  men, a domain which i s  to  
be a s c e r t a i n e d  by means o f  t h e s e  r u l e s  o f  
j u s t i c e  . . .
The o b j e c t  o f  i n j u s t i c e ,  o f  d e l i b e r a t e  human a c t i o n ,  i s  the
p r i v a t e  sphe re  o f  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  On Hayek 's  account  o f  j u s t i c e ,
i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e  choice  and v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s  a re  i n v i o l a b l e .  The
ta sk  o f  a th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e  does n o t  ex tend  beyond th e  p r o h i b i t i o n
o f  c o e rc io n .  I t  cannot  p r e s c r i b e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a s p e c i f i c  m a t e r i a l
1 7c o n d i t i o n  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  groups .  F o u r t h l y ,  Hayek claims
. . .  t h a t  t h e s e  r u l e s  o f  j u s t  conduct  which 
a r e  themselves  n e g a t i v e  can be deve loped  
by c o n s i s t e n t l y  a p p ly in g  to  w ha teve r  such 
r u l e s  a s o c i e t y  has  i n h e r i t e d  the  e q u a l ly  
n e g a t i v e  t e s t  o f  u n i v e r s a l  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  . . . 18
Rules a re  j u s t ,  a cc o rd ing  t o  Hayek, i f  they  a re  a p p l i e d  n e g a t i v e l y ,
g e n e r a l l y  and c o n s i s t e n t l y ,  n o t  be ing  open to  the  d i s c r e t i o n a r y
powers o f  government.  They a re  i n f r i n g e d  on ly  by c o e rc iv e  human
a c t i o n ,  and th e  o b j e c t  o f  t h e i r  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  the  p r i v a t e  sphere
o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l .  And given  Hayek's  d e l i m i t a t i o n  o f  th e  l a t t e r
(as o u t l i n e d  in  t h e  p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r ) ,  j u s t  r u l e s  n e c e s s a r i l y
19en fo rce  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  and c o n t r a c t s  f r e e l y  a r r i v e d  a t .
Hayek 's  th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r o c e d u r a l . As 
N. P . Barry  n o t e s ,
[ p j r o c e d u r a l  j u s t i c e  can b e s t  be unders tood
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as a c o n t r a s t  to  e n d - s t a t e  o r  p a t t e r n e d  
concep t ions  o f  j u s t i c e .  In s te a d  o f  s o c i a l  
s i t u a t i o n s  be ing  compared in  terms o f  such 
e x t e r n a l  c r i t e r i a  as m e r i t ,  d e s e r t ,  need ,  
and so on,  they  are  e v a l u a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  
to  r u l e s  and p r o c e d u r e s ;  i f  t h e s e  r u l e s  
and p rocedu res  a re  adhered  to  r i g o r o u s l y  
then  no f u r t h e r  comment on th e  j u s t i c e  
o r  th e  i n j u s t i c e  o f  t h e  outcome i s  r e q u i r e d . ^0
21
Hayek ' s th e o ry  has  a lso  been d e s c r ib e d  as ’ commutative* j u s t i c e . “
He r e j e c t s  the  l e g a l  p o s i t i v i s m  o f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Hobbes and
22Kelsen - h i s  r u l e s  e x i s t  in d e p e n d e n t ly  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  l e g i s l a t u r e s . ““
( I t  i s  in  t h i s  sense  t h a t  th e y  are  d i s c o v e re d  r a t h e r  than  c r e a t e d ) .
In making such c l a im s ,  Hayek i s  much c l o s e r  to  th e  n a t u r a l  law 
23p o s i t i o n .
The a n t i - u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  o f  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  c l e a r l y  
e v id e n t  in  h i s  concep t ion  o f  j u s t i c e .  He e m p h a t i c a l l y  r e j e c t s  
th e  very  n o t i o n s  o f  ' s o c i a l '  o r  ’d i s t r i b u t i v e ’ j u s t i c e ,  and the  
s t r o n g ,  c e n t r a l i s e d  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  they  would r e q u i r e .  His n o t io n  
o f  j u s t i c e  i s  c l e a r l y  h i s t o r i c a l :  c r i t e r i a  f o r  judg ing  j u s t i c e  
exclude  r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  human a c t i o n s .  In sum, Hayek's  
p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  a j u s t  s o c i a l  o r d e r  i s  one i n  which in d i v i d u a l  
freedom i s  gua ran teed  by t h e  fo rm u la t io n  and enforcement o f  genera l  
r u l e s  and th e  avoidance o f  s p e c i f i c  commands which r e f l e c t  a 
’s o c i e t a l  p u r p o s e ’ .
I I I . NQZICK' S ENTITLEMENT THEORY.
N oz ick 's  th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e ,  t h e  ' e n t i t l e m e n t  t h e o r y ’ , a r i s e s  
as a counte r -a rgument  a g a i n s t  th o s e  who p u r p o r t  to  j u s t i f y  a more 
e x t e n s i v e  s t a t e  than t h a t  t o l e r a t e d  by Nozick.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  
he q u e s t i o n s  t h e  cla im  ' . . .  t h a t  a more e x t e n s i v e  s t a t e  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,
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because  n e c e s s a r y  (or  the  b e s t  in s t ru m en t )  to  ach ieve  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
24j u s t i c e  The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e ,  as p roposed ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
?5
by Rawls, -  has  fu n c t i o n s  t h a t  go beyond th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the  n e g a t i v e ,  
a b s o lu t e  r i g h t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Moreover,  i n  N oz ick ’s view, a 
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  s t a t e  cannot  avo id  v i o l a t i n g  r i g h t s .
For Nozick,  j u s t i c e  concerns  t h e  ’h o l d i n g s ’ o r  ' e n t i t l e m e n t s ’
26t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  p o s s e s s . "  A p e r s o n ' s  h o ld i n g s  a re  j u s t l y  h e ld  i f
he i s  e n t i t l e d  to  ho ld  them. This e n t i t l e m e n t  c o n d i t i o n  r e f l e c t s
t h r e e  g en e ra l  p r i n c i p l e s :  j u s t i c e  in  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  t r a n s f e r  and
r e c t i f i c a t i o n .  Put s im ply ,  an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  e n t i t l e d  to  a h o ld in g
i f  i t  i s  unheld ,  and he a c q u i r e s  i t  w i th o u t  v i o l a t i n g  the  p r i n c i p l e
o f  j u s t i c e  in  a c q u i s i t i o n ;  o r  i f  i t  has  been l e g i t i m a t e l y  t r a n s f e r r e d
to  him from someone e l s e  ( e i t h e r  as a g i f t  o r  by v o lu n t a r y  exchange)
who had p r e v i o u s l y  been e n t i t l e d  t o  i t ;  o r  i f  he had been p r e v i o u s l y
w rongfu l ly  depr ived  o f  a h o l d i n g  which he had a r i g h t  t o ,  and could
27c la im  i t  under the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c t i f i c a t i o n .
Nozick admits  t h a t  th e s e  b road  p r i n c i p l e s  form only  an o u t l i n e
28o f  an adequate  th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e .  For example,  he n o te s  t h a t
t h e  p r a c t i c a l  (and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e )  problems r a i s e d  by the  r e c t i f i -
29c a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  a re  enormous. However, the  t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s  
do p rov ide  an e x p l i c i t  b a s i s  f o r  th e  working out  o f  an e n t i t l e ­
ment th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e .  Moreover,  the y  r e f l e c t  h i s  g en e ra l  c r i t e r i o n  
f o r  t h i n k i n g  about  j u s t i c e .
The complete p r i n c i p l e  o f  d i s t r i b u t i v e  
j u s t i c e  would say simply  t h a t  a d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  i s  j u s t  i f  everyone  i s  e n t i t l e d
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to the holdings they possess under the 
distribution.^
For Nozick, a society is susceptible to the description ’just’ 
only in the sense that the individuals who comprise it possess 
their holdings legitimately, that is, by not infringing rights. 
This is similar to Hayek's claim that only indvidual action, not 
a society’s resource allocation, can be described as 'just' or 
’unjust'. Hence, '[i]f each person's holdings are just, then the 
total set (distribution) of holdings is just'.^
The major point of such ’historical' principles is that the
justice of any situation, whether it be a matter of distribution
generally or a particular individual action, is purely a function
32of how it came about.
A distribution is just if it arises from 
another just distribution by legitimate 
means. The legitimate means of moving 
from one distribution to another are spec­
ified by the principle of justice in 
transfer. The legitimate first "moves" 
are specified by the principle of justice 
in acquisition ... Whatever arises from 
a just situation by just steps is itself 
j ust.33
Alternative conceptions, variously termed by Nozick 'patterned',
'end-state' or 'current time-slice' principles, judge matters
of justice in terms of the results, not simply the nature, of
human actions. They assess justice according to what a situation
or distribution actually looks like, whether it fulfils some
34preferred allocation such as equality, merit or need.
Nozick's theory, then, is distinctive; he claims that '[ajlmost 
every suggested principle of distributive justice is patterned:
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to each according to his moral merit, or needs, or marginal product,
or how hard he tries, or the weighted sum of the foregoing, and
so on’.^  But whereas most alternative theories specify distribution
along a particular dimension, Nozick states that
[t]here is no one natural dimension or 
weighted sum or combination of a small 
number of natural dimensions that yields 
the distributions generated in accord­
ance with the principle of entitlement.
The set of holdings that results when 
some persons receive their marginal pro­
ducts, others win at gambling, others 
receive a share of their mate's income, 
others receive gifts from foundations, 
others receive interest on loans, others 
receive gifts from admirers, others re­
ceive returns on investment, others make 
for themselves much of what they have, 
others find things, and so on, will not 
be patterned.^6
The voluntary choices of free individuals in an open market 
are unpredictable. The resulting allocation of resources will not 
necessarily conform to any pattern, particularly not one of equality.^ 
More importantly, the entitlement theory is not only distinct from, 
but is incompatible with a patterned theory that is concerned 
solely (or even primarily) with particular results. This is so 
because Nozick’s concrete entitlements - determined by the three 
principles - leave no room for any other rights or conceptions of 
j ustice.
On this view, there can be no conflict between one individual's 
right to particular holdings and another's claim to the same 
holdings. If the first individual's claim is legitimate, then his 
holdings cannot be taken without his consent to the transfer.
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There i s  no room f o r  a ' g e n e r a l '  e n t i t l e m e n t ,  in  o t h e r  words.  
N o z ic k ' s  r i g h t s  a re  a b s o l u t e ,  no t  prima f a c i e .  The t h r e e  p r i n c i p l e s  
f i l l  t h e  moral landscape  upon which a th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e  must be 
e r e c t e d .
A n o t a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  the  p e r c e iv e d  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f
N o z ick ' s  e n t i t l e m e n t s  w ith  any p a t t e r n e d  concep t ion  i s  t h a t ,
in  o r d e r  to  ach ieve  and m a in ta in  the  l a t t e r ,  the  a l l o c a t i n g  agency
would f o r  Nozick have s e v e r e l y  to  c u r t a i l  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y .
. . .  no e n d - s t a t e  p r i n c i p l e  o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  
p a t t e r n e d  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e  can be con­
t i n u o u s l y  r e a l i z e d  w i th o u t  con t inuous  i n t e r ­
f e ren ce  with  p e o p l e ' s  l i v e s .  Any favored  
p a t t e r n  would be t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  one un­
favored  by the  p r i n c i p l e ,  by peop le  choos ing 
to  a c t  i n  v a r io u s  ways; f o r  example,  by 
people  exchanging goods and s e r v i c e s  w ith  
o t h e r  p e o p le ,  o r  g iv in g  t h i n g s  t o  o t h e r  
p e o p le ,  t h i n g s  th e  t r a n s f e r r e r s  a re  e n t i t l e d  
to  under  the  favored  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  p a t t e r n .
To m a in ta in  a p a t t e r n  one must e i t h e r  con­
t i n u a l l y  i n t e r f e r e  to  s top  peop le  from t r a n s ­
f e r r i n g  r e s o u r c e s  as they  wish t o ,  o r  con­
t i n u a l l y  (o r  p e r i o d i c a l l y )  i n t e r f e r e  to  
t ake  from some p e rsons  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  o t h e r s  
f o r  some reason  chose to  t r a n s f e r  t o  th e m .38
A th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e  committed t o  any p a t t e r n  i s ,  acc o rd in g  to
Nozick,  i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r i g h t  no t  to  be fo rc e d
to  do c e r t a i n  t h i n g s .  The compulsion r e q u i r e d  by such en fo rced
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  schemes b re a c h e s  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s e n t .
Another i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  N o z ick ' s  e n t i t l e m e n t  th e o ry  i s  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  a r e  l i m i t l e s s  in  a s o c i e t y  whose s o le  
d i s t r i b u t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  j u s t i c e  i s  f r e e  ch o ic e ,  p ro v id ed  t h a t  
no o n e ' s  e n t i t l e m e n t s  a re  i l l e g i t i m a t e l y  owned o r  t r a n s f e r r e d .  
J u s t i c e  in  o r i g i n a l  a c q u i s i t i o n  occurs  when no o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s
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a re  e n t i t l e d  t o  a good o r  h o ld in g .  Nozick’ s only r e s t r i c t i o n  upon
r i g h t s  to  a c q u i r e  p r o p e r t y  i s  th e  weak Lockean p ro v i s o :
A p ro c e s s  no rm al ly  g iv ing  r i s e  to  a perma­
nen t  beq u e a th a b le  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t  in  a 
p r e v i o u s l y  unowned t h i n g  w i l l  n o t  do so 
i f  the  p o s i t i o n  o f  o th e r s  no lo n g e r  a t  
l i b e r t y  to  use th e  t h i n g  i s  th e re b y  
w o rse n e d .^9
Nozick cla ims t h a t  t h i s  p r o v i s o  i s  no t  on ly  weak, bu t  i s  u n l i k e l y
40t o  come i n t o  e f f e c t  in  a t r u e  market economy. I m p o r t a n t ly ,  
the  p ro v i s o  does no t  g u a ran tee  to  pe rsons  r i g h t s  to  w e l l - b e i n g  
o r  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o p e r t y .  And i t  does n o t  p ro v id e  any s u b s t a n t i v e  
l i m i t a t i o n s  on an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r i g h t  t o  accumula te p o s s e s s i o n s .
Such l i m i t a t i o n s ,  c l e a r l y ,  would no t  c o n s t i t u t e  l e g i t i m a t e  r e q u i r e ­
ments f o r  N oz ick ' s  concep t ion  o f  an adequa te  th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e .
I t  i s  a p p a r e n t ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  N oz ick ' s  e n t i t l e m e n t  t h e o ry  o f
j u s t i c e  accords  with  h i s  concep t ion  o f  r i g h t s .
Some peop le  s t e a l  from o t h e r s ,  o r  de f raud  
them, o r  en s lav e  them, s e i z i n g  t h e i r  p roduc t  
and p r e v e n t in g  them from l i v i n g  as they  
choose,  o r  f o r c i b l y  exclude  o t h e r s  from 
competing in  exchanges .  None o f  t h e s e  are  
p e r m i s s i b l e  modes o f  t r a n s i t i o n  from one 
s i t u a t i o n  to  a n o t h e r .  ^
In o t h e r  words,  any in f r in g e m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  i s  s u s c e p t i b l e  
to  Nozick ' s  t h i r d  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e , ,  t h a t  o f  r e c t i f i c a t i o n .
But t h i s  i s  the  only j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  by the  
s t a t e  t h a t  i s  al lowed by Nozick.  And i t  does n o t ,  on t h i s  accoun t ,  
invo lve  ap p e a l in g  to  a p a t t e r n e d  o r  e n d - s t a t e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e .
S i m i l a r l y ,  in  the  t h r e e  cases  p r e v i o u s l y  n o t e d ,  t h a t  o f  Wilt
Chamber lain,  t h e  marr iage  p a r t n e r s ,  and th e  worker -employer
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r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  i n v a r i a b l y  appea led  t o  i s  h i s t o r i c a l  
and dependent  upon r i g h t s .  Wilt  Cham ber la in ’s massive income i s  
j u s t  because i t  came about  th rough a l e g i t i m a t e ,  v o lu n t a r y  t r a n s f e r  
o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  d e s p i t e  th e  gross  i n e q u a l i t y  o f  th e  e n d - r e s u l t  o f  
the  t r a n s f e r .  The f a c t  t h a t  Z has no o p t io n  b u t  t o  marry Z’ because  
A and A' to  Y and Y’ have m arr ied  and th e re b y  f o r e c l o s e d  p a r t i c u l a r  
cho ices  i s  no t  an u n j u s t  s i t u a t i o n  because  a l l  those  p a r t n e r s  had 
a r i g h t  to  marry whom they  chose to  - those  who would marry them.
The worker who must accep t  s e r v i l e  employment or  s t a r v e  cannot  
complain t h a t  h i s  s i t u a t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  the  employer i s  u n j u s t ,  
p rov ided  t h a t  th e  employer d id  no t  fo rc e  him to  take  th e  job .
What the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  looks  l i k e  b e a r s  no c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n  to  m a t te r s  
o f  j u s t i c e .  The above cases  can only  be d e s c r ib e d  as ' u n j u s t '  
by a p p ea l in g  to  p r i n c i p l e s  o t h e r  than those  advoca ted  by Nozick,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  to  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s .
In sum, N oz ick ' s  h i s t o r i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  a re  c l e a r l y  
o v e r l a p p in g  with  the  va lu e s  o f  autonomy, consen t  and r e s p e c t  f o r  
n e g a t iv e  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s .  The p r o p e r  t a s k  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  to  uphold 
j u s t  p r a c t i c e s ,  and does n o t  encompass such concerns  as the  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  s o c i e t y  o r  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  r e s u l t s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  t h e r e i n .  Like 
Hayek's  n o t io n  o f  th e  r u l e  o f  law, Nozickean j u s t i c e  i s  e n t i r e l y  
p r o c e d u r a l .  I t  leaves  no room f o r  th e  s t a t e  t o  pursue  i t s  own 
view o f  ' s o c i a l  j u s t i c e ' .
IV. FREEDOM, RIGHTS AND THE JUST POLITICAL ORDER.
I have hi  the r to  argued t h a t  both  Hayek and Nozick have e x p l i c i t  
and s p e c i f i c  t h e o r i e s  o f  t h e  j u s t  s o c i a l  o r d e r .  T h e i r  s t a n d a r d s
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for judging justice are comprehensive yet stringent. However, the 
foregoing analysis also establishes a substantial similarity 
between Hayek’s rule of law and Nozick’s entitlement theory of 
justice. Both sets of assertions about the nature of justice are 
consistent with the political imperatives of the non-interventionist 
state - that a just political order must not coerce the individual 
except in the punishment of injustice; that such an order cannot, 
without exceeding its legitimate role, impose its own pattern of 
justice if this breaches voluntary individual choices; and that 
governments need not create positive obligations in the name 
of justice, for these are not required by the punishment of injustice. 
The principles of justice appealed to by Hayek and Nozick fully 
meet the requirements of freedom and rights in the non-interventionist 
order.
Both Hayek and Nozick view justice in terms of individual 
action rather than according to the dictates of a preferred end- 
result. Hence nature, misfortune, the results of non-coercive human 
action and the random allocation of resources by the market cannot 
by properly described as ’unjust’ and therefore subject to a central 
re-allocation. Society as a whole is not responsible for determining 
particular end-results; distribution in a free society cannot be 
determined by a single human will. Since only particular injustices 
need be prevented, the economic order does not require regulation 
in the pursuit of justice. Hence for both Hayek and Nozick, just 
individual components make a just society.
Similarly, how things come about is the sole criterion for
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Hayekian law and Nozickean entitlement. End-results are of no
relevance to the problem of justice. The morality of state action
is defined solely by reference to the legitimate particular actions
of individuals. This reduction of all considerations of justice
to the one level of individual entitlement is charcteristic of both
Hayek's liberal order and Nozick's minimal state. For Hayek, the
42pursuit of social justice is a dangerous 'mirage'. For Nozick, 
individual rights and private domains leave no room for a re­
distributive political order. For both, the role of the state is 
circumscribed negatively in its treatment of the individual by 
the nature of justice.
Clearly, for defenders of the notions of positive rights, 
self-realisation and social justice, a non-interventionist political 
order is insufficient. Redistributive state action is, on this 
view, allowable under, even required by, the dictates of equality, 
welfare and the common good. Morality is seen here as consisting 
of more than simply the allowance of uncoerced, voluntary, individual 
choosing. The choices that individuals make affect others in 
important ways. Hence postive rights theorists argue that the 
task of a just order is to ameliorate constraints upon individual 
action so that persons may actually fulfil their life-goals in 
meaningful ways.
In the first three chapters I have outlined and characterised 
the nature of the non-interventionist order and the fundamental 
principles of freedom, rights and justice that it upholds. I have 
confirmed the connection between Hayek and Nozick in their common
rejection of coercive state action outside the punishment of 
injustice. This exercise has been expository and comparative.
The following chapters will explore the justificatory arguments 
appealed to by Hayek and Nozick in support of their shared political 
positions, and will seek to elicit their contrasting sources and 
emphases as well as their shared premises and assumptions. In doing 
so I will expose them to the counter arguments of those who, like 
the above-mentioned theorists, see a much more positive role 
for the political realm in the life of the individual.
PART II. JUSTIFICATORY ARGUMENTS.
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CHAPTER 4 . HAYEK1S ARGUMENT FOR THE NON-INTERVENTIONIST ORDER:
THE BENEFITS OF FREEDOM.
I . INTRODUCTION.
In P a r t  I I o f f e r e d  an account  o f  the  k inds  o f  s o c i a l  a r r a n g e ­
ments espoused by Hayek and Nozick;  the  aim o f  P a r t  I I  i s  to  examine 
t h e  arguments w i th  which they  a t tem p t  t o  j u s t i f y  o r  s u ppo r t  th o se  
k inds  o f  a r rangem en ts .  The c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n  i s  whether  Hayek and 
Nozick p rov ide  good r ea sons  f o r  a c c e p t i n g  t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  p o l i t i c a l  
o r d e r ,  and whether  they  succeed  in  d e l e g i t i m i s i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  
forms o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  and the  a c t i v i t i e s  which th e s e  s t a t e s  
engage i n .  The main t h r u s t  o f  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  Hayek and Nozick i s  
t h a t  t h e i r  ’nightwatchman s t a t e ’ does too  l i t t l e , n o t  t h a t  i t  does 
too  much.Hence i t  i s  w i th  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  I mainly d e a l .
Both Hayek and Nozick appea l  to  v a r io u s  arguments to  j u s t i f y  
t h e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  Hayek embraces two 
p o s i t i o n s  in  h i s  a t tem pted  d i s m i s s a l  o f  the  i n t e r v e n i n g  o r d e r .  
F i r s t l y ,  he cla ims t h a t  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n ,  f o r  example th e  r e ­
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w ealth  to  e l i m i n a t e  p o v e r ty  o r  i n e q u a l i t y ,  o r  g ra d u ­
a t e d  t a x a t i o n  to  ensu re  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ,  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  h i s  
s t a t e d  va lue  o f  freedom and a l l  t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s .  Secondly ,  Hayek 
argues  t h a t  t h e s e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  a re  based  on 
fundamenta l ly  f lawed p r e m i s e s ,  and are  t h e r e f o r e  bound to  f a i l  
anyway. Hence t h e r e  a re  two l e v e l s  o f  argument in Hayek, two s e t s  
o f  reasons  why he r e f u s e s  t o  acc ep t  a s t a t e  whose c o e rc iv e  r o l e  
goes beyond t h a t  o f  p r o t e c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom.
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In this chapter and the first part of Chapter 6 I want to 
do three things: firstly, to establish that there are the two levels 
of argument in Hayek’s thought outlined above; secondly, to outline 
the form that his two arguments actually take; and thirdly, to 
explore whether his premises, assumptions and arguments yield the 
desired conclusions, and whether they meet the objections of Hayek*s 
critics.
This chapter focusses on Hayek's contention that the inter­
ventionist order is inconsistent with individual freedom, and asks 
whether this conclusion is important politically. That is, does 
Hayek provide good reasons for placing freedom above other possible 
goods? Does he demonstrate that freedom outweighs the advantages 
to be gained from an interventionist order?
In The Constitution of Liberty and elsewhere, Hayek continually 
refers to the benefits of freedom. In this sense, he seems to regard 
freedom as an instrumental or consequentialist value. The good 
derived from protecting freedom is not solely, or even largely, 
related to the actual pursuit of freedom, but rather is to be seen 
in the things that flow from freedom. Hence, freedom, for Hayek, 
is not justified by argument about the evil nature of coercion, 
the source of unfreedom. Although he emphasises coercion, and 
occasionally refers to the nature of compulsion, he seems to eschew 
it for more complex reasons. The immorality of coercion does not 
occupy the focal point of his political thinking. For instance, 
he is prepared to abide some forms of coercive state action if 
they can be shown to generally enhance individual freedom.
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Hayek, then, has a ’maximising' view of freedom. In this sense 
his justification of it is utilitarian in nature. Although his 
conclusions are strictly non-, and in fact anti-utilitarian, to 
the extent that he refuses to 'fill in' the content of freedom 
and prescribe particular societal goals, he does nevertheless 
espouse the virtues of freedom largely in terms of the ways in 
which it best utilises society's productive forces. It enables 
individuals to do things that maximise their own happiness and 
that of others. Freedom is the means whereby society benefits from 
the actions of individuals - hence it is said to serve the utili­
tarian function of transmitting the preferences of particular people 
into socially useful actions. Although the uses to which society 
will put freedom are not specified by Hayek, his argument in terms 
of the benefits of freedom does depend on there being uses. Other­
wise, in the absence of a deontological argument, his case for 
individual freedom would collapse.
What, then, are the specific benefits of freedom appealed 
to by Hayek? Essentially, he argues that the free society, based 
on voluntary contracts to the mutual benefit of participating 
individuals, is conducive to individual goal-satisfaction. The 
catallaxy, based on reciprocity of interests, is more likely to 
enable individuals to pursue self-fulfilment than is an order 
based on commands and government intervention. Through uncoerced 
activity, individuals can make more use of dispersed knowledge 
than is possible under centralised planning.
Hence Hayek’s primary justificatory appeal is to the notion
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of self-gratification, eschewed by him in constructing a definition 
of freedom. He sees a tension between the ideals of goal-pursuit 
and goal-satisfaction in the political order. However, the question 
is raised, firstly, whether the political order of non-intervention 
is sufficient to provide the framework for goal-satisfaction that 
Hayek clearly desires, and secondly, whether a more positive 
attempt to do so by the state would deny the benefits of Hayekian 
freedom. These questions, and the possbile tensions that they point 
to in Hayek's thinking, occupy the central critical thesis of this 
chapter: that a thoroughgoing commitment to individual self-fulfilment, 
to which Hayek ultimately appeals in his teleological argument, 
perhaps requires much more than simply the containment of coercion, 
for coercion is not the only interference in individual life that 
prevents goal-satisfaction and that is susceptible to positive 
corrective action by the state.
To establish this thesis I examine, in turn, the nature of 
the benefits Hayek associates with freedom as non-coercion, the 
reasons why Hayek is concerned only with coercion in defining 
freedom, the relationship between coercion and goal-satisfaction, 
and the distinction Hayek draws between actions which affect options 
and actic s which dictate choices. I then turn to Hayek's liberal 
order to determine the extent to which he actually allows coercion 
in certain instances.
II.THE BENEFITS ARGUMENT STATED.
According to Hayek's understanding of the development of 
liberalism, the non-interventionist order
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. . .  d e r iv e s  from the  d i s c o v e ry  o f  a s e l f ­
g e n e r a t i n g  o r  spontaneous  o r d e r  in  s o c i a l  
a f f a i r s  . . .  an o r d e r  which made i t  p o s s i b l e  
to  u t i l i z e  the  knowledge and s k i l l  o f  a l l  
members o f  s o c i e t y  to  a much g r e a t e r  e x t e n t  
than would be p o s s i b l e  i n  any o r d e r  c r e a t e d  
by c e n t r a l  d i r e c t i o n ,  and th e  consequent  
d e s i r e  to  make as f u l l  use o f  t h e s e  power­
fu l  spontaneous  o r d e r i n g  fo r c e s  as p o s s i b l e . 1
Although t h i s  i s  an h i s t o r i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  the  development 
o f  l i b e r a l i s m ,  Hayek ho ld s  th e  view t h a t  a freedom-maximising 
p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by bo th  a d i s c o v e ry  and a d e s i r e .
Though th e s e  two c la ims a re  r e l a t e d ,  they  p ro v id e  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  
o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  i n d i v i d u a l  choos ing ,  
and have d i f f e r e n t  normat ive  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  The d i s c o v e ry  o f  spon­
taneous  o r d e r  a c c o rd in g  to  Hayek, i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  an a s s e r t i o n  about  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  which supposed ly  d i r e c t s  us towards  a non­
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  The d e s i r e  t o  maximise s p o n t a n e i t y  t a k e s  
i n d i v d i u a l  freedom as a s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  and a rgues  from th e  b e n e f i t s  
t h a t  u t i l i s i n g  i t  w i l l  p r o v id e .  That freedom r e f l e c t s  c e r t a i n  f a c t s  
about  s o c i e t y  and t h a t  i t s  p u r s u i t  en s u re s  s p e c i f i c  d e s i r a b l e  
consequences a re  both  im p o r ta n t  arguments s a i d  to  j u s t i f y  a non­
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  p o l i t c a l  o r d e r .
Hayek a s s e r t s  t h a t  freedom provides b e n e f i t s  and v a l u e s .  As 
J.W.N. Watkins c l a im s ,  ’Hayek conduct s  h i s  arguments in  te rms o f  
the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom; and t h e  b e n e f i t s  he p o i n t s  to  a re  enormous ' .  
I f  t h i s  account  i s  a c c u r a t e ,  i t  would appea r  t h a t  Hayek's  argument 
i s  a c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t  one,  and t h a t  freedom i s  p r i m a r i l y  v a l u a b le  
i n s t r u m e n t a l l y , as a means f o r  th e  ach ievement o f  o t h e r  ends .
For i n s t a n c e ,  Hayek quo tes  ap p ro v in g ly  th e  c la im  o f  one w r i t e r ,  H.B. 
P h i l l i p s ,  who argues t h a t
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[ t j h ro u g h o u t  h i s t o r y  o r a t o r s  and p o e t s  have 
e x t o l l e d  l i b e r t y ,  b u t  no one has t o l d  us 
why l i b e r t y  i s  so im p o r ta n t .  Our a t t i t u d e  
toward such m a t t e r s  should  depend on 
whether  we c o n s id e r  c i v i l i s a t i o n  as f ix e d  
o r  advancing . . .  In an advancing s o c i e t y ,  
any r e s t r i c t i o n  on l i b e r t y  reduces  the  
number o f  t h i n g s  t r i e d  and so reduces  the  
r a t e  o f  p r o g r e s s .  In such a s o c i e t y  freedom 
o f  a c t i o n  i s  g r a n te d  to  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  no t  
because  i t  g ives  him g r e a t e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
bu t  because  i f  al lowed  to  go h i s  own way 
he w i l l  on average s e rv e  the  r e s t  o f  us 
b e t t e r  than  under  any o r d e r s  we know how to  
g i v e . ^
The i n f e r e n c e  i s  c l e a r .  On t h i s  view, s o c i e t y  i s  b e t t e r  s e rv e d ,  
f o r  r ea sons  o f  p r o g r e s s  which e v e n t u a l l y  b e n e f i t  eve ryone ,  by 
a l low ing  p o t e n t i a l l y  c r e a t i v e  human be ings  to  pu rsue  t h e i r  own goals  
and v a lu es  to  ach ieve  the  ends th e y  seek by t h e i r  own cho ices  
and d e c i s i o n s ,  untouched by c o e rc iv e  s t a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  For Hayek, 
the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  can be d e s c r ib e d  as th e  means to  
an end. What i s  im p o r tan t  i s  t h a t  s o c i e t y  b e n e f i t s  from th e  m in i ­
m isa t io n  o f  c o e rc io n .  That  n o t  every  i n d i v i d u a l  ach iev es  in  H ayek 's 
f r e e  s o c i e t y  t h e  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  appea led  to  by t h e o r i s t s  o f  
p o s i t i v e  freedom does no t  mean t h a t  h i s  argument h e r e  i s  no t  
i n s t r u m e n t a l .  His p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goal -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  i n c r e a s e d  when peop le  are n o t  coerced  by th e  s t a t e .
By emphasis ing  the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom t h a t  acc rue  from the
4
u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  d i s p e r s e d  and fragmented knowledge,  Hayek dem ons t ra te s  
t h a t  freedom i s  n o t  s imply  an end in  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  n o t  to  be j u s t i f i e d  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  n a t u r a l  r i g h t s ,  t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  
which does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d  t o  any th ing .
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Hayek*s concern in his justification of an uncompromising 
commitment to freedom as non-coercion is therefore clearly utili­
tarian. It implies the value of achieving the greatest freedom for 
the greatest number in order that each individual will do things 
beneficial for society. It espouses the maximisation of individual 
goal-satisfaction in terms of the beneficial results of progress. 
And progress through freedom, he claims, can only come about with 
a non-interventionist political order.
It is one of the most characteristic facts 
of a progressive society that in it most 
things which individuals strive for can 
be obtained only through further progress...^
If we abandoned progress, we should also 
have to abandon all those social improve­
ments that we now hope for. All the desired 
advances in education and health, the 
realisation of our wish that at least a 
large proportion of the people should 
reach the goals for which they are striving, 
depend on the continuance of progress.6
Here Hayek appears almost to be connecting freedom as a means of
achieving want-satisfaction with freedom as an actual guarantor
of benefits to individuals through its promotion of creativity,
invention, and the achievement of better standards of living.
A close analysis of Hayek's views reveals an almost Darwinian
appeal to the notion of allowing different ways of living to
compete in order that the most successful will emerge as an
example for others to follow. In effect, Hayek's instrumental
argument is, as Watkins points out, an extension to society of
7the argument for academic freedom. For knowledge to grow, and 
be used to good effect by countless individuals in the pursuit 
of their goals, there must be no arbitrary constraining power 
which determines what individual choices will be and which thereby
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d i s a l l o w s  exper iments  in  l i v i n g  from b e in g  a t  l e a s t  t r i e d ,  even 
i f  they  prove u n s u c c e s s f u l .
Hayek b e l i e v e s  t h a t  when new ide as  a re  t r i e d ,  th e  s u c c e s s f u l  
w i l l  p r e v a i l  and become adopted  g e n e r a l l y ,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  
freedom i s  l i k e l y  to  l ead  to  s p e c i f i c  in c re m e n ta l  g a i n s .  Hence,
' [w]hat m a t t e r s  i s  the  s u c c e s s f u l  s t r i v i n g  f o r  what a t  each moment
g
seems a t t a i n a b l e ' .  However, th e  argument f o r  freedom r e s t s  e q u a l ly
on the  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  no improvements in  th e  human c o n d i t i o n  w i l l
e v e r  e v e n tu a te  i f  n o th in g  new i s  e v e r  t r i e d ,  i f  the  freedom o f
p o t e n t i a l  in n o v a to r s  i s  c o n s t a n t l y  i n f r i n g e d  by s t a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e
and c o n s t r u c t i v i s t  p l a n n in g .  Hence a l though  one cannot  know whether
(and how) o n e ' s  id e a s  w i l l  be used by o t h e r s ,  e i t h e r  now o r  in  the
f u t u r e ,  i f  freedom i s  n o t  g u a ra n t e e d  one can be c o n f id e n t  t h a t
no p ro g r e s s  w i l l  ev e r  be ach ieved .  D esp i te  Hayek 's  c a u t io n  in
c la im ing  t h a t  ' [i ] t  i s  because  we do no t  know how i n d i v i d u a l s
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w i l l  use t h e i r  freedom t h a t  i t  i s  so i m p o r t a n t ' ,  he s t i l l  a rgues  
t h a t  freedom i s  l i k e l y  to  ' . . .  on b a l a n c e ,  r e l e a s e  more fo r c e s  
f o r  th e  good than f o r  the  b a d ' . ^
Hayek' s  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  t h e n ,  ' . . .  i s  a scheme
f o r  maximising t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  improving s o c i a l  knowledge and
o f  employing i t  t o  b e t t e r  e f f e c t  . . . ' . ^  Moreover,  Hayek argues
t h a t  h i s t o r y  has  dem ons t ra ted  t h i s  b e n e f i c i a l  r e s u l t  o f  freedom,
t h a t  f r e e  d e c i s i o n s  taken  by i n d i v i d u a l s  in  a spontaneous  o r d e r
have c r e a t e d  Western c i v i l i s a t i o n  and a l l  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  have 
12r e s u l t e d  from i t .  “ Thus he c la im s  to  b e long  t o  the  ' e m p i r i c i s t  
e v o l u t i o n a r y  t r a d i t i o n ' ^  which f i n d s  ' . . .  th e  o r i g i n  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
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n o t  in  c o n t r i v a n c e  o r  d e s i g n ,  bu t  i n  th e  s u r v i v a l  o f  the  s u c c e s s f u l ' .  
Hayek wants to  sugges t  h e re  t h a t  th e  im por tance  o f  p r e s e r v i n g  freedom 
as an in s t ru m e n t  f o r  p r o g r e s s  can be e s t a b l i s h e d  by o b s e r v a t i o n  
o f  the  p a t t e r n  o f  Western development.  These claims f o r  freedom 
seen through a view o f  s o c i e t a l  p r o g r e s s  ( t h a t  o f  spon taneous ,  
un in tended  growth r e s u l t i n g  from the  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  knowledge by 
i n d i v i d u a l s  to  s p e c i f i c  problems)  s e rv e  as d e s c r i p t i v e  a s s e r t i o n s  
w i th  normat ive  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  demanding freedom as a p o l i t i c a l  
g o a l .
14
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h i s  e m p i r i c i s t  argument i s  c l e a r l y  a 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t  one,  which r e f l e c t s  n e i t h e r  the  ' b e a u t y  o f  l i b e r t y '  
no r  ' t h e  d i g n i t y  o f  man' . ^  I t  c la im s  t h a t  freedom i s  v a l u a b le  
p r i m a r i l y  i n s t r u m e n t a l l y , and does n o t  appea l  to  e i t h e r  the  n a t u r e  
o f  man as a r a t i o n a l  choose r  o r  to  the  e t h i c a l  o b j e c t i o n s  t h a t  can 
be made a g a i n s t  c o e rc io n .
For Hayek, the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom are  b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e d  by
th e  market o r d e r .  The spontaneous  o r d e r  o f  t h e  market  i s  based
on r e c i p r o c i t y  and mutual  advan tage .  Hayek 's  f r e e  o r d e r ,  the
' c a t a l l a x y ' ,  d e r i v e s  from t h e  a n c i e n t  Greek,  meaning n o t  only
' t o  b a r t e r '  and ' t o  e x c h a n g e ' ,  bu t  a l s o  ' t o  admit i n t o  the  community'
and ' t o  tu rn  an enemy i n t o  a f r i e n d ' . ^  R e f e r r i n g  to  O a k e s h o t t ' s
d i s t i n c t i o n  between n o m o c ra t ic  ( law-governed)  and t e l o c r a t i c
(purpose-governed)  o r d e r s ,  Hayek c la ims t h a t
[ t ] h e  g r e a t  im por tance  o f  the  spon taneous  
o r d e r  o r  nomocracy r e s t s  on th e  f a c t  t h a t  
i t  ex tends  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  p e a c e fu l  co­
e x i s t e n c e  o f  men f o r  t h e i r  mutual  b e n e f i t  
beyond the  smal l  group whose members have
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concrete common purposes, or were subject 
to a common superior, and that it thus 
made the appearance of the Great or Open 
Society possible.1?
The non-interventionist order, then, helps us achieve our ends 
in two ways. Firstly, it leaves us free to pursue our goals without 
coercive interference. This enables us to maximise our chances 
of success by cooperating with others who are equally free. Secondly, 
the knowledge that each of us has can be utilised meaningfully in 
a way that will benefit unknown persons in the future. Hayek's 
instrumental argument in support of the non-interventionist orider, 
then, is that it achieves 'the good', defined as the numerous and 
various goals of individuals. This argument makes no direct appeal 
to the morality of allowing individuals free choice.
Hayek's argument, it seems, turns out to be a jsutification 
of individual self-gratification. Individual autonomy is prized 
by Hayek, not on deontological grounds, but because it allows 
for self-fulfilment and the pursuit of goal satisfaction. Although 
Hayek makes no comment on the worth or possible ordering of particualr 
individual goals - here his thesis is at its most anti-utilitarian - 
he does, nevertheless, effectively claim that we should be allowed 
freedom because we have individual goals that are worth pursuing.
On this view, it is good that as many individuals have as many of 
their goals fulfilled as possible. And the free market, Hayek 
suggests, is the means whereby this aim is best realised. This,
I have argued, is Hayek's principal political conclusion.
III .THE NATURE OF COERCION.
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An im p o r ta n t  q u e s t i o n  r a i s e d  by Hayek’s argument t h a t  we 
ought t o  va lue  freedom because  i t  maximises t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
o f  c o e r c i o n . This  i s  summed up by Marshall  Cohen 's  argument r e ­
g a rd ing  B e r l i n ' s  n e g a t iv e  n o t io n  o f  freedom.
I f  the  va lue  o f  n e g a t i v e  l i b e r t y  l i e s  in  
the  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  d e s i r e ,  why i s  t h e  n a t u r e  
o f  t h e  o b s t a c l e  t o  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  d e s i r e  
o f  such c r u c i a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  im por tance?
I t  seems r e l a t i v e l y  un im por tan t  t h a t  t h e  
o p p re s s io n  o r  co e rc io n  p roceeds  from th e  
d e l i b e r a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o f  ot h e r  p e o p l e .
On t h i s  view,  a u t i l i t a r i a n  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  freedom such as Hayek's
one which s t r e s s e s  th e  ends o f  freedom and i t s  maximisa t ion  r a t h e r
than  s imply t h e  im m ora l i ty  o f  co e rc io n  - cou ld  p l a u s i b l y  lead  to
to  the  a m e l i o r a t i o n  o f  env i ronm en ta l  c o n s t r a i n t s  upon human a c t i o n .
One would perhaps  expec t  such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  freedom to  al low
f o r  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  which a c t i v e l y  promotes  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n .
A c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , i n s t r u m e n t a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  a r g u a b l y ,  s i t s  j u s t
as com fo r tab ly  w i th  the  p o s i t i v e  n o t i o n  o f  freedom as w i th  th e
n e g a t i v e .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  a t  l e a s t  open (and i s  an e m p i r i c a l  o n e ) ;
which k ind  o f  o r d e r  - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  -
more com ple te ly  s a t i s f i e s  i n d i v i d u a l  s e l f - g r a t i f i c a t i o n .  Hayek
c e r t a i n l y  does n o t  go f a r  enough in  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  non-
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  to  be favoured  in  t h i s  r e g a r d .
Hayek 's  s t r i c t l y  n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  s i t  
awkwardly wi th  h i s  u t i l i t a r i a n  argument in  s u p p o r t  o f  them. There 
i s  an i n c o n s i s t e n c y  between,  on the  one hand ,  a commitment to_ 
freedom in  an a b s o l u t i s t  sense  - one which fo c u s s e s  e x c l u s i v e l y
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on n o n -co e rc io n  and which t h e r e f o r e  cannot  g u a ran tee  g o a l - f u l f i l m e n t  - 
and,  on the  o t h e r ,  an i n s t r u m e n t a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  freedom as 
a means towards i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - f u l f i l m e n t .
Yet Hayek, in  s p i t e  o f  t h i s ,  m a in ta in s  t h a t  coe rc io n  i s  the
p r i n c i p a l  e v i l  to  be p r e v e n t e d  by government.  The p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r
has no r o l e  to  p la y  in  the  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  beyond
the  m in im isa t io n  o f  one p a r t i c u l a r  k ind  o f  c o n s t r a i n t  upon a c t i o n .
Why does he i n s i s t  upon t h i s  anomalous p o s i t i o n ?  He claims  t h a t
[ c j o e r c io n  i s  e v i l  p r e c i s e l y  because  i t  
thus  e l i m i n a t e s  an i n d i v i d u a l  as a t h i n k i n g  
and v a l u in g  person  and makes him a ba re  
t o o l  in  the  ach ievement o f  t h e  ends o f  
a n o t h e r .  Free a c t i o n ,  i n  which a p e rson  
p u rsues  h i s  own aims by the  means i n d i ­
ca t e d  by h i s  own knowledge,  must be based  
on d a t a  which cannot  be shaped by t h e  w i l l  
o f  a n o t h e r . 19
Hence Hayek*s very  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  freedom as n o n - c o e r c i o n ,  h i s  
s t a t e d  concern t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  be al lowed  t o  make t h e i r  own 
cho ices  ( i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  w he ther  o r  n o t  the y  reach  t h e i r  g o a l s ) , 
and h i s  view o f  j u s t i c e  as p r o t e c t i o n  only  o f  the  p r i v a t e  domain,  
a l l  t u r n  on a p a r t i c u l a r  view o f  th e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  
upon human a c t i o n .
Hayek e x p l i c i t l y  c la im s  t h a t  ' . . .  l i b e r t y  i s  no t  merely one
p a r t i c u l a r  va lue  b u t  t h a t  i t  i s  the  source  and c o n d i t i o n  o f  most 
20moral v a l u e s ' . “ His argument f o r  freedom i s  one ' . . .  f o r  p r i n c i p l e s
21and a g a i n s t  expediency  . . . ' . Hence t h e r e  can be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  s t a t e  coe rc ion  which seeks  t o  promote w e l f a r e  o r  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  
d e s p i t e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  r ea s o n  we va lu e  freedom i s  because
i t  promotes t h e s e  t h i n g s .  Hayek w r i t e s  o f  freedom:
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Like all moral principles, it demands that 
it be accepted as a value in itself, as a 
principle that must be respected without 
our asking whether the consequences in 
the particular instance will be beneficial.““
Havek’s emphasis on freedom as a moral principle, and his claim
that coercion is an evil in itself are revealed in his notion of
toleration, and help explain his insistence on the importance of
equality before the law.
The recognition that each person has his 
own scale of values which we ought to 
respect, even if we do not approve of it, 
is part of the conception of the value of 
individual personality ... But believing 
in freedom means that we do not regard 
ourselves as the ultimate judges of 
another person's values, that we do not 
feel entitled to prevent him from pur­
suing ends we disapprove so long as he 
does not infringe the equally protected 
sphere of others.
A society that does not recognise that 
each individual has values of his own 
which he is entitled to follow can have 
no respect for the dignity of the indi­
vidual and cannot really know freedom.-^
Hayek's commitment to non-coercion purports to be a thoroughgoing
defence of toleration which finds political expression in an insistence
on freedom as a general principle that is not to be applied only
in cases where it will benefit particular individuals, or even
society as a whole. The implication is that freedom can never be
sacrificed in order to benefit specific individuals or society generally.
This reflects the uncompromising nature of Hayek's political position,
despite the utilitarian nature of his argument for it. Thus there
is a dilemma.
Hayek's definition of freedom is concerned explicitly and
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exclusively with interpersonal coercion, that is, with the control 
of one individual's choosing process either by other individuals or 
by the state. On this view, the most objectionable feature of coercion 
is its elimination of the individual's choosing capacity. This 
outweighs the simple fact of the non-fulfilment of individual 
wants and goals. Hayek admits that many constraining factors prevent 
the satisfaction of our wishes. This is, at most, unfortunate.
It is not a problem to be addressed by the non-interventionist
+ + 24state.
Moreover, it is not merely because coercion admits of political 
control that it is emphasised by Hayek. Although many constraints 
are undoubtedly beyond the reach of social control and beyond the 
political realm - inner or metaphysical freedom falls under this 
category - others are susceptible to public legislation, particularly 
in the area of economic constraints. Rather, it is the nature 
of coercion, not its effects upon individual plans, that attracts 
the exclusive attention of the definition offered by Hayek of the 
just political order. The defining mark of coercion is not its 
control of the choice environment of individuals (including the 
range of meaningful options available), but its deliberate dictation 
of the actual choice process. As Hayek has noted, the important 
factor in freedom is whether it is the individual himself who 
decides, and not whether the available choices are pleasant or 
desirable. Hence the nature of Hayek's definition of coercion 
appeals to a concern for the choice process and not to ultimate 
questions of individual welfare.
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Taylor  d e s c r ib e s  th e  k ind  o f  freedom embraced by Hayek as an
25' o p p o r t u n i t y  ■ - r a t h e r  than  a ' e x e r c i s e  ' - c o n c e p t , t o  th e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  i t  i s  up to  the  i n d i v i d u a l  to  make the  most o f  h i s  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  
Freedom i s  not  d e f in e d  a c c o rd in g  to  how i t  i s  e x e r c i s e d ,  o r  what 
i t  a c h i e v e s .  Yet t h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  how Hayek a t tem p ts  to  j u s t i f y  
freedom.
But what k ind  o f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  does Havekian freedom, upheld 
by the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  p ro v id e  f o r  the  i n d i v i d u a l ?
In e f f e c t ,  i t  does no more than  remove one o f  the  many p o s s i b l e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  upon i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n .  I t  says  n o th in g  about  which 
i n d i v i d u a l  goals  can be ach ieved .  I t  makes no g ua ran tee s  o f  goa l -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  no commitment to  p o s i t i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Hence even 
as an o p p o r t u n i t y - c o n c e p t , t h e  focus  o f  Hayekian freedom i s  ex t remely  
l i m i t e d .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t s  concern  f o r  t h e  means by which i n d i v i d u a l s  
a re  i n h i b i t e d  in  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  i s  on e -d im e n s io n a l .  I t  does n o t ,  no r  
does i t  seek t o ,  p ro v id e  a f av o u ra b l e  cho ice  environment  f o r  the  
i n d i v i d u a l .  Hayekian freedom r e s t s  on th e  o p t i m i s t i c  p remise  t h a t ,  
on b a l a n c e ,  freedom i s  l i k e l y  t o  r e l e a s e  more f o r c e s  f o r  good than 
f o r  bad.  I t  r e l i e s  only  on the  d i c t a t e s  o f  t h e  market  t o  p rov ide  
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  wants and needs .  I f  t h e  absence  o f  coe rc io n  does 
le ad  to  the  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i t  can be no 
more than a happy c o i n c id e n c e .
Thus the  im p o r tan t  p o i n t  f o r  H ayek 's d e f i n i t i o n  i s  no t  t h a t  
th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  goa ls  a re  no t  r e a l i s e d ,  bu t  t h a t  h i s  c a p a c i t y  
f o r  cho ice has been n eg a t e d .  The absence o f  c o e rc io n  in  no way 
g u a ra n t e e s  t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  l i f e - p l a n s .  I t  a s s i s t s  the  l a t t e r
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only  in a minor and n e g a t iv e  way, given th e  f a c t  t h a t  most i n d i v i d u a l  
p l a n s  in contemporary dem ocra t ic  s o c i e t i e s  a re  undermined by f a c t o r s  
o t h e r  than i n t e r p e r s o n a l  c o e rc io n .  For i n s t a n c e ,  i n d i v i d u a l  p la ns  
a re  c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  economy, by a p e r s o n ’s 
p o s i t i o n  in  th e  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  by unemployment, and by h i s t o r i c a l  
a c c i d e n t s .  In Hayek’s t e rm s ,  th e  un in tended  consequences o f  l e g i t i m a t e ,  
n o n -c o e rc iv e  human a c t i v i t y  may very  e a s i l y  p r e v e n t  the  f u l f i l m e n t  
o f  our  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  Or,  as c r i t i c s  o f  t h e  l i b e r t a r i a n  p o s i t i o n  
a rgue ,  t h e  ’neighbourhood e f f e c t s '  o f  a c a p i t a l i s t  economy leave  
many i n d i v i d u a l s  w i th o u t  meaningful  cho ices  r e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  l i f e -
i 26p l a n s .
The dilemma f o r  Hayek i s  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between h i s  suppor t  
f o r  a p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  which has  no p o s i t i v e  r o l e  to  p l a y  in  t h e  
f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa l s  and h i s  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  such an 
o r d e r ' s  c h i e f  q u a l i t y  i s  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  i t s  promoting  g o a l -  
f u l f i l m e n t .  A u t i l i t v - m a x i m i s i n g  argument f o r  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  s i t s  awkwardly with  a co n ce p t io n  o f  freedom which ig n o re s  
most c o n s t r a i n t s  upon i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  by i t s  e x c l u s i v e  focus 
on co e rc io n .  The de fende r  o f  freedom as n o n -c o e rc io n  may appea l  
to  the  im mora l i ty  o f  c o e r c io n ,  the  maximising e f f e c t  o f  freedom 
in  g o a l - f u l f i l m e n t ,  o r  b o th .  In d e f i n i t i o n a l  t e rm s ,  Hayekian freedom 
i s  c l e a r l y  i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e  second o f  t h e s e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  and 
in  h i s  argument as to  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom, Hayek eschews the  
f i r s t  s t r a t e g y .  In o p t i n g  f o r  an i n s t r u m e n t a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
freedom, Hayek needs  t o  show t h a t  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  
a c t i v e l y  promotes g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  h i s  argument to  be a t e l l i n g  
one.  Yet he simply assumes t h i s .  Both d e f i n i t i o n a l l y  and e m p i r i c a l l y ,
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there is important evidence to the contrary.
Hayek categorises freedom politically as a negative concept
yet explains its importance in terms of its positive results.
If the non-interventionist order can be shown to fail in its
achievement of such results for particular individuals or classes,
then the normative appeal of the argument from utility is negated.
I have shown that one of Hayek's principal appeals i_s to utility -
the desire to maximise the individual's use of dispersed knowledge
in the catallaxy in order to attain his particular ends - but that
his preferred political order cannot in any meaningful sense
guarantee the fulfilment of utility. This is because of Hayek's
refusal to entertain that other-than-coercive constraints upon
27human action require social control.
Hence the non-interventionist order does not easily or 
necessarily follow from an appeal to utility. It is therefore 
strange to find Hayek committed to both. This tension creates a 
difficulty for Hayek's attempt to establish the non-interventionist 
state as the only legitimate order. I claimed earlier that if one 
takes seriously his desire to maximise goal-satisfaction, one is 
led in the direction of positive freedom and the interventionist 
state. But the latter is precluded by Hayek1s refusal to countenance 
government intervention in the life-plans of the individual. The 
state cannot legitimately interfere with individual free choice, 
by such activities as the enforced redistribution of wealth and 
the pursuit of equality of opportunity. Even 'milder' forms of
o o
intervention, including progressive taxatioifö(which does not actually
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dictate goals), which are arguably consistent with the maximisation
of goal-satisfaction and utility, are excluded by Hayek because they
involve compulsion. Thus according to Watkins,
[ajlthough Hayek's scheme is a sort of blue­
print for a good society, it differs from 
many other such schemes in being so to 
speak algebraical - the variables are not 
filled in by the author but are left to be 
filled in by chance and circumstance and 
individual initiative.^
Hayek is determined that freedom, even for progress, must not
30involve an advance towards a known goal. In accordance with his
claim that freedom must leave room for the unforeseeable and un­
predictable,^ Hayek eschews progress in the sense of the attainment 
of power over nature, for this implies constructivist planning.
Thus despite the possibility that positive intervention may provide 
benefits for the individual, it is still excluded by Hayek because 
it is said to involve the dictation of individual choices by the 
state. Hayek argues that his principle of freedom is inconsistent 
with the forms of intervention favoured by theorists of positive 
freedom and welfare. However, this claim demands critical assessment, 
especially in the light of my suggestion that the interventionist 
state is not inconsistent with some of the arguments and values 
appealed to by Hayek.
IV.COERCION AND THE INTERVENTIONIST ORDER.
Despite the observed tension between Hayek's uncompromising 
political position and his maximising argument, he remains wedded to 
a 'dogmatic' “ defence of the non-interventionist order. He is 
committed to denying that coercion may legitimately be used by the 
state to provide for individuals or groups the things that his
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freedom is said to provide, the ends by which his order is justified.
The dogmatism of Hayek's political approach reflects his 
fundamental distinction (outlined in Chapter I) between freedom 
and power, or capability for action. The former refers solely 
to the choice process, whereas the latter, Hayek claims, refer 
to the range of options available to the individual. Any government 
action which involves cutting off individual choice, by dictating 
goals, issuing specific commands, creating 'common ends’, and so 
on, even if done for the purpose of widening individuals' options, 
is regarded by Hayek as illegitimate.
The question is raised: how valid is this crucial distinction 
which is the basis of the non-interventionist order? Do positive 
interventions intended to lift environmental restrictions on 
individual action necessarily deprive other individuals of their 
choosing capacities, as Hayek wants to suggest? Or do such state 
actions simply restrict options by redistributing resources?
Perhaps the distinction, drawn so sharply by Hayek and having such 
important political consequences, is not so marked as he believes. 
The collapse of the distinction would seemingly make legitimate 
certain positive state interventions which give effect to the 
individual choice process, and would then tend to undermine the 
negative definition of freedom appealed to by Hayek. He claims that 
widening the options of some individuals deprives others of 
their choosing capacity. Is such an assumption tenable?
Hayek admits that the victim of coercion still has a choice:
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it is the unpleasant option of doing the coercer’s will (not 
following his own) or of refusing to obey the coercer and accepting 
the consequences.“^  Thus even coercion is about ’choices’, as well 
as ’who chooses’. But the reason that coercion is evil is said to 
be that the individual’s own will is denied; the options are not 
important. So long as the individual determines the course of his 
own actions, things are legitimate.
Hayek objects in principle to state actions which determine
our choices. If positive interventions simply narrowed our range
of options, there could be no objection to them. But to delegitimise
government actions that are coercive - that make the individual's
mind up for him - while tolerating the right of employers to sack
employees is inconsistent, since the results of both actions are
the same. The individual is forced in both cases to take into
account the will of another in determining his own action. Hayek's
insistence that in a competitive market the sacked worker simply
has his options reduced seems to rest on an arbitrary distinction.
One may agree that the employer is not acting 'maliciously' to
34thwart the employee's life-pians. But, nevertheless, the effect
of the action is the same. Hence to distinguish between 'choosing' 
and 'choices' is perhaps not the only criterion for talking about 
coercion and life-plans. The results of an action are also relevant. 
With reference to the American libertarian, John Hospers, J.P. Sterba 
claims that
... libertarians are not similarly sensitive 
to the loss of liberty that occurs in the 
market place. When an employer decides to 
lay someone off, for e.xample, Hospers claims 
the employer is simply deciding against
8 1 .
c o n t in u in g  a v o lu n t a ry  exchange and n e t  
r e s t r i c t i n g  the  p e r s o n ’s l i b e r t y .  L ikewise ,
Hayek claims  t h a t  as long as workers  who 
are  l a i d  o f f  can f i n d  a l t e r n a t i v e  employ­
ment t h e i r  l i b e r t y  i s  no t  be ing  r e s t r i c t e d .
But how can r e q u i r i n g  a person  to  pay $500 
i n t o  a s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  program under  t h r e a t  
o f  g r e a t e r  f i n a n c i a l  lo s s  i n f r i n g e  upon a 
p e r s o n ' s  l i b e r t y  when r e q u i r i n g  a pe rson  
t o  t ake  a job pay ing  $500 l e s s  under  t h r e a t  
o f  g r e a t e r  f i n a n c i a l  lo s s  does n o t  i n f r i n g e  
upon th e  p e r s o n ’s l i b e r t y .  S u re ly  i t  would 
seem t h a t  i f  one r equ i rem en t  r e s t r i c t s _ a  
p e r s o n ’s l i b e r t y ,  the  o t h e r  w i l l  a l s o . * ^
Here the  p l a u s i b l e  c la im  i s  t h a t  government i n t e r f e r e n c e  with  the
p l a n s  o f  employers and c o r p o r a t i o n s  i s  l o g i c a l l y  on a p a r  w ith
the  economic o r d e r ' s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  wi th  th e  p l a n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .
The e f f e c t  o f  t h e  a c t i o n s  i s  t h e  same, y e t  t h e  former  i s  d i s a l lo w e d
w i th i n  Hayek’s o r d e r  whereas the  l a t t e r  i s  a c c e p t a b l e .  Why c a l l
one a c t i o n  ' c o e r c i o n '  and th e  o t h e r  ' a  l e g i t i m a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e
wi th  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  e x p e c t a t i o n s ' ?  Hayek h i m s e l f  claims t h a t :
[m]ost human aims can be ach ieved  only  
by a cha in  o f  connec ted  ac t ions  , dec ided  
upon as a c o h e re n t  whole and based  on 
t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e  f a c t s  w i l l  be 
what they a re  expec ted  to  be .  I t  i s  
b eca u se ,  and i n s o f a r  a s ,  we can p r e d i c t  
e v e n t s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  know p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  
t h a t  we can ach ieve  a ny th ing  . . .  But 
i f  t h e  f a c t s  which de te rm ine  our  p l a n s  
a re  under  the s o l e  c o n t r o l  o f  a n o t h e r ,  
our  a c t i o n s  w i l l  be s i m i l a r l y  c o n t r o l l e d .  D
Hence i f  ' l e g i t i m a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s '  a r e  t h e  c r i t e r i a  by which
freedom i s  to  be d e f in e d ,  perhaps  a c t i o n s  o t h e r  than  Hayekian
coerc ion  must be in c lu d e d  a l s o .  Here Hayek has  so widened h i s
d e f i n i t i o n  t h a t  i t  would i n c lu d e  i n s t a n c e s  such as t h a t  o f  the
sacked  employee.  The l a t t e r ' s  r e a s o n a b le  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a re  c u r t a i l e d ;
t h e  f a c t s  s u r ro u n d in g  h i s  d e c i s i o n s  a re  e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by
a n o th e r .  He would p r e f e r  n o t  t o  be s to o d  down; hence bo th  h i s
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choos ing  and h i s  cho ices  a re  a f f e c t e d .
Such examples i n t u i t i v e l y  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e s t r i c t i o n  as s e v e re  
a s ,  and o f  th e  same k ind ( in  terms o f  e f f e c t s )  as the  p o s i t i v e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n s  o f  government in  t h e  l i f e  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l .  This  
i l l u s t r a t e s  the  tenuous  n a t u r e  o f  H ayek 's d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
' c o e r c i o n '  and ' u n p l e a s a n t  o p t i o n s ' .  I t  dem ons t ra te s  t h a t  market  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  may be r e s t r i c t i v e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  in  s i m i l a r  
ways to  s t a t e  compuls ion,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  Hayek 's  c r u c i a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n  does no t  c a r r y  the  i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  government i n t e r ­
f e r e n c e  i s  u n iq u e ly  d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  and ch o ice .  His 
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  i f  governments do t h i s ,  th e y  p r e v e n t  the  i n d i v i d u a l  
from fo rm u la t in g  and p u r s u in g  g o a l s ,  i s  weakened by the  c o u n t e r c l a i m  
t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  a f r e e  market c o n t i n u a l l y  have the  same e f f e c t  
on o t h e r s .  Of c o u r s e ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  to  argue t h a t  employers (and 
employees) do no t  have th e  r i g h t  to  t e r m i n a t e  v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s ;  
i t  s imply s e r v e s  to q u e s t i o n  Hayek' s a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t o  r e s t r i c t  
o p t i o n s  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  w h i le  denying cho ice  i s  n o t ,  and to  d i s c o u n t  
the  uncompromising p o l i t i c a l  co n c lu s io n  t h a t  i s  s a id  to  fo l low  from 
t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .
These examples draw a t t e n t i o n  to  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  an i n t e r f e r e n c e  i s ,  I would a rgue ,  an im p o r ta n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
in  judg ing  i t s  l e g i t i m a c y .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  between coe rc ion  and 
n o n -c o e rc io n  i s  no t  th e  on ly  r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r  in  a s s e s s i n g  s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n s .  However, as I have argued ,  Hayek 's  dogmatic i n s i s t e n c e  
on the  e v i l  o f  c o e rc io n  de te rm ine s  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  and de n ie s  
the  im por tance o f  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  he i n s i s t s  on e l se w h e re .
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Hence t h e r e  a re  l e v e l s  o f  c o e r c io n ,  o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e .  Even 
though ever}’ d e n i a l  o f  o p t io n s  i s  a l s o  a d e t e rm in a n t  in  i n d i v i d u a l  
a c t i o n ,  no t  every  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i s  o f  equal  e f f e c t  o r  magnitude.
I t  would appea r  t h a t  the  sacked employee has had h i s  (perhaps)  
r e a s o n a b le  e x p e c t a t i o n s  den ied  in  a more s e r i o u s  sense  than 
someone who i s  t a xed  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  in o r d e r  t o  s u ppo r t  w e l f a r e  
payments to the  needy.  Hayek f a i l s  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  s e r i o u s  forms 
o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e  from n o n - s e r i o u s  forms in  h i s  d e s i r e  to  p r e s e r v e  
a t  a l l  c o s t s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between c o e rc io n  and th e  s imple d e n ia l  
o f  o p t i o n s . ^ '  That th e  market may deny the  choos ing  p ro c e s s  in  
s i g n i f i c a n t  ways i s  th u s  ig n o red .
Hayek’ s d i s t i n c t i o n ,  t h e n ,  between freedom and power i s  a
t r i v i a l  one in  many c a s e s .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  does n o t  s u p p o r t  h i s
c o n te n t io n  t h a t  ' c o e r c i v e '  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  which seeks  to  ex tend
power a t  th e  expense o f  freedom a re  i l l e g i t i m a t e  because  o f  the
d i s t i n c t i o n .  I t  s imply becomes a m a t t e r  o f  e x t e n d in g  th e  freedom
(or  power) o f  some a t  the  expense  o f  th e  freedom (or  power) o f
o t h e r s .  Thus such p o s i t i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  may be r eg a rd ed  as i n t e r f e r i n g
w i th  i n d i v i d u a l  o p t i o n s  as much as a c t u a l  c h o i c e s .  For example,
given th e  ' h i d d e n '  n a t u r e  o f  p r o g r e s s i v e  t a x a t i o n  (which i s  den ied
38by Hayek’s p o s i t i o n  ) ,  i t  i s  h i g h l y  q u e s t i o n a b l e  w hether  i t  
i t s e l f  should  be r e g a rd e d  as c o e rc iv e  in  any meaningful  s ense .
(Though any form o f  t a x a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  a t  l e a s t  th e  t h r e a t  o f  
c o e r c io n ) .  C l e a r l y ,  th e  s t a t e ’s en fo rc e d  t r a n s f e r  o f  wea l th  
b e n e f i t s  some a t  t h e  expense  o f  o thers  in an a t t e m p t  to  add to  the  
t o t a l  w e l f a r e .  But does such a t r a n s f e r  r e a l l y  fo rc e  pe r s o n s  to 
a c t  in  s p e c i f i c  ways by r e d u c in g  t h e i r  c ho ices  to  one? ( I t  i s  the
84.
39specificity of commands that is crucial for Hayek ), Arguably, 
the taxed individual remains free in the essential ordering of 
his life-plans. Some forms of state compulsion simply cannot be 
regarded as seriously as other forms of coercive interference. But 
Hayek' s dogmatic commitment to freedom ignores this.
To simply argue that the interventionist order is necessarily 
coercive (and therefore illegitimate) fails to take account of 
relevant distinctions. Who chooses is important as a test of 
freedom. Yet the effect of human actions in curtailing choices 
is often sufficiently similar to that of an actual denial of choice 
to make the distinction meaningless. And as this is crucial to 
Hayek's claim that positive intervention by the state in the life 
of the individual is to be excluded at all costs, the normative 
status of his political conclusion is not established.
The tension for Hayek between argument and position is not 
circumvented by appealing to the artificial distinction between 
freedom and power. The 'legitimate' interferences of the market 
are on a par with state intervention in the life of the individual, 
even though only the latter is defined by Hayek as coercive. Such 
examples collapse the distinction regarded by Hayek as the basis 
of his political order.
This has important implications for the force of Hayek's 
defence of the non-interventionist order to the extent that this 
is based on his inadequate and confused critique of the welfare 
state. My general argument questions the validity of Hayek's
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i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  the  s t a t e ' s  c o e rc iv e  power shou ld  n ev e r  be used 
to  i n t e r f e r e  with  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom in  p o s i t i v e ,  s p e c i f i c  ways.
I t  su g g e s t s  t h a t  by engaging in  such a c t i v i t i e s  as w e l f a r e  programmes, 
t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w e a l t h ,  job  c r e a t i o n  schemes,  s t a t e - s u b s i d i s e d  
e d u c a t io n ,  c o n t ro l  o f  wages and p r i c e s ,  th e  c u r t a i l m e n t  o f  unimpeded 
t r a d e ,  and o t h e r  forms o f  c e n t r a l i s e d  p la n n in g  and economic i n t e r ­
v e n t io n ,  and by f i n a n c in g  th e s e  schemes th rough  ' c o e r c i v e l y '  
c o l l e c t e d  and imposed g radua ted  t a x a t i o n ,  the  s t a t e  need no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
be r ega rded  as denying freedom in  the  way, and t o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
Hayek s u g g e s t s .  I f  ' l e g i t i m a t e '  a c t i o n s  in  th e  market which deny 
in d i v i d u a l  cho ice  a re  t o l e r a b l e ,  i t  fo l lows  t h a t  s t a t e  a c t i o n s  
which have s i m i l a r  e f f e c t s  must ,  on Hayekian grounds ,  a l s o  be 
t o l e r a t e d .
But does th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  deny the  b e n e f i t s  o f  
Hayekian freedom, even i f  i t s  a c t u a l  c u r t a i l m e n t  o f  freedom i s  
n o t  to  be r eg a rd ed  as i n s i d i o u s ?  The e a r l i e r  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  
Hayek' s  u t i l i t a r i a n  argument i s  n o t  shown to  be i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w ith  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  dem ons t ra te s  t h a t  Hayek has  no t  
shown the  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  to  be i l l e g i t i m a t e .  The b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom 
r e f e r r e d  to  in h i s  argument - the  promotion o f  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  - may wel l  no t  be n e g a t e d  by p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
t h a t  he c la ims a re  d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  freedom. I w i l l  now ex p lo re  the  
s p e c i f i c  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  c la im .
The e x p l i c i t  conem  o f  Hayek 's  argument i s  ' . . .  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  
a l a rg e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  p eo p le  should  reach  th e  goa ls  f o r  which 
they  are  s t r i v i n g  . . . ' . This  seems no t  t o  exc lude  an i n s t r u m e n t a l
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w e l f a r e  s t a t i s t  framework,  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  demand i t ,  d e s p i t e  Hayek' s 
argument t h a t  th e  i n t e r v e n  t i o n i s t  s t a t e  n e g a t e s  the  b e n e f i t s  
p rov ided  by freedom. S eve ra l  forms o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  
appeal  to  n o t i o n s  o f  p o s i t i v e  freedom in  which t h e  a t t a in m e n t  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  ends i s  r ega rded  as im p o r ta n t .  R e c i p i e n t s  o f  the  
b e n e f i t s  p rov ided  by th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a re  given 
p o s i t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  in  the  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e i r  g o a l s .  But a l though  
p r o t a g o n i s t s  o f  the  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  can appea l  t o  communitar ian ,  
even c o l l e c t i v i s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  they  need n o t  in  o r d e r  to  d e f e a t  
HayekTs arguments a g a i n s t  th e  e f f i c a c y  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  They can simply 
r e v e r t  t o  Hayek 's own appeal  to  the  im por tance  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
g o a l - a t t a i n m e n t .  I f  t h i s  i s  the  p r im ary  b e n e f i t  o f  freedom, the  
main reason  why we va lue  i t ,  as Hayek a r g u e s ,  then  he need no t  be 
w or r ied  by a p a r t i a l  s a c r i f i c e  o f  i t  and a genuine commitment 
to  such i n t e r v e n t i o n  as a movement towards  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y .
On t h i s  view, t h e  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  i s  s imply  a n o t h e r  (and perhaps  
a b e t t e r )  means o f  maximising i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The w e l f a r e  s t a t e ,  t h e n ,  can accommodate, and need no t  deny,
th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom. C ha r le s  T ay lo r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a s t e p  away
from the  p o l i t i c a l  i d e a l  o f  n e g a t iv e  freedom need n o t ,  c o n t ra
Hayek, imply a commitment t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v i s t  s t a t e .
The f i r s t  s t e p  from th e  Hobbesian d e f i n i t i o n  
to  a p o s i t i v e  n o t i o n ,  t o  a view o f  freedom 
as the  a b i l i t y  t o  f u l f i l  my p u r p o s e s ,  and 
as be ing  g r e a t e r  the  more s i g n i f i c a n t  the  
p u rp o s e s ,  i s  one we cannot  h e lp  t a k i n g .
Whether we must a l s o  take  th e  second s t e p ,  
to  a view o f  freedom which sees  i t  as 
r e a l i s a b l e  o r  f u l l y  r e a l i s a b l e  on ly  w i t h ­
in a c e r t a i n  form o f  s o c i e t y ,  and whether  
in  t a k in g  a s t e p  o f  t h i s  k in d  one i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  committed to  j u s t i f y i n g  the
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ex ce sse s  o f  t o t a l i t a r i a n  o p p re s s io n  in  the  
name o f  l i b e r t y ;  t h e se  a re  q u e s t i o n s  which 
must now be ad d re s s ed .  What i s  c e r t a i n  i s  
t h a t  they  cannot  s imply be evaded by a 
p h i l i s t i n e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  freedom which 
r e l e g a t e s  them by f i a t  to  the  limbo o f  
m e tap h y s ica l  p s e u d o - q u e s t i o n s .41
The impor tance  o f  T a y l o r ’s cl a im  i s  n o t  s imply  t h a t  n e g a t i v e
freedom i s  d e f i n i t i o n a l l y  in a d e q u a te ,  b u t  t h a t  a move beyond i t
t o  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  need n o t  imply t h e  abandonment o f
th e  i n d i v i d u a l l y  d e r iv e d  goa ls  and va lu e s  t h a t  a re  appea led  to
in  Hayek' s u t i l i t a r i a n  argument.  Nor does i t  e n t a i l  the  p u r s u i t
o f  some ’ common u l t i m a t e  p u r p o s e ’ . In t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  the  f a c i l e
e q u a t io n  o f  some o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p o s i t i v e  freedom with
the  commitment t o  c o l l e c t i v i s m  i s  q u i t e  m i s l e a d i n g .  There may be
some h i s t o r i c a l  grounds f o r  b e l i e v i n g  in  a s l i p p e r y  s lo p e  p r o g r e s s i o n
from t h e  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  t o  t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m  (Hayek c e r t i a n l y  adhere s
42t o  t h i s  view though he by no means e s t a b l i s h e s  i t  ) ,  b u t  t h e r e  
a re  no l o g i c a l  g rounds ,  u n l e s s  the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  goa ls  a re  p r e s c r i b e d  
by t h e  s t a t e .  Hayek’ s a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  any e x t e n s i o n  o f  s t a t e  c o e r c iv e  
power n e c e s s a r i l y  i n v o l v e s  c o l l e c t i v i s m ,  and a d e n i a l  o f  th e  b e n e f i t s  
o f  freedom i s  m is taken .  This  i s  a n o t h e r  im p o r t a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n  
ignored  by Hayek. By c l a im in g  t h a t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  n e c e s s i t a t e s  
c o l l e c t i v i s m ,  Hayek a t t e m p t s  to  argue that i n  such an o r d e r  the  
b e n e f i t s  p rov ided  by freedom are  w as ted .  But i n t e r v e n t i o n  need 
n o t  imply c o l l e c t i v i s m .
Hence th e  c la im  im p l ie d  by Hayek’s p o s i t i o n  - t h a t  th e  b e n e f i t s  
o f  freedom t h a t  acc rue  from market t r a n s a c t i o n ,  th e  m axim isa t ion  
o f  the  use  o f  d i s p e r s e d  knowledge and th e  m u tu a l ly  advantageous  
r e c i p r o c i t y  o f  v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t  which e n ab le  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  a t t a i n
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their goals and society to generate progress, are denied by positive 
state actions of a coercive nature - is nowhere established.
For example, the argument for academic freedom - that freedom
maximises progress through the interplay of competing ideas -
does not imply that positive encouragement (in the form of subsidies)
negates its benefits. Nor is it established that academic freedom
43alone is sufficient to ensure particular beneficial results.
By labelling all forms of intervention as constructivist, Hayek 
implies that the value of freedom is removed whenever state compulsion 
is involved. However, it is one thing to claim that taxation and 
redistribution are coercive; it is entirely different to assert 
that the individual and all that he values and can achieve is negated 
in some sense by such principles as equality of opportunity and 
the division of rewards according to merit or desert rather than 
choice.
In sum, Hayek claims that freedom demands the commitment to 
a non-interventionist order because of its benefits. He argues 
that positive state intervention necessarily denies individual freedom, 
thereby implying that the benefits freedom provides are also denied. 
These claims, however, are open to serious question. Hayek's view 
of freedom as non-coercion rests upon a tenuous distinction between 
’choosing’ and 'options’, an ignoring of relevant differences 
between the effects of different kinds of coercion, an assumption 
that all forms of state coercive interference are to be regarded 
as equally serious, and a facile reduction of all state intervention
to the level of collectivist determinations.
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It can be demonstrated that the coercive activities of the 
positively intervening order need not deny individual freedom in 
the sense of seriously restricting goal - formulation and pursuit.
Hayek does not demonstrate that the maximisation of goal-satisfaction 
and the interventionist state are inconsistent.
Hence neither Hayek's argument for freedom, his uncompromising 
commitment to non-coercion, nor his distinction between coercion 
and non-realisation of goals, demonstrates the necessity of the 
non-interventionist order. A certain amount of positive intervention, 
even if this involves compulsion, is tolerable, even desirable, 
on Hayek's own grounds. The tension between Hayek’s political 
conclusions, which involve an unjustifiably narrow commitment 
to non-coercion, and the flexibility implied, even demanded, by 
his instrumental justification of freedom, undermines the normative 
impact of his claim that compulsion cannot be justified in the 
fulfilment of individual goals.
V.HAYEK’S LIBERAL ORDER.
Despite Hayek’s insistence that compulsion to achieve a common 
hierarchy of ends is never justified, a closer examination of his 
own non-interventionist political order shows that it exhibits 
some coercive features, although these are designed to enhance 
freedom. But when these are analysed, it is apparent that there 
are some inconsistencies which further demand an admittance of state 
intervention. It may be argued, in general, that if some forms 
of coercion are justified in order to enhance freedom, then any
forms are potentially justifiable on the same grounds. For instance,
90.
Hayek admits the possibility of some taxation (provided that it is 
44proportional), he allows conscription, which clearly involves
the states giving specific commands to particular individuals,
and he denies strictly laissez-faire arguments by allowing extensive
45governmental service functions to compete in the market place.
He acknowledges that though such functions should never involve
monopoly nor restrict trade, they must be funded by coercively
46collected taxation which is necessarily redistributive.
If these activities allow, even demand state intervention, 
why does Hayek not also include more positive intervention in 
individual choice? His own argument that it is the compulsion 
involved in the interventionist order that makes it illegitimate 
is laid aside. Hayek claims that such interventions treat people 
differently, thereby infringing the rule of law which upholds 
freedom. But Hayek*s rule of law is itself restrictive of individual 
choice, despite his insistence to the contrary. His distinction 
between general rules which he claims are never coercive, and 
specific orders which are always coercive, can be shown to be 
greatly exaggerated. Perhaps general rules which treat everyone 
equally can still be coercive. And even treating people differently 
need not deny their freedom. Hence a close analysis of Hayek*s 
law-governed liberal order reveals contradictions which, taken 
with his utilitarian argument and the problems faced by his rigid 
adherence to freedom as non-coercion, fail to yield a coherent 
or cogent case for non-intervention.
Hayek's insistence on the rule of law and its necessary
corollary of a non-interventionist order rests upon the following 
claim:
[t]he conception of freedom under the law 
... rests on the contention that when we 
obey laws, in the sense of general abstract 
rules laid down irrespective of their 
application to us, we are not subject to 
another man's will and are therefore free.^7
But Hayek nevertheless admits that even general, abstract
rules, equally applicable to all, may constitute severe restrictions 
48on liberty’. De Crespigny points out that because the rules 
apply to everybody, Hayek thinks it unlikely that they
49will ever prohibit much that anybody may reasonably wish to do'.
Yet other critics are not so sanguine about Hayek's optimism.
For instance, Lionel Robbins is 'perplexed' by Hayek's claim 
that '... most such restrictions imposed on all...' are '... 
comparatively innocuous beside those likely to be imposed on 
s o m e ' I t  is not clear, on Hayek's account, how this distinction 
(between generality and specificity)is relevant to an individual's 
freedom. If the 'legitimate expectations' of an individual are 
controlled by another (the law-giver), his freedom is denied, 
even if the law-giver is also similarly constrained. It seems strange 
to argue that an individual's freedom is conditional upon whether 
some other individual's freedom is being infringed or not. If 
freedom is defined in terras of the effect of a promulgation on 
one's actions or expectations, then all laws clearly can be 
coercive. Hence to claim, as Hayek does, that the specific commands 
of the interventionist state are coercive and the general rules 
of his liberal order are not (because they are general), is
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quite misleading. And to argue, from this, that freedom is necessarily 
preserved in a non-interventionist order, and necessarily infringed 
by positive state intervention, does not follow. If all kinds of 
law can be seen to restrict freedom, then the fact that state action 
in the area of equality of opportunity is supported by laws which 
treat people differently need not worry the defender of freedom. 
Treating people the same is not a sufficient condition for freedom, 
and treating people differently is not a necessary condition of 
unfreedom.^
Hayek's distinction (which is unwarranted) is reflected in 
his view that proportional taxation is legitimate whereas graduated 
taxation is not. This is said to be because the former leaves 
individuals in the same relative position after tax as before, 
while the latter is necessarily redistributive. But what this 
difference has to do with individual freedom is unclear. At most, 
the greater losses of the rich are more restrictive of options 
than actual choice, since the poor are also 'dictated to' in their 
actions by the taxation. This case further calls into question 
Hayek's earlier distinction between freedom and capability for 
action.
He argues that '[cjoercion thus is bad because it prevents
a person from using his mental powers to the full and consequently
from making the greatest contribution that he is capable of to the 
5 9community'. " If Hayek uses this kind of reasoning to claim that 
progressive taxation is more harmful to initiative than simple 
proportional taxation, and that therefore it denies the benefits
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of freedom, must he not also conclude that any restrictive interference 
with an individual’s potential for contribution to society must 
be ameliorated if society is to gain? This line of reasoning tends 
to justify an interventionist order rather than prohibiting it.
Hence Hayek's distinction between general rules and differential 
laws, and his example of taxation which reflects this distinction, 
is neither supported by the imperative of freedom nor shown by 
the benefits of freedom. Treating people differently need not deny 
freedom; rather, it may be necessary 'in order that the individual 
may do the things most beneficial to society'. It seems that if 
one is committed to the view that taxation is legitimate (as Hayek 
is) , then to distinguish between proportional and progressive 
taxation as the basis for rejecting the interventionist order is 
not shown by Hayek to be warranted.
The demands of adhering to the rule of law, while superficially 
relevant to freedom as non-coercion, need not be taken to imply a 
rejection of positive state action. Hayekian law can be just as 
restrictive of choice as other laws. Thus whether or not state 
promulgations involve a common hierarchy of ends is not the sole 
criterion for judging freedom. To use compulsion in order to pursue 
state goals seems no more coercive than to do so with laws which 
restrict private goals. The argument that the rule of law is 
inconsistent with the interventionist order because of the former's 
generality and the latter's inequality does not establish that the 
interventionist order is illegitimate. Again, Hayek makes exaggerated 
distinctions in his attempt to delegitimise all forms of interventionist
state action.
Hayek's law-governed liberal order is perhaps more utilitarian 
than he admits, despite his stated commitment to individual autonomy 
rather than active goal-maximisation. This is not to say that his 
position on positive intervention by the state is not genuine; 
rather, it can be established that his allowance of various govern­
ment activities implies a commitment to an end-state and not simply 
to the model of unimpeded individual action adhered to by proponents 
of a strictly laissez-faire position. This allowance by Hayek of 
extensive government activity further supports the argument that 
a positive, intervening state may be quite acceptable despite 
Hayek's general insistence otherwise.
Laws, according to Hayek, provide additional information
to be taken into account by individuals in the ordering of their
actions. Hence, according to M.W. Wilhelm,
[l]iberals recognise that the state, while 
restrained from violating basic principles, 
must continually formulate laws and policies 
conducive to a liberal society.
And, as Scott Gordon argues, Hayek
... accepts the use of the power of the 
state, through taxation and ether means, 
for the provision of collective goods, 
the correction of externalities, the 
financing of education, a sys.tem of trans­
fer payments to assure that no one falls 
below a minimum standard of income ... 
licensure and certification, building 
codes, health, safety standards in the 
workplace, the prevention of private 
monopoly, and the prohibition of price 
discrimination. He does not wish to 
reject such governmental activities on 
principle . ..^4
These interventions, for Hayek, support the liberal order and 
provide additional opportunities for the indivdiual to maximise
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g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n . They r e q u i r e  a s t a t e  fa r - removed from a 'm i n i m a l ’ 
one ^  (as in  Nozick) and al low governments to  'become i n v o l v e d '  
in  the  l i f e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  Hayek r e g a rd s  such a c t i v i t i e s ,  b r o a d ly ,  
as the n o n -c o e rc iv e  s e r v ic e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  government.  He d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
them from th e  co e rc iv e  s t a t e  a c t i v i t y  o f  p u n i s h in g  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
co e rc io n .  The l a t t e r  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  the  only  t a s k  f o r  which the  
p o l i t i c a l  rea lm may use f o r c e .
By p r o v id i n g  ' a d d i t i o n a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ' ,  Hayek 's  n o n - c o e r c i v e  
government c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  im p e r a t i v e s  o f  h i s  u t i l i t a r i a n  
argument f o r  maximising g o a l - f u l f i l m e n t .  Yet t h i s  s t i l l  s i t s  
awkwardly wi th  h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  compulsion i s  wrong, and t h a t  
s t a t e  a c t i o n  should  n e v e r  p o s i t i v e l y  i n t e r v e n e  in  f r e e  market 
t r a n s a c t i o n s .  For Hayek admits  t h a t  T [i ] t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  th e  non- 
co e rc iv e  o r  p u r e l y  s e r v i c e  a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  government u n d e r t a k e s  
a re  u s u a l l y  f in an c ed  by c o e rc iv e  m eans ' .  This  very  u t i l i t a r i a n  
admiss ion seems to  s e r i o u s l y  compromise Hayek 's  p o s i t i o n  - bo th  
h i s  argument t h a t  the  r u l e  o f  law which governs the  l i b e r a l  o r d e r  
i s  n e v e r  c o e r c i v e ,  and h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  ( q u e s t i o n e d  by M arshall  
Cohen) on the  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  coe rc io n  as the  o p p o s i t e  
o f  freedom.
D esp i te  Hayek 's  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  on ly  government monopol ies  
i n f r i n g e  freedom, whereas the  s t a t e ' s  a c t i n g  as s imply  one o t h e r  
c o m p e t i t o r  i n  the  market  i s  l e g i t i m a t e ,  the  l i b e r a l  o r d e r  seems t o  
r e q u i r e  as s t a t e  f u n c t i o n s  c e r t a i n  s u p p o r t s  which in v o lv e  compulsion 
and which go beyond the  r e d u c t i o n  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  c o e r c io n .  I f  
s t a t e  coe rc io n  i s  a l lowed - i n  the  i n s t a n c e  o f  s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s
96.
which do not necessarily benefit all - why is it not also legitimate 
to engage in other areas (redistribution and welfare) which do 
not benefit all, but which seek to give meaning to the fulfilment 
of individual purposes in similar ways?
The service functions of government are coercive; in fact, 
they are also redistributive. Any taxation, even proportional, 
cannot avoid being so, for not everyone utilises services, and 
certainly not to the same extent. If governments can legislate 
on minimum wage levels and safety requirements for work, thereby 
restricting the freedom of employers, why should thaT not also 
have some voice in determining what is a ’fair’ wage?
If the state can order conscription - this would seem to be 
an enormous power over the life of the individual, perhaps the 
greatest means of depriving an otherwise uncoerced individual 
of his freedom - then why is a redistribution of wealth to be 
regarded as totally illegitimate. If defence of the country is 
sufficient to warrant coericon, is not poverty equally requiring 
of substantial state action?
Hayek acknowledges that there are good utilitarian reasons 
for sometimes denying individual freedom, yet he selectively ignores 
other areas which, on utilitarian grounds, would seem to demand 
similar intervention. Hayek claims that ’[t]he provision of ... 
services has long been a recognized field of public effort, and 
the right to share in them is an important part of the protected 
sphere of the individual'.^  This willingness to give content to
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an individual's freedom by state compulsion is inconsistent with 
Hayek1s refusal to grant the efficacy of redistributive goal- 
maximising policies in other areas. If the market is insufficient 
in one instance, it may be equally insufficient in others.
Hence Hayek's insistence on the legitimate service functions
of government creates additonal problems for his argument against
the interventionist order. His appeal to utility sits awkwardly
with his stated value of autonomy which, he claims, sets determinate
limits to the coercive role of government in the life of the
individual. However, Hayek insists that the coercion involved in
state service functions is legitimate because it is predictable,
and rests upon known rules. These do not conform to Hayek's dictum
that ' [t]he interference of the coercive power of government with
our lives is most disturbing when it is neither avoidable nor
predictable','" since such compulsion as that involved in taxation
and military service is scarcely avoidable. But Hayek, strangely,
takes the predictability of coercion to be a measure of freedom.
If the known necessity of paying a certain 
amount in taxes becomes the basis of all 
my plans, if a period of military service 
is a foreseeable part of my career, then 
I can follow a general plan of life of my 
own making and am as independent of the 
will of another person as men have learned 
to be in society. ®
But if non-redistributive coercion is legitimate because it is 
predictable, and therefore need not affect life-plans in fundamental 
ways, presumably many forms of positive state intervention are 
similarly harmless to our freedom. If we expect to pay progressive 
taxes which support even a massive welfare state, it would seem 
that, on Hayek's own argument, we can still be free. The predictability
9 8 .
o f  law a l lows an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  in  the  same way t h a t  i t  
a l lows government ' s  s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s .  H ayek ' s p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
s e r v i c e  fu n c t i o n s  and d u t i e s  a re  l e g i t i m a t e  while  p o s i t i v e  i n t e r ­
v e n t io n s  are n o t ,  because  o f  the  n a t u r e  and requ i re m en ts  o f  the  r u l e  
o f  law, c l e a r l y  f a i l s  in  i t s  o b j e c t i v e  o f  d i s m i s s i n g  t h e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e .  Hayek h i m s e l f  admits  t h a t  the  taxed  person  i s  
s t i l l  f r e e .
In sum, an exam ina t ion  o f  Hayek' s  l i b e r a l  o r d e r  r e v e a l s
f u r t h e r  t e n s i o n s  between c onc lu s ion  and argument,  d e f i n i t i o n  and
j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  The u t i l i t a r i a n  defence  o f  autonomy le ads  even
Hayek in  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  He abandons
the  minimal s t a t e  and t h e  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  o r d e r ,  because  they  f a i l
to  p ro v id e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  with  meaningful  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  o f  f u l f i l l i n g
goa ls  and a c h i e v in g  th e  b e n e f i t s  which freedom i s  s a i d  to  b r i n g .
Yet the  d i s t i n c t i o n s  he p r o v id e s  between l e g i t i m a t e  government
co e rc io n  f o r  th e se  p u rposes  and t h a t  which i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  - th e
59r u l e  o f  law i s  s a i d  to  be th e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  ju dg ing  t h i s  
do n o t  s e rve  to  d i sm iss  the  claims o f  th o s e  who argue t h a t  an 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  g ive meaning and 
c o n te n t  to  freedom.
This i s  the  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o f  Hayek 's  p o s i t i o n .  He demands 
autonomy f o r  the i n d i v i d u a l  and claims t h a t  a c t i n g  on c o n s t r a i n t s  
o t h e r  than coe rc io n  a re  in c o m p a t ib le  w i th  t h i s  end.  He then  j u s t i f i e s  
autonomy on the  grounds t h a t  i t  a c h iev es  b e n e f i t s .  But f i n a l l y  he 
admits  t h a t  t h e s e  goods a re  only  r e a l i s e d  i f  freedom i s  ' f i l l e d  
o u t '  by s t a t e  a c t i o n .  His u t i l i t a r i a n  argument f o r  a n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n
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position eventually demands a negation of his position. Yet his 
refusal to allow positive state action in the amelioration of 
other-than-coercive constraints upon action leads him to the 
contradictory position that the free society cannot fulfil its 
own requirements.
Hayek thus admits that the state can have a positive role 
to play in fulfilling individual goals. But the narrowness of 
his conclusions precludes the possibility of the state's acting 
in positive ways to help achieve this end. To do this would clearly 
require much more than the mere prevention of coercion in inter­
personal relations. It would require the kind of state action that 
Hayek (wrongly, I believe) claims would destroy autonomy. Hayek's 
dilemma is summed up by N.P. Barry.
Liberty is said to characterise voluntary, 
uncoerced actions of individuals such as 
exchange in an economic market ... yet 
the concept is also used to describe, 
favourably, a society that exhibits those 
very features. However,as a matter of 
logic, it is not necessarily the case 
that a liberal society, a society des­
cribed in terms of freely contracting 
individuals, will result from the free 
contracts of individuals. Individuals 
may very well freely agree to impose re­
straints upon themselves of a kind 
severe enough to warrant the outcome 
being called 'illiberal' even though 
each individual may regard himself as 
better off as a result of the prior 
exchanges.60
Hayek does appear committed to both autonomy (the ability to enter 
into free contracts) and to the benefits that he believes will 
accrue from it (goal-maximisation). The problem is, as I have argued, 
that autonomy does not automatically lead to the benefits that
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Hayek w an ts ,  n o r  i s  a r i g i d  p o l i t i c a l  commitment to  autonomy the  
only  way to  ach ieve  th e  b e n e f i t s .  Committ ing o n e s e l f  t o  a u t i l i t a r i a n  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  freedom i s  q u i t e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  a d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  i t  as n o n -c o e rc io n .  An exam ina t ion  o f  H ayek 's l i b e r a l  o r d e r  s e r v e s  
to h i g h l i g h t  t h i s  problem.
V I .SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
In t h i s  c h a p t e r  I have a t tem p ted  to  o u t l i n e ,  c h a r a c t e r i s e  and 
a s s e s s  Hayek's  argument f o r  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  This  
o r d e r ' s  c h i e f  f e a t u r e s  a re  i t s  commitment to  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom 
in  a d i s t i n c t i v e  sense  and i t s  use o f  coe rc ion  e x c l u s i v e l y  in  th e  
a r e a  o f  p r e v e n t i n g  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  c o e r c io n .  The l e g i t i m a t e  p o l i t i c a l  
o r d e r  need n o t  h e lp  i n d i v i d u a l s  to  a t t a i n  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n ,  and 
i t  must n o t  use compulsion to  ach ieve  t h i s  end.  The va lue  o f  autonomy 
d i c t a t e s  the  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t e  in  t h i s  a rea .
Hayek's  c h i e f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  freedom as a p o l i t i c a l  va lu e  
l i e s  in  h i s  d e s i r e  to  maximise th e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  acc rue  from a spon­
taneous  s o c i e t y .  (His d i s c o v e ry  o f  t h a t  s p o n t a n e i t y  i s  a d i s t i n c t  
c la im  which a l s o  s e rv e s  as an argument f o r  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r .  This  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  in  C hap te r  6 . )
Hayek's  argument f o r  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom i s ,  I s u g g e s t ,  
genu ine ly  u t i l i t a r i a n .  I t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  the  p e r c e i v e d  l i k e l i h o o d  
t h a t  as many i n d i v i d u a l s  as p o s s i b l e  w i l l  a t t a i n  t h e i r  g o a l s .
This  k ind  o f  argument s i t s  awkwardly w i th  Hayek' s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  
coerc ion  a lone i s  t o  be e l i m i n a t e d .  I f  th e  end r e q u i r e d  i s  g o a l -  
m ax im isa t ion ,  i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  to  argue  t h a t  c o n s t r a i n t s  upon
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i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  o t h e r  than  c o e rc io n  need to  be addressed  by the  
s t a t e .  Hence t h e r e  i s  a t e n s i o n  in  H ayek ' s though t  between h i s  
s t a t e d  p o s i t i o n  and th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  n a t u r e  o f  h i s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
i t .  U t i l i t y  im p l ie s  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and may w el l  be c o n s i s t e n t  
with  c e r t a i n  k inds  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Hayek c e r t a i n l y  does no t  
show the  c o n t r a r y .
Yet he makes c e r t a i n  c la ims about  coe rc io n  which a re  s a i d  to  
deny the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s in g  s t a t e  compulsion t o  ach ieve  th e s e  
u t i l i t a r i a n  ends .  Here he d i r e c t l y  c o n f r o n t s  th o s e  who c la im  s t a t e  
coe rc io n  i s  e n t i r e l y  l e g i t i m a t e  in  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  aims.
He argues  t h a t  coe rc io n  d en ie s  the  i n d i v i d u a l  h i s  choosing c a p a c i t y .
He makes th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between freedom and c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a c t i o n  
and argues  t h a t  a p o l i t i c a l  d i c t a t i o n  o f  ends i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  with  
f r e e  cho ice .  Yet he f a i l s  to  acknowledge s u f f i c i e n t l y  t h a t  some 
forms o f  coe rc io n  are  more s e r i o u s  than  o t h e r s ,  and t h a t  c e r t a i n  
c o n s t r a i n t s  in  t h e  market  have e x a c t l y  the  same e f f e c t  on choice  
as those  den ied  to  t h e  s t a t e .  Thus the  w eigh t  a t t a c h e d  to  th e  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  between freedom and c a p a b i l i t y  i s  too  g r e a t .  Coercion both  
d e n ie s  cho ice and reduces  o p t i o n s ,  y e t  i t s  c h i e f  e f f e c t  on i n d i v i d u a l  
a c t i o n  i s  th e  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  g o a l - a t t a i n m e n t .  Hayek' s n e g a t i v e  view 
o f  freedom does no t  t ake  s u f f i c i e n t  account  o f  t h i s .  I f  the market  
i s  al lowed  to d i c t a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  c h o i c e s ,  why i s  s t a t e  coe rc io n  
[which r e a l l y  r e s t r i c t s  o p t i o n s  r a t h e r  than  p r e v e n t i n g  th e  p u r s u i t  
o f  goa ls )  to  be r ega rded  as i l l e g i t i m a t e ?
Thus the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  n o t  shown by Hayek to  imply 
a s ev e re  c u r t a i l m e n t  o f  freedom, d e s p i t e  i t s  compulsory p r e s c r i p t i o n s .
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Nor does i t  n e c e s s a r i l y  deny th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom i n  the  maxi­
m isa t io n  o f  d i s p e r s e d  knowledge.  Hayek does n o t  show t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
forms o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  do n o t  s a t i s f y  the  u t i l i t a r i a n  reason  f o r  
wanting  freedom. On the  other  hand,  th e  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e ' s  n e g a t io n  
o f  the  b e n e f i t s  i s  n o t  so c l e a r l y  e s t a b l i s h e d .  By red u c in g  a l l  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  to  the  l e v e l  o f  c o l l e c t i v i s m ,  Hayek ig n o re s  t h i s  f a c t .
He f a l s e l y  claims  t h a t  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  n e c e s s a r i l y  d e n ie s  
i n d i v i d u a l  v a lu e s .  I t  i s  a rguab le  t h a t  such an o r d e r  cou ld  be j u s t i f i e d  
because  i t  would seek t o  promote the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom, a l b e i t  
a c t i v e l y  and through a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s .
However, a c lo se  a n a l y s i s  o f  Hayek's  l i b e r a l  o r d e r  r e v e a l s  
f u r t h e r  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  which s e t  a s id e  the  argument t h a t  r e d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  freedom. Hayek's  u t i l i t y  argument 
i n c l i n e s  him to  al low v a r io u s  n o n -c o e rc iv e  s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  
government.  These ,  he c l a im s ,  r e f l e c t  the  r u l e  o f  law, whereas the  
use o f  c e rc io n  to en fo rc e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  t r e a t s  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
d i f f e r e n t l y ,  and the re by  b re a c h e s  the  r u l e  o f  law. But t h i s  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  too c o l l a p s e s .  There i s  no n e c e s s a r y  nexus between Hayekian 
law and freedom, s i n c e  a l l  laws d i c t a t e  c h o ic e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Hayek 's  
s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s  a re  c o e r c i v e .  Moreover,  they  a re  a l s o  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e .
By c la im ing  t h a t  i f  r u l e s  a re  gene ra l  and p r e d i c t a b l e ,  though r e s t r i c t i v e ,  
t h e i r  wors t  f e a t u r e s  a re  avo ided .  Hayek e f f e c t i v e l y  admits  t h a t  h i s  
own p r e f e r r e d  o rd e r  i s  n o t  the  only  one c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  freedom.
The h e a v i ly  ta x ed  man need n o t  t h e r e f o r e  c o n s i d e r  h i m s e l f  ' u n f r e e '  
s i n c e  h i s  c a p a c i t y  to  choose s t i l l  e x i s t s ,  though he i s  coerced  
by the  s t a t e .  I t  i s  a dubious c la im  t h a t  e q u a l l y  a p p l i e d  co e rc io n  
i s  l e s s  i n s i d i o u s  than  co e rc io n  which t r e a t s  peo p le  d i f f e r e n t l y .
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E i t h e r  might be a r e s t r a i n t  on - a d im in u t io n  o f  - freedom.
That Hayek’ s o r d e r  i s  i t s e l f  c o e rc iv e  admits  a d e s i r e  to  
maximise b e n e f i t s  in h i s  p o s i t i o n  as well  as h i s  argument.  This  
r e v e a l s  th e  u l t i m a t e  t e n s i o n  between the  e s s e n t i a l l y  competing 
demands o f  autonomy and end -m a x im isa t io n .  A u t i l i t a r i a n  argument 
f o r  freedom seems to  demand t h a t  some freedom may be s a c r i f i c e d  
i n  the  p u r s u i t  o f  numerous and v a r i e d  i n d i v i d u a l  ends.  Hayek*s 
argument,  in  s h o r t ,  does n o t  s u p p o r t  on ly  h i s  own p o l i t i c a l  
c o n c l u s i o n s . l t  su g g e s t s  a much w ider  concern  than  simply  n e g a t i v e  
freedom, and le aves  open the  q u e s t i o n  o f  the  b e s t  means o f  a c h i e v in g  
g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n .  By f a i l i n g  t o  j u s t i f y  h i s  uncompromisingly 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p o s i t i o n  o f  m in im is ing  coe rc io n  o n ly ,  Hayek’ s argument 
does n o t  r e f u t e  th e  c la im  made on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  t h a t  goa l -m ax im isa t io n  r e q u i r e s  p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n  and t h a t  
t h i s  a c t i o n  should  be r e g a rd e d  as l e g i t i m a t e .  In o t h e r  words,  
t h a t  Hayek's  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  argument can be used  (w i thou t  too much 
d i s t o r t i o n )  to  r e n d e r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n s  f a r  d i f f e r e n t  from 
h i s  own e i t h e r  g r e a t l y  reduces  th e  impact  o f  h i s  argument o r  
q u e s t i o n s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n s .
N o z ick ' s  p r i n c i p a l  argument,  i t  w i l l  be s e e n ,  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t ,  
and hence r a i s e s  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  q u e s t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  the  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip  between p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  This  w i l l  be the  
s u b j e c t  o f  th e  fo l l o w in g  c h a p t e r .
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CHAPTER 5 . NOZICK’S ARGUMENT FOR THE NON-INTERVENTIONIST ORDER:
THE NATURE OF MAN.
1 - INTRODUCTION.
Chapters  I and 2 e s t a b l i s h e d ,  c l e a r l y  the  dominance o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
r i g h t s  in Nozick’s though t  and t h e i r  im por tance  as c r i t e r i a  f o r  
l e g i t i m i s i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a r rangem en ts .  In C hap te r  3 i t  was seen 
t h a t  t h e se  a b s o l u t e ,  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  a re  r e g a rd e d  by Nozick as 
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  j u s t i c e .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  N oz ick ’s p o s i t i o n  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  th e o ry  i s  
t h a t  h i s  r i g h t s  can,  a l l e g e d l y ,  only  l e ad  t o  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r ,  committed to  uphold ing  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s  and i n d i v i d u a l  
e n t i t l e m e n t s  a t  th e  expense o f  w e l f a r e  and g u a ran teed  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
The l a t t e r  ’u t o p i a n ’ aims a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  exc luded  by th e  d i c t a t e s  
o f  n a t u r a l  r i g h t s .  Whether t h i s  co n c lu s io n  i s  j u s t i f i e d  by N oz ick ' s  
s u p p o r t iv e  arguments i s  the  s u b j e c t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  N o z ick ' s  two 
p r i n c i p a l  c o n t e n t io n s  t h a t  are o f  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a re  t h a t  
f i r s t l y ,  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f r i n g e s  r i g h t s ,  
and must t h e r e f o r e  be r e j e c t e d ;  and se c o n d ly ,  t h a t  th e  n e g a t i v e  
r i g h t s  a g a i n s t  o t h e r s  a re  the  only  r i g h t s  t h a t  we p o s s e s s .  These 
a s s e r t i o n s  w i l l  be c r i t i c a l l y  a s s e s s e d  and th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
p o s i t i o n  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  examined.
Hence the  p r i n c i p a l  concerns  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  (as in  the  case  
o f  the  p rev io u s  ch a p te r )  a re  what R.G. Wright has  c a l l e d  ’ i n t e r n a l  
c r i t i c i s m s ’ .^ They p e r t a i n  t o  m a t t e r s  o f  i n t e r n a l  l o g i c ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  
o f  premises  and c o n c l u s i o n s ,  adherence  to  s t a t e d  v a l u e s ,  and the
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r e l a t i o n s h i p  between d e f i n i t i o n  and argument.  They do no t  d i r e c t l y  
q u e s t i o n  e i t h e r  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  p rem ises  o r  the  gene ra l  a c c e p t a ­
b i l i t y  o f  th e  c o n c l u s i o n s .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  r a t h e r  whe ther  N ozick ’ s 
ex p re s s e d  reason  f o r  uphold ing  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  y i e l d s  only a 
s t a t e  whose a c t i v i t i e s  a re  so s e v e r e l y  c u r t a i l e d .
I argued  t h a t  Hayek p r i z e s  i n d i v i d u a l  autonomy o f  a c t i o n  as 
an i n s t r u m e n t a l  va lue  t h a t  i s  s a i d  to  maximise u t i l i t y .  The i n h e r e n t  
t e n s i o n  in  h i s  argument between i n d i v i d u a l i t y  and the  im p e ra t iv e  
o f  g o a l - f u l f i I m e n t  i s  e x p re s s e d  in  h i s  l i b e r a l  o r d e r ,  which seeks  
bo th  to  gua ran tee  autonomy and a t  the  same t ime p ro v id e  b e n e f i t s  
( the  s e r v i c e  f u n c t io n s  o f  government) ,  p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  
t r e a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  e q u a l l y .
Nozick,  on the  o t h e r  hand,  does no t  t a l k  o f  s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s  
at  a l l .  He d o e s n ’t  e n t e r  th e  debate  w i th  Hayek as to  whether  t h e r e  
i s  a meaningful  d i s t i n c t i o n  between such supposed ly  n o n -c o e rc i v e  
a c t i v i t i e s  and the  s t r i c t l y  c o e rc iv e  r o l e  o f  the  s t a t e .  For Nozick,  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  has on ly  one f u n c t i o n ,  th e  p r e v e n t io n  and p u n i s h ­
ment o f  f o r c e ,  t h e f t ,  f r a u d  and b reac h es  o f  c o n t r a c t .  Any a c t i v i t i e s  
beyond th e s e  are  s a i d  t o  be i l l e g i t i m a t e .
For Nozick i s  s t r i c t l y  a n t i - u t i l i t a r i a n ,  bo th  in  p o s i t i o n  and
2argument.  He does no t  even al low f o r  a ’u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  o f  r i g h t s ' . “
This i s  because  N o z ick ' s  r i g h t s  a re  a b s o l u t e ,  n o t  prima f a c i e ;  
th e y  may n ev e r  be s a c r i f i c e d  f o r  any reason  p e r t a i n i n g  to  a c o l l e c t i v e  
good. N oz ick ' s  commitment t o  a r i g h t s - b a s e d  p o s i t i o n  i s  uncompromising.  
As L.P.  and J .G .  F r a n c i s  p o i n t  o u t ,  such r i g h t s  a re  i n f l e x i b l e .
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. . .  r i g h t s  a r e  moral p r o p e r t i e s  one can 
' j u s t  h a v e ' ,  whether  one needs them, d ese rves  
them o r  they  p la y  an im p o r tan t  r o l e  in  o n e ' s  
l i f e  . . .  The s t a n d a r d  reason  f o r  t a k in g  
r i g h t s  to  be prima f a c i e  i s  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  
f o r  any r i g h t  t h e r e  may be o t h e r  moral 
c la ims o f  equal  o r  g r e a t e r  im por tance ,  so 
t h a t  in  some cases  th e  r i g h t  w i l l  no t  be 
m ora l ly  d e t e r m in a t iv e  . . .  Nozick avoids  the  
need to  make r i g h t s  prima f a c i e  by c la im ing  
t h a t  r i g h t s  cannot  c o n f l i c t  w i th  o t h e r  
r i g h t s ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no o t h e r  moral 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  im por tan t  enough t o  o v e r r i d e  
r i g h t s  which c o n f l i c t  w i th  them.^
Nozick den ies  t h a t  r i g h t s  may be only  p a r t i  a l l y  im p o r tan t  f o r
moral ,  and t h e r e f o r e  p o l i t i c a l  judgements .  Like H ayek ' s ,  h i s  p o s i t i o n
does n o t ,  and cannot  al low f o r  b a l a n c i n g ,  compromise,  and t r a d e - o f f s
between p r i n c i p l e s .
Although u t i l i t a r i a n  p o l i t i c a l  arguments may be e q u a l l y  un­
compromising, they  can env isage  some s a c r i f i c i n g  o f  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  
a g r e a t e r  good. This i s  a l t o g e t h e r  im p o ss ib l e  in  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o rd e r .  As N.P. Barry n o t e s ,
[a] contemporary,  and p o p u la r  approach to  
p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo so p h y  ho lds  t h a t  in  m a t t e r s  
o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  t r a d e - o f f s  can be made 
between p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h a t  marg ina l  amounts 
o f  l i b e r t y  may be given up f o r  marg ina l  
i n c r e a s e s  in  e q u a l i t y .  This  i s  p r e c l u d e d  
by Hayek's  [and a l s o  by N oz ick ' s ]  system; 
t h e  commitment to  l i b e r t y  must be d o g m a t i c . . . 4
The im por tan t  p o i n t  h e r e  i s  no t  w hether  dogmatic t h e o r i e s  o f  p o l i t i c s
a r e  j u s t i f i e d  or  n o t ,  b u t  whe ther  th e  ' d o g m a t ic '  co n c lu s io n  reached
by Nozick - t h e  a b s o lu t e  dominance o f  r i g h t s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  -
i s  j u s t i f i e d  by h i s  s u p p o r t i v e  c l a im s .
th e
N oz ick ' s  argument,  t h e n ,  appea ls  to  the  ' r i g h t *  r a t h e r  than  
' g o o d ' .  N oz ick ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  u t o p i a ,  in  which many d i f f e r e n t
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communit ies  a r i s e  out  o f  the  f r e e  c o n t r a c t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  he i s  p l e a s e d  a t  th e  thought o f  d i v e r s i t y  and uncoerced  goa l -  
f u l f i l m e n t .  U top ia ,  th e n ,  i s  ' . . .  i n s p i r i n g  as well  as r i g h t ' . ^
However, i t  would be m i s l e a d in g  to  argue t h a t  Nozick i s  the re by  
committed to a p a r t i c u l a r  e n d - s t a t e ,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  h i s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  r i g h t s - e n f o r c e m e n t  i s ,  l i k e  H ayek 's ,  i n s t r u m e n t a l .  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  
t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  r i g h t s - e n f o r c e m e n t  a re  an addendum to  N ozick ' s  
argument;  th ey  are  no t  c e n t r a l  to  i t ,  even n e c e s s a r y  f o r  i t .  That 
N oz ick ' s  u t o p i a  i s  ' i n s p i r i n g '  i s  c o i n c i d e n t a l .  He would s t i l l  
appea l  to  r i g h t s  i f  they  were no t  ' i n s p i r i n g ' .  To s u gges t  t h a t  
Nozick a ppea ls  to  ' t h e  good'  would be a s u p e r f i c i a l  r e a d in g  o f  
h i s  argument.  Autonomy i s  no t  p r i z e d  by Nozick as a means to  an 
end;  he does n o t  seek to  b u t t r e s s  h i s  argument by a p p ea l in g  to  
b e n e f i t s .  His p r o p o s i t i o n ,  s im p ly ,  i s  t h a t  r i g h t s - i n f r i n g e m e n t  i s  
wrong, whatever  th e  consequences.
Hence N oz ick 's  argument a p p a r e n t l y  avo ids  the  t e n s i o n  in  Hayek 
between u t i l i t y  and autonomy. T h e i r  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments a re  
q u i t e  d i s s i m i l a r ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n c l u s i o n s .  But does N o z ick ' s  argument p r o v id e  suppo r t  f o r  h i s  
ax io m a t i c  p o s i t i o n ?
I w i l l  argue  in t h i s  c h a p t e r  t h a t  Nozick d e r i v e s  h i s  view o f  
r i g h t s  from a p a r t i c u l a r  concep t ion  o f  human n a t u r e .  In o t h e r  words,  
coe rc io n  by th e  s t a t e  i s  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  b eca use  man i s  l i k e  ' x ' .
Nozick h e re  i s  f i r m ly  p la c e d  in th e  n a t u r a l  r i g h t s  t r a d i t i o n  in  
which n a t u r e , n o t  custom, t r a d i t i o n  n o r  u t i l i t y ,  de te rm ines  th e  shape
o f  th e  j u s t  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .  On t h i s  view, r i g h t s  shou ld  be uphe ld
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because  p e rsons  qua pe r s o n s  deserve  r e s p e c t .  According to  Nozick,  
on ly  an un trammelled i n d i v i d u a l i s m  ta k e s  s u f f i c i e n t  account  o f  
the  fundamental  d i c t a t e s  o f  human n a t u r e .  His s i d e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
p r o h i b i t i n g  a g g re s s io n ,  h i s  b e l i e f  i n  the  u l t i m a t e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  
v o lu n t a r y  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  and h i s  commitment to  R o th b a rd ’s n o t i o n
o f  s e l f - o w n e r s h i p ,  a l l  r e f l e c t  a concern f o r  human d i g n i t y .  The
♦
sources  o f  t h i s  d i g n i t y  a r e ,  on Nozick’s v iew, to  be found in  
man’s s e p a r a t e n e s s  and moral agency,  h i s  r a t i o n a l i t y  and s t r i v i n g  
f o r  ’meaningful l i f e ' ,  and in  th e  i m p e r a t i v e s  o f  Kant ian e t h i c s .
In p u t t i n g  forward t h i s  d e o n t o lo g ic a l  a rgument ,  Nozick c la ims t h a t  
compulsion as such i s  i n d e f e n s i b l e .  Hence any s t a t e  a c t i v i t y  beyond 
th e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  r i g h t s  i s  a l s o  wrong, s imply  because  i t  i s  immoral 
to  coerce  p eop le .  For Nozick,  t h e  e n d - r e s u l t s  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  
a c t i o n ,  even i f  they  a re  d e t r i m e n t a l  to  ( o t h e r  co n ce p t io n s  of)  
human d i g n i t y ,  a re  no t  to  be ta ken  i n t o  account  in  t h e  j u s t  o r d e r  
o f  t h e  minimal s t a t e .
However, N ozick ' s  argument from man’s n a t u r e  r a i s e s  s e v e r a l  
c r i t i c a l  problems.  Why need human d i g n i t y  y i e l d  on ly  n e g a t i v e  
r i g h t s ?  Cannot ' r e s p e c t i n g  p e r s o n s '  a l s o  in v o lv e  r e s p e c t i n g  t h e i r  
needs  and n o t  j u s t  the  p r o p e r t y  they  have? Even i f  i t  i s  wrong to  
coerce  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a re  t h e r e  n o t  o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  i t  i s  a l s o  
wrong to  do to  them? I w i l l  q u e s t i o n  w he the r  Nozick a c t u a l l y  dem ons t ra te s  
t h a t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  s e p a r a t e n e s s ,  mean ingful  l i f e  
and Kantian e t h i c s  cannot  be a m o r a l i t y  t h a t  goes beyond th e  co n f in e s  
o f  h i s  n o t i o n  o f  autonomy. Such a m o r a l i t y  would c l e a r l y  al low f o r  
p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  which seeks  to  g ive  e f f e c t  and meaning 
to  t h e  v a lues  o f  the  g o a l - o r i e n t e d  i n d i v i d u a l .  On the  o t h e r  hand ,
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i t  may be argued t h a t  N o z ick ' s  r i g h t s  a re  n o t  ab le  to  g u a ran tee  
t h e s e  t h i n g s .
T h is ,  in  t u r n ,  r a i s e s  th e  q u e s t i o n  w hether  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( t a x a t i o n ,  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  and 
w e l f a r e  measures)  r e a l l y  den ies  the  t h i n g s  Nozick argues  i t  does ,  
o r  w hether  i t  s imply i n f r i n g e s  (by d e f i n i t i o n )  N oz ick ’ s own narrowly  
conce ived  r i g h t s .  I f  N oz ick ’s j u s t i f i c a t o r y  argument i s  to  be taken 
s e r i o u s l y  (some c r i t i c s  have s u g g e s te d  t h a t  Nozick n e v e r  j u s t i f i e s  
h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  concep t ion  o f  r i g h t s  b u t  s im ply  assumes i t ^ ) , then 
the  q u e s t i o n  how, e x a c t l y ,  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  den ies  human 
d i g n i t y ,  i s  i t s e l f  a s e r i o u s  prob lem. Hence, a l though  t a x a t i o n  
may be p l a u s i b l y  s a i d  t o  i n f r i n g e  Nozickean r i g h t s ,  i t  i s  an 
a l t o g e th e r  d i f f e r e n t  c la im  t h a t  t a x a t i o n  de n ie s  ’ i n d i v i d u a l i t y ’ in  
any meaningful  sense  o f  t h a t  te rm. I w i l l  examine the  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
o f  N oz ick ' s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  f o r  example,  t h a t  t a x a t i o n  impinges upon 
moral agency in  th e  same way as f o r c e d  l a b o u r  would.  I t  w i l l  be 
argued t h a t  perhaps  a l s o  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  r i g h t s - i n f r i n g e m e n t  
upon the  i n d i v i d u a l ’s l i f e - p l a n s  should  be taken  i n t o  account  in 
d e te rm in in g  th e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  a c t i o n .
I t  w i l l  be q u e s t i o n e d  whether N ozick’ s n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  and h i s  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  c o n c lu s io n s  t a k e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s e r i o u s l y  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  h i s  own p r e m i s e s ,  and w he the r  inde ed ,  N oz ick ' s  
i n d i v i d u a l i s m  i s  i t s e l f  j u s t i f i e d  by h i s  a rguments .  In t h i s  c h a p t e r ,
I w i l l  a l s o  a n a ly se  th e  r o l e  t h a t  N o z ick ' s  v a r i o u s  examples - 
i n c l u d i n g  th o se  o f  th e  m a r r i a g e - p a r t n e r s ,  W i l t  Chamber la in ,  and the  
worker  v e r sus  the  o w n e r - o f - c a p i t a l  - p l a y  in  h i s  a rgument ,  and w hether
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they substantiate his conclusions.
Nozick, like Hayek, uses two levels of argument. These, are 
firstly, the specifically moral premises he appeals to to delegitimise 
the interventionist state, and secondly, his more general claims 
about the nature of society, which do not appeal to the rights of 
persons, but which are said also to support his political conclusions. 
These are very similar to Hayek's assumptions which suggest that 
arguments for the interventionist order are based on fallacious 
premises regarding the possibility of collective goods. They will 
be assessed as a shared individualism in the final chapter.
11.NOZICK *S ARGUMENT STATED.
Being concerned with the means by which individuals are con­
strained in the pursuit of their ends, Nozick's deontological 
argument refers exclusively to the specific nature of coercion and 
of rights-infringement. Individual rights are, essentially, moral
claims against others. They are, as David Lyons points out, for
7Nozick, the sum total of morality.
All political considerations are reducible to Nozickean rights, 
according to this ethical theory. The justice of a situation, as 
I argued in Chapter 3, depends entirely on how it came about, not 
on its outcome. Justice, rights and morality concern only the processes 
of human actions.
The importance of Nozick's conclusions is clear for both ethics 
and political theory - what the state may not do to individuals
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derives from an understanding of what individuals may not do to 
other individuals, and why. When Nozick condemns the state for being 
coercive he is applying to it the same moral categories as he would 
apply to individual persons.
For Nozick, there is something peculiarly ’human’ about 
individuals. This necessitates treatment of them in a way which 
takes into consideration (in an absolute sense) their rights, 
and which prescribes certain constraints on our actions towards 
other individuals. There is something special about man qua man 
such that his rights are natural, moral and absolute.
This view of man is, above all, individualistic. Nozick 
suggests that the ’... moral side constraints upon what we mayg
do, I claim reflect the fact of our separate existences'. Man,
for Nozick, is above all an individual; moreover, he is capable
of rational choice, that is of '... using abstract concepts, not
9tied to responses to immediate stimuli ...’. But Nozick questions
the sufficiency of the simple fact of 'separateness' as a justification
of rights-enforcement. He poses the questions:
[i]f a being is capable of choosing autono­
mously among alternatives, is. there some 
reason to let it do so? Are autonomous 
choices intrinsically good? If a being 
could make only once an autonomous choice, 
say between flavours of ice-cream on a 
particular occasion, and would forget 
immediately afterwards, would there be 
strong reasons to allow it to choose?^
Nozick's conception of man is not simply one of separate individuals,
not even of separate, rationally choosing individuals. His view
of man is that of '... a being able to formulate long-term plans
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f o r  i t s  l i f e ,  ab le  to  c o n s id e r  and dec ide  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a b s t r a c t  
p r i n c i p l e s  o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i t  fo rm u la te s  t o  i t s e l f  . For
Nozick, an o v e r a l l  concep t ion  o f  l i f e  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  d i s t i n c t  
from such s p e c i f i c  human c h a r a c t e r  t r a i t s  as s e p a r a t e n e s s  and 
r a t i o n a l i t y .
Such an o v e r a l l  c o n c e p t io n ,  and knowing 
how we are  doing in  terms o f  i t ,  i s  
im por tan t  to  the  k ind  o f  goa ls  we formu­
l a t e  f o r  o u r s e l v e s  and th e  k in d  o f  
be ings  we a r e . ^
Nozickean man i s  c l e a r l y  g o a l - d i r e c t e d .  The im p o r ta n c e ,  in  terms
o f  r i g h t s - e n f o r c e m e n t  by the  s t a t e ,  o f  man's  a b i l i t y  to fo rm u la te
l i f e - p l a n s  i s  r e l a t e d  to  N o z ic k ' s  concept  o f  th e  'meaning o f  l i f e ' ;
' . . .  only a be ing  wi th  th e  c a p a c i t y  to  so shape h i s  l i f e  can have
13o r  s t r i v e  f o r  meaningful  l i f e ' .
Hence man's n a t u r e ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  h i s  i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  r a t i o n a l !
and a b i l i t y  to  fo rm ula te  goa ls  which have meaning on ly  f o r  him,
c o n s t i t u t e  f o r  Nozick s u f f i c i e n t  reason  f o r  a s s e r t i n g  a r i g h t  n o t
to  be coerced .  Coerc ion i s  s a i d  to  be a n e g a t io n  o f  e s s e n t i a l l y
human c h a r a c t e r s i t i c s . The c o n s t r a i n t s  upon i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n
towards o th e r s  a re  c a u s a l l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  k in d  o f  be ings  t h a t  Nozick
th i n k s  we a r e .  On t h i s  view, we have our  own i n t e r e s t s ,  and those
14are  im por tan t  because  they  a re  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  human l i f e .
Above a l l ,  ' [ t ] h e r e  a re  on ly  i n d i v i d u a l  p e o p l e ,  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l  
p e o p le ,  with  t h e i r  own i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s ' . ^
Moreover, N oz ick ' s  r i g h t s  and th e  ' s p e c i a l n e s s  o f  man' which 
they r e f l e c t  d e r iv e  from th e  f a c t  t h a t  man i s  a moral agen t  who
p o s se s s e s  f r e e  w i l l .  Th is  c o n d i t i o n  i s  im p o r ta n t  f o r  the  r e j e c t i o n
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o f  ' u s i n g '  peop le  to  ach ieve  p a r t i c u l a r  ends .
Side c o n s t r a i n t s  upon a c t i o n  r e f l e c t  the  
u n d e r ly in g  Kantian p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
a re  ends and n o t  merely means; they  may 
no t  be s a c r i f i c e d  o r  used f o r  t h e  a c h i e v in g  
o f  o t h e r  ends w i th o u t  t h e i r  c o n s e n t .  I n d i ­
v id u a l s  are i n v i o l a b l e . ^
Nozick claims  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo sophy  shou ld  on ly  be concerned
with  c e r t a i n  uses which i n d i v i d u a l s  make o f  one a n o th e r  - t h a t  i s ,
by c o e r c i v e l y  i n t e r f e r i n g  wi th them, by a g g r e s s i n g  a g a i n s t  them.
’Side c o n s t r a i n t s  e xp re s s  th e  i n v i o l a b i l i t y  o f  o t h e r s ,  in  the  ways 
17th e y  s p e c i f y ' .  And i n v i o l a b i l i t y  i s  s a i d  e x p l i c i t l y  to  exc lude
,  - 18 com puls ion .
Hence, t h e r e  i s  no t  only a p h y s i c a l  s e p a r a t e n e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,
and a l o g i c a l  c la im t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  good f o r  which some
i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s  o r  goa ls  may be s a c r i f i c e d  in  o r d e r  t o  h e lp  o t h e r s .
There i s  a moral c la im  in v o lv ed  as w e l l .
. . . n o  moral b a l a n c i n g  a c t  can ta k e  p l a c e  
among us ;  t h e r e  i s  no moral ou tw eigh ing  
o f  one o f  ou r  l i v e s  by o t h e r s  so as to  
lead  to  a g r e a t e r  o v e r a l l  s o c i a l  good.
There i s  no j u s t i f i e d  s a c r i f i c e  o f  some 
o f  us f o r  o t h e r s .
I r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  whether  t h e r e  can be a ' s o c i a l  good'  o r  no?^ Nozick
cla ims t h a t  Kantian  e t h i c s  g e n e r a l l y ,  and h i s  own p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t
u s in g  people  in  s p e c i f i e d  ways in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  amount to  a moral
axiom r e g a r d i n g  r i g h t s - i n f r i n g e m e n t . 'To use  a p e rson  in  t h i s  way
does no t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r e s p e c t  and take  account  o f  the  f a c t  t h a t  he
21i s  a s e p a r a t e  p e r s o n ,  t h a t  h i s  i s  the  only  l i f e  he h a s ' .  The 
s e p a r a t e n e s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  and t h e i r  p e c u l i a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
demand d i g n i t y ; i t  i s  a moral s e p a r a t e n e s s  as wel l  as a d e s c r i p t i v e ,  
p l u r a l i s t  c la im  about  i n d i v i d u a l s '  d i f f e r i n g  n eed s .  He quo te s  Kant
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in  s u p p o r t  o f  h i s  own moral i n j u n c t i o n :
[ a ] c t  i n  such a way t h a t  you always t r e a t  
humanity ,  whe ther  in  your  own p e r s o n  o r  in 
the  pe rson  o f  any o t h e r ,  n ev e r  s imply  as a 
means, b u t  always a t  th e  same t ime as an 
e n d .22
N o z ick ' s  argument f o r  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  t h e n ,  
fo c u s s e s  on th e  means by which p e rsons  may n o t  c o n s t r a i n  one 
a n o t h e r ,  on th e  means by which i n d i v i d u a l s  e i t h e r  ach ieve  o r  do 
n o t  ach ieve  t h e i r  goa ls  and p u rp o s e s .  Nozick c l e a r l y  need n o t  
o b j e c t ,  a cc o rd ing  to  the  d i c t a t e s  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  i f  n o t  a l l  
i n d i v i d u a l s  a c t u a l l y  f u l f i l  t h e i r  needs  o r  w ants .  R a the r ,  he on ly  
o b j e c t s  i f  they  do n o t  ach ieve  them because  t h e i r  r i g h t s  have 
been i n f r i n g e d .  And more i m p o r t a n t l y  fo r  Nozick ,  the  n a t u r e  o f  man 
does no t  r e q u i r e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  be p l a c e d  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  
( m a t e r i a l )  p o s i t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  b e n e f i t  from t h e i r  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  
r i g h t s .  His argument can only  g ive  r i s e  t o  p u r e l y  n e g a t i v e  and 
p r o c e d u r a l  c la ims upon o t h e r s .  The on ly  p o s i t i v e  moral o b l i g a t i o n s  
a re  th o s e  c o n s e n s u a l l y  a r r i v e d  a t .
As I argued in  Chapte r  I ,  Nozickean r i g h t s  a re  h i g h l y  s p e c i f i c .  
The n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  ex t rem ely  narrow in  i t s  c o n c e rn s ,  
s i n c e  i t s  on ly  j u s t i f i e d  r o l e  i s  to  p r o t e c t  t h e s e  r i g h t s .  Yet ,  i n  
g e n e r a l ,  t h e  appea l  to  human d i g n i t y ,  r e g i s t e r i n g  th e  f a m i l i a r  
im p e ra t i v e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  r a t i o n a l i t y  and moral  agency,  forms 
th e  b a s i s  o f  many p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s .  P o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  c la im s  - 
such as the  r i g h t  to  work,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  be f r e e  from p o v e r t y ,  and 
to  be in  a c e r t a i n  p o s i t i o n  o f  w a n t - s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and even the  
r i g h t  t o  f o u r  weeks p a id  annual  le ave  - s i m i l a r l y  r e f l e c t  n o t i o n s  o f
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t h e  i n h e r e n t  va lue  o f  humanity ,  the  worth o f  i n d i v i d u a l  a s p i r a t i o n s .  
Only they  conclude - c o n t r a  Nozick - t h a t  t h i s  im p l ie s  a very d i f f e r e n t  
k ind  o f  s o c i a l  o r d e r ,  one which s p e c i f i c a l l y  g u a ra n t e e s  much more 
than  the  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  f o r c e ,  t h e f t ,  f r a u d ,  and b reaches  o f  
c o n t r a c t .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  r a i s e d ,  th e n ,  i s  N oz ick ' s  p a r t i c u l a r  
co n c lu s io n  j u s t i f i e d  by h i s  arguments? Is  n o t  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  the  d i g n i t y  o f  man r e q u i r e s  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  and enforcement o f  
p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  a l e g i t i m a t e  i n f e r e n c e  from N ozick ’s arguments on 
b e h a l f  o f  r i g h t s ?  I t  may be sugges ted  t h a t  h i s  appea l  t o ,  and concern 
f o r ,  t h e  d i g n i t y  o f  man demands much more than th e  minimal s t a t e ,  
and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  he p r o v id e s  no good rea son  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  the  
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r .  On t h i s  view, i s  no t  h i s  p roc la im ed  moral 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m  simply one way o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  th e  d i g n i t y  
o f  man, w i th  no s p e c i a l  c la ims on our  p o l i t i c a l  a f f i l i a t i o n ?
I I I . THE DICTATES OF MORAL AGENCY.
I t  i s  a p p a re n t ,  upon e xam ina t ion ,  t h a t  Nozick does n o t  show 
p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  to  be i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  a p p ea ls  he h i m s e l f  
makes in h i s  s u p p o r t in g  arguments .  I f  man's r i g h t s - e n g e n d e r i n g  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a re  c o n s i s t e n t  with  c la im s  f o r  the  p o s i t i v e  view,  
N o z ick ' s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  only  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  can be 
shown to  be w i thou t  f o u n d a t io n .
Nozick argues  t h a t ,  on t h e i r  own, r a t i o n a l i t y ,  f r e e  w i l l  and
moral agency may no t  j u s t i f y  th e  conce p t ion  o f  man t h a t  he p o r t r a y s .
But t o g e t h e r ,  he c l a im s ,  the y  add up to  ’ . . .  a b e in g  ab le  to  fo rm u la te
23lo n g - te rm  p l a n s  f o r  i t s  l i f e ' .  He concludes  t h a t  i t  i s  the  o v e r a l l
conce p t ion  o f  our  l i f e  t h a t  i s  im p o r ta n t  t o  ou r  humani ty .
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But Nozick does no t  e x p l a i n ,  and i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  no t  c l e a r ,  
why such a view o f  human n a t u r e  should  imply only  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s ,  
and n o t  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  as w e l l .  The n o t io n  o f  meaningfu l  l i f e ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  i n c lu d e s  no t  only  n o n -a g g r e s s io n ,  b u t  a l s o  the  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  under w:h ic h  our  l ives can be g iven 
meaning.  I t  i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  to  j u s t i f y  a th e o ry  o f  r i g h t s  in  terms 
o f  man's g o a l - o r i e n t e d  c h o i c e - p a t t e r n s  w hile  a t  the  same t ime l i m i t i n g  
th o s e  r i g h t s  in  such a way as to  ig nore  the  im por tance  o f  a c t u a l l y  
f u l f i l l i n g  g o a l s .  R igh ts  a re  r ega rded  as im p o r ta n t  by Nozick b ecause 
they  reco g n i se  l i f e - p l a n s .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  s t r a n g e  to  f i n d  him un­
concerned wi th  th e  a c t u a l  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  human p u rp o s e s .
Yet Nozickean r i g h t s  c l e a r l y  do no t  make any g u a ra n t e e s  t o  
t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t  he w i l l  a t t a i n  meaningful  l i f e  o r  be ab le  to  
t a k e  advantage o f  h i s  r a t i o n a l  cho ice  c a p a c i t y .  N oz ick ’s p o l i t i c a l  
framework o f  r i g h t s  in no way a c t i v e l y  en co u ra g es ,  o r  even p r e t e n d s  
to  be concerned with  t h e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  our  w ants .  Hence N ozick ’s 
appea l  to  the  n o t i o n  o f  meaningful  l i f e  appea rs  no t  to  p ro v id e  
a convinc ing  reason  f o r  ad o p t in g  a minimal s t a t e .
I t  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  th e  case  t h a t  N oz ick ' s  i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  n o t  
l e a d in g  meaningful  l i v e s  i f  t h e i r  l i f e - p l a n s  a r e  b e in g  i n t e r f e r e d  
w i th .  This  in  i t s e l f  seems a p l a u s i b l e  c la im .  Man's r a t i o n a l i t y  
i s  o f  c e n t r a l  importance t o  Nozick’s image o f  ’man as c h o o s e r ’ .
To deny t h a t  t h i s  im p l ie s  t h a t  human goa ls  a r e  wor thw hi le  because  
th ey  are  i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  wor thw hi le  t o  have such 
goa ls  f u l f i l l e d ,  and t h a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  o f  l i t t l e  use  i f  our 
i n t e r e s t s  a re  c o n s t a n t l y  th w a r te d  by t h i n g s  o t h e r  th an  r i g h t s -
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i n f r i n g e m e n t ,  i s  t o  d iv o rce  the  th e o ry  from i t s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  
fo u n d a t io n s .  Nozick i s  c l e a r l y  g u i l t y  o f  such an i n c o n s i s t e n c y .
We supposedly  r e s p e c t  r i g h t s  because  man i s  l i k e  x: he i s  a r a t i o n a l  
choose r ,  he has  goa ls  t h a t  a re  im por tan t  t o  him, he needs  to  l e a d  
a meaningful  l i f e ,  he i s  a ’s e p a r a t e '  i n d i v i d u a l .  I t  i s  i m p l a u s i b l e  
f o r  Nozick to  then c la im  t h a t  t h e s e  a s p e c t s  o f  man's  n a t u r e  a re  
r e d u c i b l e  to  the  n o t i o n s  t h a t  uncoerced  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  whose n e g a t i v e  
r i g h t s  a re  r e s p e c t e d ,  n e c e s s a r i l y  l e ad  meaningfu l  l i v e s .  However, 
i f  h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments a re  to  be ta k e n  s e r i o u s l y ,  t h i s  
conc lu s ion  seems u navo idab le .
Samuel S c h e f f l e r  p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t :
[ t ] o  say t h a t  t h e  v a l u a b le  c a p a c i t y  to  l e ad  
a meaningful  l i f e  i s  the  b a s i s  o f  r i g h t s ,  
i s  presumably  to  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  moral 
p r o t e c t i o n s  and g u a ra n t e e s  which r i g h t s  
a s s ig n  to  peop le  may be u nders tood  as j e a l o u s  
o f  p e o p l e ' s  a b i l i t y  to  a c t u a l l y  l r v e  mean­
i n g f u l  l i v e s . -4
The re l e v a n c e  o f  t h i s  c l a im  t o  t h e  t e n a b i l i t v  o f  N oz ickf s argument
i s  t h a t  meaningful  l i f e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  only  wi th  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
whereas N oz ick ' s  own r i g h t s  a re  n o t .  In o ther  words,  we do no t
choose simply because  we l i k e  choos ing ,  b u t  in  o r d e r  t h a t  we may 
25f u l f i l  g o a l s .  To i s o l a t e  man's  c a p a c i t y  f o r  cho ice  from h i s  d e s i r e  
to  make th e s e  cho ices  'm e a n in g f u l '  i s  q u i t e  a r t i f i c i a l ;  i t  i g n o r e s  
t h e  r e a l  reason  why choos ing  i s  im p o r tan t  to  i n d i v i d u a l s .
S c h e f f l e r  concludes  t h a t  an appea l  t o  a co n ce p t io n  o f  human
d i g n i t y  y i e l d s  a p o s i t ive  th e o ry  o f  r i g h t s ,  ( i n c l u d i n g  th e  r i g h t  to
26' w e l f a r e ' ) ,  and no t  t h a t  espoused  by N o z ic k . “ Whether t h i s  c o n c lu s io n  
i s  shown to  be j u s t i f i e d  i s  n o t  a t  i s s u e .  WTat i s  im p o r ta n t  i s  t h a t
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such a c o n c lu s io n ,  which r e l a t e s  th e  n o t io n  o f  meaningfu l  l i f e  in 
a p o s i t i v e  way to  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  j u s t  as p l a u s i b l e  
as N oz ick ' s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  coe rc ion  makes i n d i v i d u a l  l i f e  m ean ing less .  
On t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( e q u a l ly  p l a u s i b l e )  view o f  meaningful  l i f e ,  
the  s t a t e  may c l e a r l y  do p o s i t i v e  t h i n g s  to  h e lp  the  i n d i v i d u a l  
ach ieve  s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t ,  an i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  i s  r e j e c t e d  by Nozick.  
Nozick d o e s n ' t  show t h a t  h i s  own i n d i v i d u a l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
o f  meaningful  l i f e  i s  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  any o t h e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
Hence h i s  appeal  to  t h i s  n o t i o n  does no t  r e n d e r  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  i l l e g i t i m a t e ,  no r  does i t  e s t a b l i s h  th e  pr imacy o f  n e g a t i v e  
r i  gh t  s .
Nozick claims  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  i n v i o l a b l e ;  on t h i s  view, 
moral agency d i c t a t e s  t h a t  the y  should  n o t  be ' s a c r i f i c e d ' .  But 
what do t h e s e  a s s e r t i o n s  a c t u a l l y  mean? What e x a c t l y  i s  i t  about  
th e  i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t  i s  i n v i o l a b l e ?  Nozick h i m s e l f  p o s i t s  t h a t  i t  
i s  no t  r a t i o n a l i t y  a lone .  Hence we may q u e s t i o n  w hether  i n v i o l a b i l i t y  
can simply be reduced to  th e  axiom t h a t  we shou ld  n e v e r  deny cho ice .  
What moral agency and i n v i o l a b i l i t y  a c t u a l l y  d i c t a t e  i s  r e s p e c t  
f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  concep t  o f  th e  in d i v id u a l .  But i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
doing th i n g s  to  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i th o u t  t h e i r  consen t  i s  mere ly  one 
way o f  f a i l i n g  to  take  s u f f i c i e n t  account  o f  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .
That th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  l i f e  ' . . . i s  th e  only l i f e  he h a s '  may e q u a l ly  
sugges t  r e s p e c t i n g  th e  c o n t e n t  o f  t h a t  l i f e ,  and t a k i n g  i n t o  account  
t h e  va lu e s  t h a t  the  i n d i v i d u a l  f i n d s  im p o r ta n t .  This,  c l e a r l y , 
would invo lve  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  a r rangements  t h a t  go beyond 
N oz ick ' s  minimal s t a t e .  R esp ec t in g  th e  c o n t e n t  o f  a p e r s o n ' s  l i f e
would,  a t  l e a s t ,  r e q u i r e  some commitment to  human needs .  Yet t h i s  i s
1 1 9 .
n o t  p o s s i b l e  w i th i n  N oz ick ' s  p o l i t i c a l  framework.  S a c r i f i c i n g  a 
p e r s o n ' s  w i11 (by denying him cho ice)  i s  by no means th e  on ly  way 
o f  s a c r i f i c i n g  h i s  1i f e . A de n ia l  o f  o p t i o n s  may have th e  same e f f e c t .
I t  has  been argued by s e v e r a l  c r i t i c s  t h a t  Nozick f a i l s  t o  draw
w id e r ,  b u t  s t i l l  a c c e p ta b l e  co n c lu s io n s  from h i s  appea l  to  Kantian
27e t h i c s ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  in t h e  a r e a  o f  d u t i e s  to  mutual a i d .  The 
accuracy  o f  Noz ick ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Kant ,  whe ther  he ' g o t  Kant 
r i g h t ' ,  i s  no t  a t  i s s u e .  What i s  more im p o r ta n t  i s  w hether  the  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  K an t ' s  e t h i c a l  im p e ra t i v e  - no t  to  t r e a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
as means towards our  ends ,  b u t  r a t h e r  to  acknowledge t h a t  they  
have t h e i r  own ends which a re  themse lves  im por tan t  - a r e  such t h a t  
only  N oz ick ' s th e o ry  o f  r i g h t s  can accommodate i t .
Again,  t h e  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  i s  w he ther  moral agency i s  t h r e a t e n e d  
only  when our  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  a re  i n f r i n g e d .  T r e a t i n g  pe r s o n s  as 
ends in  themselves  and n o t  ' t o o l s '  in  th e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  our  own 
d e s i r e s  would appear  to  encompass r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  u s e s ,  and i n f l u e n c e s  
t h a t  cannot  p o s s i b l y  be covered by N oz ick ' s  t h e o ry .  The Kantian 
i n j u n c t i o n  appea led  to  by Nozick could  p l a u s i b l y  be i n t e r p r e t e d  
to  imply r e s p e c t  f o r  th e  im por tance  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  and ends 
th e m se lv es .  Such a view would demand a p o l i t i c a l  commitment t o  
g o a l - f u l f i l m e n t ,  no t  s imply n o n -c o e rc io n .  I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l ,  on t h i s  
acc o u n t ,  no t  to  t r e a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  as means because  t h e i r  1iv e s  
a re  im p o r ta n t  - and l i v e s  embrace i n t e r e s t s  and needs  as w ell  as 
c h o i c e s .  Kantian e t h i c s  appea r  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  an i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  committed to  the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  human g o a l s .
Nozick p ro v id e s  no argument t o  s u g g es t  t h a t  h i s  own i n d i v i d u a l i s t
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conclusions, with their exclusive commitment to negative rights, 
follow easily or directly from Kantian foundations. Nor does he 
demonstrate that positive obligations are not possible on Kantian 
grounds.
An appeal to moral agency, therefore, sits awkwardly with Nozick's 
narrow concern with consent-based obligations. The inviolability 
of humans, the dignity that demands respect, may be reflected in 
more ways than by simply avoiding coercing them. The interpretation 
of Kantian ethics, for instance, to include the injunction that all 
taxation is illegitimate is open to question. (Whether taxation 
and other forms of state intervention really infringe moral agency 
is a question that will be taken up in the following section).
Neither Nozick’s concern for meaningful life, nor his appeal
to Kant’s notion of moral agency, need imply the exclusion of
recognising some positive rights and obligations. Nozick’s political
conclusions, therefore, are not shown to be demonstrably true by
his stated arguments. As George Kateb points out,
As I understand it, Nozick's general con­
clusion is that only when the rights of 
persons are respected absolutely are persons 
respected absolutely. Only when the rights 
of persons are respected absolutely can 
persons freely search for, and perhaps 
find, meaning in and for their lives, and 
thus be recognised in their distinct 
individuation. I think Nozick is saying 
that persons as persons deserve respect 
... There is, however, a terrible dis­
tortion that destroys the book's useful­
ness in the cause of newly defending the 
idea of limited government. Instead of 
assuming that many kinds of rights must 
be recognised, and many social conditions
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raust e x i s t  i f  we a re  to  f a v o r  the  l i f e  o f  
meaning f o r  p e r s o n s ,  Nozick narrows h i s  th e o ry  
o f  r i g h t s  to  the  r i g h t  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  and he 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y  makes t h a t  r i g h t  h i s  t r u e  
a b s o l u t e .28
Kateb does not  prove t h a t  ' r e s p e c t  f o r  p e r s o n s '  engenders  p a r t i c u l a r  
p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s .  However, h i s  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  a l lo w in g  many 
k inds  o f  r i g h t s  i s  q u i t e  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  n o t i o n s  o f  meaningfu l  
l i f e  and moral agency t h a t  a re  appea led  t o ,  b u t  i n t e r p r e t e d  nar row ly  
by ,  Nozick.
The a b s o lu t e n e s s  and the  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  N oz ick ' s  r i g h t s  are
n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  by h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments.  For i n s t a n c e ,
N ozick ' s  concern f o r  s e l f - o w n e r s h i p  embraces ,  as Kateb s u g g e s t s ,
t h e  n o t i o n  o f  only  n e g a t i v e  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s .  But how does Nozick
j u s t i f y  such a c onc lu s ion?  On th e  one hand,  when an i n d i v i d u a l ' s
r e s o u rc e s  a re  t axed  f o r  w ha teve r  purpose ( to  a i d  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s ) ,
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  p a r t  o f  him i s  ' removed'  o r  ' i n f r i n g e d ' .
Hence th e  r i g h t f u l  owning o f  p r o p e r t y  i s  p a r t  o f  Nozick*s concept
29o f  th e  i n v i o l a t e  i n d i v i d u a l .  (Hayek too acknowledges the  n e c e s s i t y
o f  i n c lu d in g  some p r o p e r t y  in  th e  p r i v a t e  sphe re  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l
30t o  make i t  meaningful" ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  however,  t h o s e  who 
a r e  denied  access  to  p r o p e r t y  by n o n - c o e r c i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  cannot  
c la im ,  acco rd ing  to  Nozick,  t h a t  a p a r t  o f  them i s  s i m i l a r l y  
' l a c k i n g ' .  I f  meaningful  l i f e  i s  t i e d  to p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s ,  why i s  
i t  g ran te d  to  some y e t  den ied  t o  o th e r s ?
The eq u a t io n  o f  moral  e s sence  with  m a t e r i a l  p o s s e s s i o n s  seems 
to  be a s e r i o u s  f a l l a c y  embraced by Nozick,  an unw arran ted  r e d u c t io n  
o f  the impor tance  o f  r e s p e c t i n g  p e rsons  as p e r s o n s .  His commitment
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to absolute and unrestricted property rights is inconsistent with 
the need for property that is denied to those who do not have it. 
Seemingly those who have property cannot have it taken away because 
it is part of them, necessary for their personhood and meaningful 
life. But those who have no property cannot demand to be given 
any, because they have no right to.
This is a strange conclusion to draw for one whose principal 
appeal is to human dignity. Yet such a conclusion is demanded by 
Nozick's insistence that property rights must be absolute. As Kateb 
suggests, Nozick’s reasons for enforcing rights, though legitimate, 
are not fulfilled by his commitment to only negative property rights. 
Nozick’s appeal to his conception of human nature equally supports 
the claims of those without property that they should be given some.
Hence the logic of Nozick's arguments is consistent with an 
interventionist order committed to the demands of propertyless 
individuals. Recognising the importance of property leaves open the 
possibility of a positive theory of rights. If meaningful life, 
separateness and moral agency are to be regarded as important reasons 
for respecting persons, and if these things include the right to 
control material possessions, it follows that people without 
property are leading meaningless lives and therefore are worthy of 
Nozick’s (and the state’s) concern. The need to know how one is 
going in terms of one’s life-plans, acknowledged by Nozick to be 
a vital part of personhood, is clearly denied to those without 
property. The statement that 'the individual's life is the only 
life he has' is just as much an argument for positive guarantees
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as i t  i s  f o r  n e g a t iv e  p r o h i b i t i o n s .  The tone  o f  N oz ick’s appea ls  
q u i t e  c l e a r l y  embraces a concern  f o r  the  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s .
Yet p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  a re  den ied  by Nozick,  who c la im s  t h a t  only 
ou r  ’ l e g i t i m a t e '  e n t i t l e m e n t s  f i l l  t h e  la ndscape  o f  moral o b l i g a t i o n .  
Hence i f  a l l  ou r  a c q u i s i t i o n s  and v o lu n t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  a re  l e g i t i m a t e ,  
t h e r e  i s  s imply no room f o r  a p o s i t i v e  th e o ry  o f  r i g h t s .  Nozick 
would argue t h a t  though p r o p e r t y  may be im p o r tan t  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  
g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  i t  i s  the  a c t  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  i t  by the  
i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t  r e n d e r s  i t  a p a r t  o f  h i s  personhood.  There i s  n o th in g  
s p e c i a l  in t h e  p r o p e r t y  i t s e l f ,  b u t  r a t h e r  i t  i s  h i s  ownership  o f  
i t  t h a t  makes i t  wrong to  take  i t  from him. T h ere fo re  th e  s t a t e  s imply 
cannot  accede to  the  demands o f  t h e  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  t h e o r i s t  and 
t h e  needs o f  th e  p r o p e r t y l e s s .
But t h i s  conc lu s ion  r e s t s  on t h e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  view t h a t  t h e r e  
a re  only  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s .  As I have argued ,  Nozick n e v e r  e s t a b l i s h e s  
t h i s ,  and h i s  own arguments s u g g es t  t h a t  o t h e r  co n c lu s io n s  a re  
e q u a l l y  p l a u s i b l e .  There i s  on ly  no room f o r  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  v i a  
compulsory t r a n s f e r s  i f  we accep t  the  a b s o l u t e n e s s  o f  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  
in t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .
In e f f e c t ,  N oz ick ’s i n d i v i d u a l i s t  co n c lu s io n  as to  the  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  on ly  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  i s  b u i l t  i n t o  h i s  p rem ises  r e g a r d i n g  
human n a t u r e  and th e  consequen t  im m ora l i ty  o f  c o e r c io n .  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  
he g ives  human n a t u r e  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t  ’t w i s t ’ and thus  r e n d e r s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  by th e  s t a t e  i n a d m i s s a b l e . Hence one must r e j e c t
i n d i v i d u a l i s m  in  o r d e r  to  j u s t i f y  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  in terms o f  an 
appeal  to  human n a t u r e .
But are no t  N ozick’ s p rem ises  - Kantian e t h i c s ,  s e p a r a t e n e s s ,  
moral agency and meaningful  l i f e  - s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  t r e a tm e n t  in 
o th e r - th a n -N o z ie k e a n  ways? We only  have N o z ic k ' s  word t h a t  t h e s e  
t h i n g s  demand i n d i v i d u a l i s t  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s .  I f  we remove the  
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  s t r u c t u r e  from Nozick’s p r e m i s e s ,  th e y  may wel l  
y i e l d  (and no t  be i n f r i n g e d  by) p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s .  Many s o c i a l i s t s  
and i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s  use  t h e s e  same prem ises  in  non-Nozickean- 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  ways. This  does n o t  d is p rove  N oz ick ’ s argument from 
human n a t u r e  - i t  s imply q u e s t i o n s  whether such p r e m i s e s ,  when s t r i p p e d  
o f  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  n e c e s s a r i l y  produce  only  
a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  N o z ick ' s  p r e m i s e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  no t  
independen t ,  o b j e c t i v e  ' f a c t s '  about  human n a t u r e  and th e  im m ora l i ty  
o f  c o e rc io n ,  b u t  a re  s u b j e c t  t o  N oz ick ' s  a l 1- p e r v a s i v e  i n d i v i d u a l i s m .  
They y i e l d  t h e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  only  by d e f i n i t i o n .
Thus,  in  c o n c l u s i o n ,  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  no t  exc luded  
by an appea l  to  Kant,  s e p a r a t e n e s s ,  meaningful  l i f e  o r  moral agency 
p e r  s e . I t  i s  exc luded  only  by an appeal  t o  them couched in terms o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  The d i c t a t e s  o f  moral agency,  as 
such ,  remain i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  as does N oz ick ' s  c la im  t h a t  h i s  own 
e t h i c a l  p rem ises  conce rn ing  th e  n a t u r e  o f  man r u l e  out  th e  r e ­
d i s t r i b u t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e .
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IV.RIGHTS AND THE INTERVENTIONIST ORDER.
Nozick f ace s  such a dilemma e s s e n t i a l l y  because  he ,  l i k e  Hayek,
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f a i l s  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between s e r i o u s  and n o n - s e r i o u s  forms o f  r i g h t s -  
i n f r i n g e m e n t . I f  t h i s  a b s o lu t e n e s s  i s  abandoned,  t h e r e  i s  c l e a r l y  
room f o r  a v a r i e t y  o f  r i g h t s  to  give f u l l e r  e f f e c t  t o  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  
o f  human worth t h a t  Nozick h i m s e l f  f a v o u rs .
Upon a n a l y s i s ,  N oz ick ’ s f a i l u r e  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between d i f f e r e n t
k i nds and degrees  o f  r i g h t s - v i o l a t i o n  i s  a s e r i o u s  f law in  h i s  t h e o ry .
Me neve r  dem ons t ra tes  why a l l  i n s t a n c e s  o f  b r e a c h in g  consen t  should
be reduced a p r i jo r i  to  th e  one l e v e l  o f  ’ i n f r i n g e m e n t ’ . Are no t
some v io la t io n s  l e s s  a c c e p t a b l e  than  o t h e r s  on Kantian  grounds?
Nozick ' s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  such i n t e r v e n t i o n  as p r a c t i s e d  by th e  w e l f a r e
s t a t e  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f r i n g e s  r i g h t s  i s  t r u e  by d e f i n i t i o n .  However,
i t  i s  no t  e q u a l ly  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e se  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i v i t i e s  deny
t h e  t h i n g s  t h a t  Nozick c la ims make r i g h t s  v a l u a b l e .  Hence N ozick’s
argument t h a t  the  co e rc io n  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  n e g a t e s
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  j u s t  as open to  q u e s t i o n  as h i s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e
are no p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s .  As such ,  h i s  a t t e m p t  to  d i s m is s  arguments
f o r  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  i s  no t  e s t a b l i s h e d .  I t  i s  worth
r e p e a t i n g  Nozick ' s  c onc lu s ion  t h a t  only  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
s t a t e  r e s p e c t s  humanity:
[ t ] h e  minimal s t a t e  t r e a t s  us as i n v i o l a t e  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  who may n o t  be used in  c e r t a i n  
ways by o t h e r s  as means o r  t o o l s  o r  i n s t r u ­
ments o r  r e s o u r c e s ;  i t  t r e a t s  us as p e rsons  
hav ing  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  with  th e  d i g n i t y  
t h i s  c o n s t i t u t e s .  T r e a t i n g  us w i th  r e s p e c t  
by r e s p e c t i n g  our  r i g h t s ,  i t  a l lows  us ,  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  w i th  whom we choose ,  to  
choose our  l i f e  and to  r e a l i z e  our  ends 
and our  c o nce p t ions  o f  o u r s e lv e s  i n s o f a r  
as we can,  a ided  by th e  v o l u n t a r y  co­
o p e r a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  p o s s e s s i n g  
th e  same d i g n i t y .  How dare  any s t a t e  o r  
group o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  do more. Or l e s s .
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I have a l r e a d y  sugges ted  t h a t  t o  c la im  t h a t  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  ' a l l o w s '  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  n o t  a g u a ran tee  o f  meaningful  
l i f e .  Such an o r d e r  as N o z i c k ' s ,  l i k e  H ay ek ' s ,  which merely e n fo rc e s  
n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s ,  cannot  gua ran tee  any th ing  more than  the  e l i m i n a t i o n  
o f  one c o n s t r a i n t  upon a c t i o n  amongst a wide range o f  i n f l u e n c e s .  And 
to  sugges t  t h a t  r e s p e c t i n g  r i g h t s  fu l ly  embraces the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
o f  human d i g n i t y  i s ,  a rg u a b ly ,  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  Perhaps  i t  i s  merely 
one a s p ec t  o f  i t .  N oz ick ' s  e q u a t io n  o f  d i g n i t y  w i th  r i g h t s  i s  drawn 
too  e a s i l y .
But Nozick a l s o  s u g g e s t s  in  t h e  co n c lu s io n  above t h a t  any 
m ore - than -m in imal s t a t e  n e c e s s a r i l y  n e g a t e s  human d i g n i t y .  Hence,  
on t h i s  view, even i f  t h e  mot ives o f  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  t h e o r i s t s  
a re  l e g i t i m a t e  - the  a m e l io r a t i o n  o f  human h a r d s h i p  and the  removal 
o f  o b s t a c l e s  to  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  - i t  cannot  be denied  t h a t  any 
a t tem p t  to  ach ieve  th e s e  aims by compulsion in v o l v e s  c o e rc in g  p eo p le .  
And t h i s  i s  u n a c c e p ta b l e  t o  Nozick.
Does the  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w ea l th  ( t h i s  covers  most o f  the  
a l l e g e d l y  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e ,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  w e l f a r e ,  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  common 
g o a l s ,  and so on) by t a x a t i o n  r e a l l y  deny human d i g n i t y ?  A ga ins t  
Nozick,  Hayek argues  t h a t  t h e  most o b j e c t i o n a b l e  f e a t u r e s  o f  c o e rc io n  
a re  reduced when i t  i s  p r e d i c t a b l e .  In o t h e r  words ,  we can s t i l l  
shape our  l i v e s  acc o rd in g  to  a p la n  and a t t e m p t  t o  f u l f i l  ou r  aims 
even i f  we a re  t a xed  a p r o p o r t i o n  o f  our  income. I f  t h i s  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
i t  undermines the  v a l i d i t y  o f  N o z ick ' s  argument a g a i n s t  t a x a t i o n .  
Nozick a s s e r t s ,  however,  t h a t  any t a x a t i o n  makes t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a
resource for the use of others in the pursuit of their goals. The 
important question is whether Nozick's supporting arguments establish 
the truth of this view. We might be a resource of the state in 
one sense, and yet be still free to lead a meaningful life and engage 
in the voluntary contracts favoured by Nozick.
In the previous chapter I claimed that redistributive measures 
do not eliminate freedom of action. Here, it is equally clear that 
they are not inconsistent with the premises appealed to in Nozick's 
argument for the value of autonomy. This conclusion is unavoidable 
if one accepts that some instances of coercion are more harmful 
than others, and that therefore there are different kind£ of rights 
with different political implications.
Thomas Scanlon is correct when he suggests, in reference to
Nozick's disavowal of taxation, that he
... tries to make such measures seem more 
alarming to us by tying them to more 
extreme forms of intervention ... But 
there seems to be no reason to disregard 
such obvious differences in the degree of 
regulation of a person's life. It may be 
true, as Nozick claims, that there is a 
continuum of interferences extending from 
taxation to forced labor, each foreclosing 
a few more options than the p.receeding.
But the fact that there is such a continuum 
is no reason why we must be indifferent 
between any two points along it. 2^
However, such a relevant differentiation is precluded by Nozick's
restricted conception of rights. By defining rights exclusively in
terms of consent, he begs the question of the legitimacy of the
interference. Whether or not our moral intuitions may be reasonably
expected to reject forced labour on the grounds of human dignity
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and mean ingful  l i f e ,  i t  i s  no t  a t  a l l  c l e a r  t h a t  the  r e j e c t i o n  o f  
r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  t a x a t i o n  i s  w a r ran ted  on the  same grounds .  This  r e f l e c t s  
th e  view o f  Char les  Tay lor  t h a t  a s t e p  away from the  n e g a t i v e  
concep t ion  o f  r i g h t s  need n o t  r e q u i r e  a commitment to  c o l l e c t i v i s m  
( the  a c t u a l  d i c t a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa l s )  and the  genuine  l o s s  
o f  human d i g n i t y  t h a t  t h i s  would i n v o l v e .  The f r u i t s  o f  v o l u n t a r y  
exchange are  n o t  den ied by t a x a t i o n ;  no r  a re  the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
g o a l - f o r m u l a t i o n  and th e  use o f  human r a t i o n a l i t y  in  the  achievement  
o f  ends .  We may s t i l l  ’know how we are going in  terms o f  our  
l i f e - p l a n s '  even i f  some o f  ou r  r e s o u r c e s  a re  removed.
The k inds  o f  moderate r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  p o l i c i e s  favoured  by th e  
w e l f a r e  s t a t e  embrace T a y l o r ' s  f i r s t  s t e p  towards a p o s i t i v e  view 
o f  r i g h t s .  They c l e a r l y  need  n o t  p r e v e n t  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
l i f e - p l a n s .  R a the r ,  they  may be r e g a rd e d  as s imply  a d e n i a l  o f  
o p t i o n s . ^  And as Scanlon p o i n t s  o u t ,  the  im por tance  o f  the  o p t i o n s  
denied  by o t h e r s  to  the  meaning o f  our  l i v e s  v a r i e s  enormously .  The 
co e rc iv e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  - i t s  use o f  a p o r t i o n  o f  th e  
r e s o u r c e s  o f  some to  b e n e f i t  o th e r s  - seems merely t o  i n f r i n g e  th e  
choice  envi ronment  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l s  a f f e c t e d .  As I argued  in  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  Hayek, th e  removal o f  some o f  o n e ' s  r e s o u r c e s  need n o t  
mean a ' l o s s  o f  s e l f ' .  Hence i t  i s  u n c l e a r  t h a t  Nozick need be w o r r i e d  
by the  co e rc iv e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  s t a t e  in  i t s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  w e l f a r e  
i f  h i s  arguments a re  to  be t r e a t e d  s e r i o u s l y .  I t  i s  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  coe rc ion  on in d i v i d u a l  l i f e  t h a t  i s  im p o r t a n t .  I t  i s  a dubious 
c la im t h a t  in  contemporary l i b e r a l  dem ocrac ies  th e  u l t i m a t e  g o a l s  
or  l i f e - p l a n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  undermined more by t a x a t i o n  tha n  
by,  f o r  example ,unemployment , which i s  r e g a rd e d  as a l e g i t i m a t e
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i n t e r f e r e n c e  by Nozick (and Hayek). Examples such as t h i s  i l l u s t r a t e  
the  u n r e a l i t y  o f  many o f  Nozick ' s  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  even in  r e l a t i o n  to 
h i s  own s t a t e d  p re m is e s .  The impor tance  o f  r i g h t s  i s  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
to  th e  autonomy o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Things o t h e r  than  Nozickean r i g h t s -  
in f r i n g e m e n t  deny autonomy by e f f e c t i v e l y  n e g a t i n g  the  whole range 
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  o p t i o n s .  Yet Nozick ig n o re s  t h e s e ,  on ly  t o  focus 
on th i n g s  (such as t a x a t i o n )  which dem onst rab ly  do no t  have t h i s  
e f  f e e t .
L i v e s , t h e n , a re  no t  ' s a c r i f i c e d '  by t h e  t a x a t i o n  t h a t  makes 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  p o s s i b l e  and r e c o g n i s e s  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s .  Taxa t ion  
does n o t  ig n o re  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  l i f e  i s  th e  on ly  one 
he h a s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  ' c o n s e n t '  i s  reduced when N oz ick ' s  
argument f o r  meaningful  l i f e  i s  co n s id e r e d .
I t  i s  s t r e t c h i n g  an argument to  s u g g es t  t h a t  pe r s o n s  who are
taxed  a p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  income to  h e lp  t h e  needy (Nozick sometimes
34g ives  th e  im press ion  t h a t  a l l  t a x a t i o n  i s  used t o  h e l p  th e  needy ) 
a re  th e re b y  denied  the  s t a t u s  o f  moral agency.  Is  i t  N o z ick ' s  c la im  
t h a t  th e  poor  man, who i s  n o t  be ing  coerced  by anyone,  b u t  who 
cannot  make any r e a s o n a b le  l i f e - p l a n s  because  o f  h i s  c o n d i t i o n , 
i s  l e a d in g  a more meaningful  l i f e  than  th e  e n t r e p r e n e u r  who i s  
' c o e r c e d '  by t a x a t i o n ?  The a b i l i t y  to  lead  a meaningful  l i f e  
b e a r s  no n e c e s s a r y  r e l a t i o n  to  w hether  one i s  be ing  ta x ed  o r  n o t .
Yet in  h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  argument Nozick makes an e x p l i c i t  connec t ion  
between hav ing  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  and hav ing  the  a b i l i t y  to  f i n d  
meaning in  l i f e .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  the l a t t e r  i s  c l e a r l y  very im p o r tan t  
f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  N oz ick ' s  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s c r i p t i o n s .  This  c a l l s  i n t o
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q u e s t io n  the  a t tem p t  by Nozick to  d e f i n e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
s o l e l y  in  terms o f  o n e ' s  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s .
Using a p e r s o n ' s  r e s o u rc e s  f o r  th e  purpose  o f  mutual  a i d ,  
whether  o r  no t  demanded by Kantian e t h i c s ,  need n o t  i n f r i n g e  them. 
N oz ick ' s  c la im  t h a t  we are  s t i l l  mere ly  r e s o u r c e s  i s  on ly  r e l e v a n t  
he re  i f  one b u i l d s  h i s  c onc lu s ion  r e g a r d i n g  the  n o n - e x i s t e n c e  o f  
p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s  i n t o  h i s  premises  as to  the  n a t u r e  o f  man.
At any r a t e ,  i t  i s  neve r  th e  case t h a t  the  taxed  pe r so n  i s  merely 
a r e s o u r c e ,  i f  h i s  l i f e - p l a n s  remain i n t a c t .  I t  i s  o f t e n  th e  case  
t h a t  coe rc ive  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i l l  v i o l a t e  the  Kantian  moral i n j u n c t i o n .  
I t  i s  e q u a l ly  t r u e  t h a t  coe rc io n  does n o t  e xhaus t  th e  means by 
which i n d i v i d u a l s  can be used .  I t  i s  n o t  obvious  tha t  a l l  forms 
o f  coerc ion  use  p e rsons  in  ways t h a t  a re  im p o r ta n t  to  t h e i r  s t a t u s  
as moral b e i n g s .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  p r o g r e s s i v e  t a x a t i o n  o f  the  r i c h  
would appear n o t  to  be as s e r i o u s  a ' u s e '  as th e  h o ld i n g  o f  a r i c h  
man's fami ly  f o r  ransom by a k id n a p p e r .  Perhaps th e  l o s s  o f  h i s  
fami ly  would nega te  h i s  reason  f o r  l i v i n g  and make l i f e - p l a n s  
meaning less .  This  does no t  im ply ,  however,  t h a t  t a x a t i o n  a l s o  does so .
I t  would appea r ,  th e n ,  t h a t  N o z ick ' s  arguments a g a i n s t  th e  
i n t e r v e n i n g  s t a t e  (and f o r  th e  en forcement o f  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  a l o n e ) ,  
based  on moral agency,  Kantian e t h i c s  and mean ingful  l i f e ,  have l i t t l e  
fo rce  in r e j e c t i n g  one form o f  p o s i t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  
the  w e l fa re  s t a t e .  Nozick,  on t h i s  as on o t h e r  o c c a s i o n s ,  appea rs  
to  be engaged i n  the  d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  a s t raw  man by c l a im in g  t h a t  
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m  n e c e s s a r i l y  d en ie s  t h e  above v a l u e s  and n e g a t e s  
autonomy. J . P .  S t e r b a ' s  ' n e o - l i b e r t a r i a n i s m ' ,  which p r o v id e s  a
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minimum o f  l i b e r t y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h i le  r e c o g n i s i n g  th e  impor tance  
o f  w e l f a r e ,  r e j e c t s  the  nar rowness  o f  Nozickean r i g h t s . ^  This  k ind  
o f  argument s u p p o r t s  th e  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  a commitment to  the  primacy 
o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th s t a t e s  o t h e r  than  the  p u r e l y  
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  on the  grounds o f  h e l p i n g  the  i n d i v i d u a l  
achieve  some measure o f  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n . I t  shows t h a t  a more 
p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  does n o t  i n f r i n g e  r i g h t s  to  th e  e x t e n t ,  and in the  
ways t h a t  Nozick c la im s ,  and i t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the  view t h a t  
n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  a re  n o t  t h e  only  k ind  o f  r i g h t s  t h a t  we p o s s e s s .
That N oz ick ' s  p rem ises  a re  t h e r e f o r e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  d i sm iss  
claims  on b e h a l f  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  an im p o r ta n t  f law in 
h i s  argument.  However, i t  may a l s o  be the  case t h a t  N o z ic k ' s  own 
minimal s t a t e  does no t  p ro v id e  the  t h i n g s  va lued  by an appea l  to 
autonomy. I f  Nozickean r i g h t s  cannot  g u a ra n t e e  human d i g n i t y  
( t h i s  i s  a p l a u s i b l e  assumpt ion) then perhaps  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  
r e q u i r e d  r a t h e r  than simply  a l lowed .
Nozick seems to  acknowledge the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  some r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  o f  p a s t  i n j u s t i c e ,  
though he argues  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  k ind  o f  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
from t h a t  im p l ie d  by the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y .  He poses  the  
fo l low ing  problem:
J t ] h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  p a s t  i n j u s t i c e  (p rev io u s  
v i o l a t i o n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  two p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
j u s t i c e  in  h o l d i n g s ) r a i s e s  the  t h ' . r d  major  
t o p i c  under  j u s t i c e  in  h o l d i n g s :  t h e  - 
r e c t i f i c a t i o n  o f  i n j u s t i c e  in  h o l d i n g s .
I f  p a s t  i n j u s t i c e  has shaped p r e s e n t  
h o ld in g s  in  v a r io u s  ways, some i d e n t i f i a b l e  
and some n o t ,  what now, i f  a n y t h in g ,  ought  
to  be done to  r e c t i f y  t h e s e  i n j u s t i c e s ? - ^ ?
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This ,  as Nozick acknowledges,  r a i s e s  enormous problems o f  im plem en ta t ion .  
However, i t  a l s o  c r e a t e s  anomalies f o r  th e  p roponen t  o f  a non- 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r .  C l e a r l y ,  the  need to  r i g h t  p a s t  i n j u s t i c e  
denands r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  (back t o  the  o r i g i n a l  r i g h t f u l  owners ) .
I t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t  ' i n n o c e n t '  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  no t  have t h e i r  
p r o p e r ty  removed because  o f  the  misdeeds o f  t h e i r  f o r e f a t h e r s ,  over  
which they  had no c o n t r o l .  Yet such a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  demanded by 
Nozick ' s  t h e o ry  o f  e n t i t l e m e n t s .  Since the  p ro c e s s  by which they  
a cq u i red  t h e i r  h o ld in g s  was o r i g i n a l l y  u n j u s t ,  even i f  they  did not  
know i t ,  th e y  a re  r e q u i r e d  to  r e t u r n  t h e  h o ld i n g s  to  the  o r i g i n a l  
owner. The problems r a i s e d  h e r e i n  are s i m i l a r  t o  th o s e  faced  by 
s u p p o r t e r s  o f  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  l e g i s l a t i o n  - f o r  example,  a r e  any ga ins  
i^for example,  from i n t e r e s t  payments) a l s o  r e g a rd e d  as i l l e g i t i m a t e ,  
and s u b j e c t  t o  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Could th e  o r i g i n a l  r i g h t f u l  owners 
c la im  compensation in l i e u  o f  the  i n t e r e s t  he_ could  have earned?
Can ' c l a s s e s '  o r  r ace s  demand r e c t i f i c a t i o n  as i n d i v i d u a l s  can?
39Nozick h i m s e l f  ad d re s s e s  th e  problem o f  compensa tion.  However, 
the  p o i n t  h e r e  i s  no t  s imply t h a t  h i s  th e o ry  o f  j u s t i c e  r a i s e s  
s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  im plem en ta t ion ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  would r e q u i r e  
such massive b u r e a u c r a t i c  machinery as t o  r e n d e r  meaning less  th e  
n o t i o n  o f  a 'm in im al '  s t a t e  which i s  no t  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e .  To e n fo rc e  
r e c t i f i c a t i o n  would demand an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e ,  would in v o lv e  
' c o n t i n u o u s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s ' ,  would n e c e s s i t a t e  
t h e  n e g a t io n  o f  meaningful  l i f e  f o r  those  in n o c e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  who 
would lose  t h e i r  p o s s e s s i o n s  under  the  r e c t i f i c a t i o n .
Hence N oz ick ' s  c la im  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  can only lead  to
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a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  i t s e l f  dem onst rab ly  f a l s e .  His b e l i e f  
t h a t  autonomy ( in c l u d in g  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s )  can be gua ran teed  by the  
o p e r a t i o n s  o f  th e  f r e e  market  i s  no t  s u b s t a n t i a t e d .  That one k ind  
o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  demanded by h i s  own th e o ry  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
weakens h i s  argument a g a i n s t  th e  gene ra l  n o t i o n  o f  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
P o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  o f  a r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  k ind  i s  shown to  be 
r e q u i r e d  by the  im pera t ive  o f  r e s p e c t i n g  human d i g n i t y .
Nozick appears  t o  c o n t r a d i c t  h i s  own argument t h a t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  because  i t  i n v o lv es  con t inuous  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in  
i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s .  And th e  s imple  e q u a t io n  o f  t a x a t i o n  w i th  i n t e r ­
fe rence  i s  m is lead in g  f o r ,  as Hayek adm i ts ,  p r e d i c t a b l e  co e rc io n  
may i n  f a c t  be more a d m is s ib le  ( in  terms o f  d i s r u p t i n g  l i f e - p l a n s )  
than  t h a t  which i s  n o t .  But the  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  p r i n c i p l e  would 
demand r e a l  i n t e r f e r e n c e  on a mass ive s c a l e .  I t  would deny cho ice  
and no t  merely r e s t r i c t  o p t i o n s .
Like Hayek 's l i b e r a l  o r d e r ,  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  i t s  s e r v i c e  f u n c t i o n s ) ,  
N o z ick ' s  minimal s t a t e  t u r n s  out  to  be bo th  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  and i n t e r ­
f e r i n g  ( i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t )  in  o rd e r  t o  f u l f i l  t h e  re q u i re m e n t s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  autonomy. Hence moral agency,  meaningfu l  l i f e  and human 
d i g n i t y  n o t  only  a l low ,  b u t  p o s i t i v e l y  demand one k in d  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e .  All  N oz ick ' s  arguments a g a i n s t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  as such are 
t h e r e b y  rende red  m ean ing le ss .
An appea l  t o  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  only  i s  t h e r e f o r e  no t  s u f f i c i e n t  
to  gua ran tee  t h e  v a lues  r e v e a l e d  i n  N oz ick ' s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments.
The l a t t e r  nowhere dem onst ra te  t h a t  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  a re  t ie  only
r i g h t s  we have ,  no r  does he convince  us t h a t  moderate forms o f  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  n e c e s s a r i l y  deny autonomy.
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V. NOZICK'S EXAMPLES.
Nozick argues  t h a t  r i g h t s  f i l l  t h e  landscape  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  
s t a t e  a c t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e s e  r i g h t s  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  n e g a t i v e  and e q u a l ly  
s t r i n g e n t ,  and t h a t  a l l  c o e rc iv e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  must be in  v i o l a t i o n  
o f  them. I have argued t h a t  in  a t t e m p t in g  t o  dem ons t ra te  th e  v a l i d i t y  
o f  t h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  Nozick appea ls  t o  c e r t a i n  moral p rem ises  
conce rn ing  human n a t u r e  and th e  consequent  i n d e f e n s i b i l i t y  o f  
c o e r c io n ,  y e t  f a i l s  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  the  
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .
However, he a l s o  appea ls  to  a number o f  d i sa rm ing  examples o f  
r i g h t s - i n f r i n g e m e n t  in  o r d e r  to  e s t a b l i s h  h i s  c l a im s .  These c a s e s ,  
l i k e  t h e  c la im  t h a t  t a x a t i o n  r e a l l y  in v o lv e s  t h e  same use o f  o t h e r s  
as r e s o u r c e s  f o r  our  purposes  as fo rced  la b o u r  d o e s , a t t e m p t  t o  
convince th e  r e a d e r  t h a t  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  r e a l l y  i s  
i l l e g i t i m a t e ,  t h a t  a l l  forms o f  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  deny human 
d i g n i t y .
P r i m a r i l y ,  the  examples r e f e r r e d  to  a re  t h o s e  o f  t h e  marr iage  
p a r t n e r s ,  t h e  Wi l t  Chamberlain b a s k e t b a l l  c a s e ,  the  worker  and 
o w n e r - o f - c a p i t a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and s p e c i f i c  i n s t a n c e s  o f  e q u a l i t y  o f  
o p p o r t u n i t y  arguments.  They a l l  a t t em p t  to  dem o n s t r a te  t h e  i m p l i ­
c a t i o n s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  autonomy o f  a l low ing  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m .  But 
do such examples j u s t i f y  N oz ick ' s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n ,  o r  do they
simply i l l u s t r a t e  i t ?
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The im p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  t w e n t y - s i x  s e t s  o f  marr iage  p a r t n e r s
i s  t h a t  i f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a re  v o l u n t a r y ,  even i f  u n p a l a t a b l e  f o r
some i n d i v i d u a l s ,  they  a re  n e v e r t h e l e s s  l e g i t i m a t e .  On t h i s  view,
no agency has the  r i g h t  to  coerae p a r t i c u l a r  p e r s o n s  in  o r d e r  to
make the  o p t io n s  o f  o t h e r s  more a t t r a c t i v e .  Envy i s  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t
40reason  f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  However, the  r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h i s  example 
to  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  no t  c l e a r .  In the  p u r s u i t  o f  s o c i a l  
j u s t i c e ,  t h e r e  i s  no ev idence  t h a t  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  need 
l e g i s l a t e  to  a r range  m a r r i a g e s .  By a p p e a l in g  to  t h e  most c h e r i s h e d  
example o f  f r e e  c h o ice ,  Nozick c la ims t h a t  a l l  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  a re  
u n j u s t .  By app ea l in g  to  an i n s t a n c e  where e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  
i s  beyond the  concern o f  a l l  bu t  the  most r e p r e s s i v e  o f  governments 
Nozick does no t  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  such e q u a l i t y  i s  n ev e r  r e l e v a n t .
In m a r r i ag e ,  cho ice i s  t h e  only  r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r ,  f o r  no amount 
o f  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  a c t i v i t y  would n e c e s s a r i l y  a l t e r  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
choice  in  t h e  m a t t e r .  N oz ick ' s  example may r e v e a l  t h e  i n s i d i o u s  
n a t u r e  o f  a r ranged  m a r r i a g e s ,  b u t  i t  t e l l s  us l i t t l e  about  the  
n a t u r e  o f  th e  j u s t  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .
Marr iages  a re  i n s t a n c e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  e x e r c i s i n g  f r e e  cho ice .  
They are  s a i d  to  dem onst ra te  the  k inds  o f  human a t t r i b u t e s  - f r e e  
w i l l ,  d i g n i t y ,  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  a b i l i t y  to  a t t a i n  meaningfu l  l i f e  - 
t h a t  make r i g h t s  v a l u a b le .  Nozick t a k es  m arr i age  to  be the  parad igm 
case o f  th e  f r e e  market o r d e r .  He asks what r i g h t  the  s t a t e  has 
to  i n t e r v e n e  in marr iage .  Hence, what r i g h t  has  th e  s t a t e  to  i n t e r ­
vene in o t h e r  e x e r c i s e s  in  f r e e  cho ice?  He im p l i e s  t h a t  i f  i n t e r ­
f e re n c e  i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  in  one,  then  i t  must a l s o  be i l l e g i t i m a t e  
in  e v e n ’ o t h e r  e x e r c i s e  o f  f r e e  c h o ic e ,  such as th e  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f
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p a r t i c u l a r  owners o f  c a p i t a l  to  employ p a r t i c u l a r  workers , and the  
w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  fans  to pay b a s k e t b a l l e r s . But such an i n f e r e n c e  
does n o t  fol low simply because  the  former i n t e r f e r e n c e  would be 
an u n j u s t i f i e d  one.  Nozick would have to  dem ons t ra te  t h a t ,  on the  
grounds o f  s e p a r a t e n e s s ,  meaningful  l i f e ,  moral agency and r a t i o n ­
a l i t y ,  a p e r s o n ' s  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  was b e in g  t h r e a t e n e d  in  every  
exam ple .
The problem r a i s e d  by such examples i s  t h a t  o f  'ne ighbourhood  
e f f e c t s ' .  Free t r a n s a c t i o n s  may c u r t a i l  o p t i o n s ,  b u t  th e y  need 
n o t  deny f r e e  cho ice  t o  o t h e r s .  I f  no o n e ' s  autonomy i s  d en ied ,  
th en  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  human a c t i o n  w'hich s e r i o u s l y  c u r t a i l  o p t i o n s  
must be r ega rded  as l e g i t i m a t e .  But Nozick seems t o  ig n o re  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  c h o i c e - e x e r c i s i n g  have g r e a t l y  v a ry in g  e f f e c t s  
on t h e  cho ice-env i ronm ent  o f  o the rs .  I t  does no t  fo l low  t h a t  s i n c e  
i t  would be immoral f o r  the  s t a t e  to  i n t e r v e n e  in  some a rea s  
( t h e  most im por tan t  to  us)  then i t  would be a l s o  and e q u a l l y  wrong 
to  i n t e r v e n e  in  o t h e r s .  All  such examples can hope to  dem ons t ra te  
i s  t h a t  i t  would be wrong f o r  t h e  s t a t e  t o  i n t e r v e n e  in  th o s e  
a r e a s .  Some i n s t a n c e s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  would deny f r e e  cho ice  in  
an u l t i m a t e  s e n s e .  But p roponen ts  o f  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  t a x a t i o n ,  f o r  
example,  need no t  s u p p o r t  such k inds  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  As I argued 
e a r l i e r ,  th e  va lu e s  o f  autonomy are  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h r e a t e n e d  in  
s i g n i f i c a n t  ways by th e  c o e rc iv e  measures o f  the  s t a t e .  By a p p e a l in g  
to p r e c i o u s  examples ,  Nozick hopes a l s o  to  d i s m i s s  l e s s  im p o r ta n t  
forms o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in th e  l i f e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  But t h i s  
a t t em p t  f a i l s ,  s i n c e  he does n o t  e s t a b l i s h  th e  pr imacy o f  h i s  own
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n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  in h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments .
S i m i l a r l y ,  the  Wil t  Chamberlain case only s e rv e s  to  d i sm iss  the
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i f  i t  i s  a cc ep ted  t h a t  t a x i n g  some o f  h i s
ea rn in g s  den ies  h i s  r i g h t  to  choose.  Again,  t h i s  i s  s imply  n o t  the
case .  The most t h a t  can be s a i d  i s  t h a t  h i s  p r o f i t s  from the  f r e e
t r a n s a c t i o n s  a re  reduced .  His r i g h t  to  choose i s  no t  c u r t a i l e d .
And, as I have a rgued ,  t h e r e  a re  problems wi th  th e  view t h a t
' p r o p e r t y 1 and ' s e l f '  a re  i n e x t r i c a b l y  l i n k e d ,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e
to  deny ( p a r t  of)  one i s  a l s o  to  deny the  o t h e r .  C l e a r l y ,
i t  would,  on N o z ick ' s  appeal  to  meaningful  l i f e ,  be d i f f e r e n t  i f
a government a c t ü a l l y  s topped  b a s k e t b a l l  p l a y e r s  from doing what
41they  en jo y ,  o r  from e a rn i n g  money from i t .  N o z ick ' s  own d i s t i n c t i o n  
between ' c h o o s in g '  and ' o p t i o n s '  must be drawn h e r e .
Hence, ag a in ,  the  example can only s e rv e  as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  
N o z ick ' s  view o f  r i g h t s ,  n o t  as an independen t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
i t .  I t s  p l a u s i b i l i t y  r e s t s  on th e  accep tance  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  assumptions  
( f o r  example,  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s )  which Nozick has 
n o t  shown to  be w ar ran ted  by h i s  s u p p o r t i n g  arguments .  I t  has 
n o t  been shown, in  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  W i l t  C h am b er la in ' s  'h um an i ty '  
i s  denied  s imply  because  h i s  p r o f i t s  a re  t a x e d ,  u n l e s s  one ac c e p t s  
N oz ick ' s  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  which,  I have a rgued ,  a re  open 
to  q u e s t i o n .
Nozick c la ims to  show t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  i n s t a n c e s  
o f  app ly ing  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  undermine th e  
p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f .  He argues  t h u s :
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I f  the  woman who l a t e r  became my w ife  r e ­
j e c t e d  a n o th e r  s u i t o r  (whom she o th e rw i s e  
would have marr ied)  f o r  me, p a r t i a l l y  b e ­
cause (I le ave  a s id e  my lova b le  n a t u r e )  
o f  my keen i n t e l l i g e n c e  and good lo o k s ,  
n e i t h e r  o f  which d id  I e a r n ,  would th e  
r e j e c t e d  l e s s  i n t e l l i g e n t  and l e s s  hand­
some s u i t o r  have a l e g i t i m a t e  com pla in t  
about  u n f a i r n e s s ?  Would my th us  impeding 
th e  o t h e r  s u i t o r ’ s winning th e  hand o f  
f a i r  lady  j u s t i f y  t a k i n g  some r e s o u r c e s  
from o t h e r s  to  pay f o r  cosm et ic  s u r g e r y  
f o r  him and s p e c i a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l  t r a i n i n g ,  
o r  t o  pay t o  deve lop in him some s t e r l i n g  
t r a i t  t h a t  I lack  in  o rd e r  t o  e q u a l i z e  
our  chances o f  be ing  c h o s e n ? ^
The answer i s  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  such a case  does n o t  w a r r a n t  g u a ra n t e e in g  
e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y .  Apar t  from th e  i r r e l e v a n c e  o f  e q u a l i t y  to  
t h i s  k ind  o f  choos ing ,  i t  i s  a c a r i c a t u r e  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
e q u a l i t y  to p o r t r a y  i t  in  t h i s  way. Because we would no t  want to  
r e - e d u c a t e  the  l o s i n g  s u i t o r  and pay f o r  p l a s t i c  s u rg e ry  f o r  h i s  
looks  need n o t  imply,  however,  t h a t  we would n o t  t a x  o t h e r s  to  feed  
him i f  he were s t a r v i n g .  The im p e ra t iv e  o f  goa l -ach ievem en t  has  n o t  
been shown by Nozick to  demand t h a t  any p o s s i b l e  i n d i v i d u a l  want o r  
need  must be s a t i s f i e d  in o r d e r  f o r  th e  p r i n c i p l e  to  be m eaningfu l .
The above case p ro v id e s  no good reason  f o r  e q u a l i s i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
But t h i s  does no t  show t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  no good reason  f o r  doing so.
A s u p p o r t e r  o f  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  need n o t  argue  tha t  a l l  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  should be e q u a l i s e d .  Nor would he deny t h a t  t h e r e  a re  
some i n s t a n c e s  o f  f r e e  choice  where the  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l i t y  has  
no r e l e v a n c e .  Hence such an example does n o t  d e l e g i t i m i s e  the  
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  which pursues  e q u a l i t y  of- o p p o r t u n i t y . I t  
does no t  show t h a t  the  v a lu e s  o f  autonomy appea led  to  by Nozick 
neve r  r e q u i r e  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  some form o f  e q u a l i t y .
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Thus N oz ick ' s  examples,  on t h e i r  own, do n o t  dem ons t ra te  
t h a t  a l l  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  which seeks  to  give some meaning and 
co n te n t  to  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ice must n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f r i n g e  autonomy.
They are simply  i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  h i s  n e g a t i v e  commitment to  r i g h t s ,  
which can be dem onst ra ted  to be unproven by h i s  s u p p o r t i n g  arguments .  
The examples c i t d d  by Nozick do n o t  f a l s i f y  the  c l a im  t h a t  human 
d i g n i t y  need n o t  be den ied  by p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o t h e r  than 
N oz ick ' s  minimal s t a t e .  Nor do they  show t h a t  f r e e  cho ice  i s  always 
t h e  s o l e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  ju dg ing  j u s t i c e  - pe rhaps  i t  i s  in  m a r r i a g e ,  
b u t  t h i s  does no t  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  i s  always so .  Only in  a world 
p o p u la te d  by o b i i g a t i o n - f r e e  i n d i v i d u a l s  do N o z ic k ' s  examples have 
meaning and fo r c e .  That Nozick b e l i e v e s  t h i s  to  be an a c c u r a t e  
p i c t u r e  o f  th e  world i s  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t  assumption  on h i s  p a r t ,  n o t  
an argument.  The only ev idence  o f  argument in Nozick as to  the  source  
and n a t u r e  o f  r i g h t s  i s  h i s  moral c la im  about  c o e rc io n  t h a t  r e s t s  
on h i s  view o f  d i g n i t y ,  s e p a r a t e n e s s ,  r a t i o n a l i t y  and meaningful  
l i f e .  And I have shown t h a t  t h e s e  p rem ises  a re  open-ended.  They 
need n o t  imply only n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s  on the  ev idence  Nozick p r o v i d e s .
As David Lyons p o i n t s  o u t ,  with  r e f e r e n c e  t o  N o z ic k ' s  Wi l t
Chamberlain example,
[n]ow, what such an example can hope to  
show i s  t h a t  v o lu n t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  a re  r e l e ­
v an t  to  judgements o f  j u s t i c e .  I t  fo l low s  
t h a t  th e  j u s t i c e  o f  a s o c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  
cannot  be de te rmined  w i th o u t  rega rd  to  
how i t  came about .  But i t  should  no t  be 
supposed t h a t  such an example shows any 
o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t o  be i r r e l e v a n t - .
Nozick may encourage such an i n f e r e n c e ,  
f o r  he does n o t  f u l l y  c l a r i f y  t h e  p o i n t  
o f  h i s  example,  and he sometimes argues  
a g a i n s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  c once p t ions  o f  j u s t i c e  
by showing t h a t  th ey  a re  i n s u f f i c i e n t
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guides to  j u s t i c e .  But o f  c o u r s e ,  i t  i s  
p e r f e c t l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  Nozick
nas shown) t h a t  more than one type o f  
p r i n c i p l e  ( f o r  example h i s t o r i c a l  p r i n c ­
i p l e s  p lu s  some o th e r s )  de termine  the  
t r u t h s  o f  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e .  We c e r t a i n l y  
cannot  assume t h e  c o n t r a r y .  The p o i n t  
o f  Nozick’s example must be- t o  remind 
us t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  p l a y  
a r o l e  in our  c o n s id e re d  moral judgments
Nozick dem ons t ra tes  t h a t  f r e e  choice i s  an im p o r tan t  valued 
and t h a t  denying i t  demands j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  But he does no t  show, 
as he wants t o ,  t h a t  no such j u s t i f i c a t i o n  can be found.  On the  
o t h e r  hand the  d i c t a t e s  o f  moral agency upon which h i s  arguments 
f o r  r i g h t s  are founded i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  may be reasons  f o r  
a l low ing  measures t h a t  deny some freedom o f  ch o ice .  This  i s  
e s p e c i a l l y  th e  case i f  one acc ep ts  t h a t  th e  im p e ra t i v e  o f  meaningful  
l i f e  demands some p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n .
N e i t h e r  h i s  examples no r  h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments prove  t h a t  
an a b s o lu t e  commitment to  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s  fo l low s  from a th e o ry  
o f  man. (Nor do h i s  arguments e s t a b l i s h  beyond doubt t h a t  any 
o t h e r  concep t ion  o f  r i g h t s  may be d e r iv e d  in  a coheren t  way.)
The c o n c l u s i o n ,  I s u g g e s t ,  must remain open. However, th e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  does n o t  deny t h e  r ea s o n s  t h a t  make r i g h t s  worth 
p u r s u in g .  Nozick f a i l s  to acknowledge th e  im por tance  o f  the  f a c t  
t h a t  n o t  a l l  s o - c a l l e d  ’ i n f r i n g e m e n t s '  o f  r i g h t s  a re  e q u a l l y  
o b j e c t i o n a b l e .  Nor does he al low t h a t  some i n f r i n g e m e n t s  may no t  
be at_ a l l  o b j e c t i o n a b l e ,  on h i s  own s t a t e d  p r e m is e s .  Here h i s  a s s e r t i o n s  
a g a i n s t  t a x a t i o n  f a i l ,  as do h i s  examples which seek to  r e f u t e  appea ls  
to  e q u a l i t y .
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Nozick's deontological argument, if anything, demonstrates
the necessity of recognising and enforcing different kinds of
rights. Thus Lyons argues that though negative rights may be important
for the reasons Nozick suggests, they need not comprise the total
44content of public morality. Nozick’s arguments do not exclude 
positive rights; rather, his conclusions define them out of 
existence. If Nozick's claims on behalf of meaningful life, moral 
agency and Kantian ethics are to be taken seriously, the possibi1itv 
of helping individuals to achieve their goals must at least be 
admitted, even if at the expense of denying others some free choice.
(If taxation can be shown to be anything more than a denial of 
options.) But, as I have argued, on his own moral grounds, redistributive 
policies need not be as objectionable as Nozick wants to suggest.
He does not show that all rights must be negative; nor does he 
establish that negative rights-infringement is never worth pursuing 
in the name of meaningful life. His appeal to examples of such infringe­
ments begs the question of whether or not they are legitimate 
forms of intervention.
VI.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
I have argued in this chapter that Nozick's argument for 
individual rights and the non-interventionist order is deontological 
in nature. Unlike Hayek, who speaks of freedom largely in terms of 
the benefits it provides for the individual and for society generally, 
Nozick justifies autonomy simply in terms of the immorality of 
denying it. The reasons he provides, then, for enforcing rights, 
do not relate to results that are largely independent of the mere 
exercise of those rights. Whether or not rights lead to goal-
142.
satisfaction is unnecessary for Nozick’s argument. Hayek, on the 
other hand, relies heavily on the belief that freedom leads to 
other obtainable goods (that, I argue, may be achieved by means other 
than the granting of negative freedom). Whereas Hayek’s argument 
is largely instrumental, Nozick’s clearly is not.
However, Nozick does not simply value autonomy per se. For 
autonomy reflects particular aspects of human nature and seeks 
to guarantee their respect. They are, specifically, rationality, 
separateness, free will, moral agency, the ability to attain meaning­
ful life and the dictates of Kantian ethics. Individuals possess 
certain characteristics that deserve recognition. These amount to a 
conception of human dignity which demands respect.
Upon these premises Nozick attempts to justify a non-inter­
ventionist order. In particular, he argues that the above human 
characteristics yield specific rights which are of a negative 
character. They do not demand positive state intervention to provide 
individuals with particular things in order to make their lives 
meaningful. Moreover, any attempt to achieve such ends through 
compulsion necessarily infringes rights and autonomy, thereby 
denying humans respect for their dignity. Hence, on this view, the 
interventionist state which uses coercion to achieve what may 
otherwise be quite legitimate goals is to be rejected.
Despite Nozick's own reservations about such concepts as
’meaningful life', and the claim made by Scanlon that Nozick doesn’t
45argue for his rights but merely assumes their existence, it
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seems p l a u s i b l e  to  s u gges t  t h a t  N oz ick ' s  view o f  man i s  the  b a s i s  
f o r  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n .  Indeed ,  i t  i s  t h e  on ly  b a s i s  he p r o v i d e s .  
Moreover, h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  genu ine ly  uncompromising,  f o r  h i s  r i g h t s  
a re  both  s p e c i f i c  and comprehensive.  He does no t  admit t h a t  some 
r i g h t s - v i o l a t i o n s  may be l e s s  u n a c c ep tab le  than  o th e r s  (which 
could  al low f o r  some s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n ) . Nor does he r e c o g n i s e  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e r e  be ing  o t h e r  ‘k inds  o f  r i g h t s  a p a r t  from n e g a t iv e  
ones (which could  a l so  al low f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by t h e  3 t a t e  in  
i n d i v i d u a l  l i t f e s ) .
I have cla imed t h a t  such an i n d i v i d u a l i s t  c o n c lu s io n  i s  no t
j u s t i f i e d  merely by an appea l  to  human d i g n i t y .  Hence N oz ick ’s moral
argument f o r  autonomy does n o t  by i t s e l f  d i s m i s s  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
o rd e r .  N oz ick’s concep t ion  o f  man i s  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the
view t h a t  t h e r e  a re  p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  and t h e r e f o r e  p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s .
Indeed c r i t i c s  such as S c h e f f l e r  have a t t e m p te d  to  d e v i se  'w e l f a r e
46r i g h t s '  u s in g  Nozick’s own p rem is es .  Nor does Nozick’s view o f  
man imply t h a t  t h e  va lues  o f  autonomy a re  d en ied  by such s t a t e  a c t i o n s  
t h a t  promote e q u a l i t y  o r  w e l f a r e  through r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  t a x a t i o n .
Though such measures v i o l a t e  Nozickean r i g h t s  i n  a t r i v i a l  sense  
(by d e f i n i t i o n ) ,  they  need n o t  nega te  th e  moral  agency o r  meaningful  
l i f e  t h a t  Nozick wants to  uphold .  Here h i s  c la im s  about  th e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  a re  q u i t e  m i s l e a d in g .  Like Hayek, he f a i l s  to  
r e c o g n i se  t h e  im por tan t  d i s t i n c t i o n  between s e r i o u s  and l e s s -  
s e r i o u s  forms o f  c o e rc io n .  He encourages  ( f a l s e l y )  the  view t h a t  a l l  
p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  c o l l e c t i v i s t  i n  n a t u r e  by s u g g e s t in g  
t h a t  t a x a t i o n  i s  l i k e  fo rced  l a b o u r .  That some forms o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
deny freedom o f  cho ice i s  obv ious ;  b u t  t h a t  o t h e r s  do no t  i s
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e q u a l ly  c l e a r .  Nozick b l u r s  r e l e v a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n s  in  h i s  a t t em p t  to  
e s t a b l i s h  the  e x c l u s i v e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s .
I f  such o rd e r s  as th e  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  do n o t  c u r t a i l  t h e  v a lues  
o f  au tonomy,in  the ways Nozick s u g g e s t s ,  and i f  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s  i s  n o t  r u l e d  out  by Nozick*s argument from the  
n a t u r e  o f  man, then h i s  a b s o lu t e  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  s e r i o u s l y  
weakened. That h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  j u s t i c e  in  r e c t i f i c a t i o n  a c t u a l l y  
demands an o r d e r  t h a t  i s  bo th  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  
c a s t s  doubt on h i s  co n c lu s io n  t h a t  only a minimal s t a t e  can s a f e ­
guard human d i g n i t y .  Nozick*s o p p o s i t i o n  t o  s t a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  p e r  
se i s  compromised by h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  p a s t  i n j u s t i c e s  be r e c t i f i e d ,  
even though the  l a t t e r  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Nozick,  in d e p e n d e n t l y  
j u s t i f i a b l e .
Nozick*s a t tem p t  to  pe rsuade  by the  use o f  com pel l ing  examples
does no t  e s t a b l i s h  his p o l i t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s .  They e i t h e r  d e s t r o y
s t raw  men by r e b u t t i n g  i r r e l e v a n t  uses  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  a rguments ,
or  c la im  t h a t  one i n s t a n c e  o f  a wrongly a p p l i e d  p r i n c i p l e  n e g a t e s
th e  p r i n c i p l e  i t s e l f .  Nozick*s appea l  t o  m arr i age  and o t h e r
47' c a p i t a l i s t  a c t s  between c o n s e n t in g  a d u l t s ’ on ly  shows t h a t  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  t h e s e  a r e a s  would be wrong on h i s  grounds .  I t  does 
no t  exc lude  i n t e r v e n t i o n  as such .  Hence Nozick*s c l a im  to  have 
d e l e g i t i m i s e d  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  f a l s i f i e d  by an a n a l y s i s  
o f  h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  argument.
I t  i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  case  t h a t  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  d e t a i l ,  Hayek 's
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l i b e r a l  o rd e r  and N oz ick ' s  minimal s t a t e  a re  q u i t e  d i s s i m i l a r .  
However, they  do s ha re  the  genera l  view t h a t  the  s t a t e  shou ld  no t  
c o e r c i v e l y  i n t e r v e n e  in  m a t t e r s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  choice  excep t  in  the  
punishment o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  c o e rc io n .  Both t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  a re  
a b s o lu t e  to  the  e x t e n t  t h a t  they  b e l i e v e  n o th in g  can j u s t i f y  
compulsion in  a rea s  beyond such punishment.  They bo th  r e l y  on the  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between freedom or  r i g h t s  on the  one hand and power 
on the  o t h e r .  But in  so doing th e y  bo th  f a i l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between 
s e r i o u s  and n o n - s e r io u s  c o e rc io n .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  Hayek and 
Nozick f a i l  to e s t a b l i s h  th e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  coe rc ion  
as a c o n s t r a i n t  upon i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  This i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  o f  Hayek, 
whose u t i l i t a r i a n  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  seems to  demand t h a t  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  
emphasis  on coe rc ion  be r e l a x e d  in favou r  o f  a m e l i o r a t i n g  o t h e r  
c o n s t r a i n t s .  However, even N oz ick ' s  appea l  to  the  supposed immoral i ty  
o f  coe rc ion  e s t a b l i s h e s  n e i t h e r  t h a t  i t  i s  n e v e r  j u s t i f i a b l e ,  n o r  
t h a t  i t  r e a l l y  den ies  i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  And f o r  t h e o r i s t s  o f  the  non­
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  who so c l e a r l y  r e l y  on a concep t ion  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  t h i s  i s  an im p o r tan t  problem.
Hence both  u t i l i t a r i a n  and d e o n t o lo g ic a l  arguments f o r  an 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p o s i t i o n  face  im p o r tan t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  the  a t tem p t  
t o  r e j e c t  v a r io u s  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  I have 
argued  t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  c lo s e n e s s  o f  Hayek 's p o s i t i o n  to  t h a t  o f  
Nozick,  t h e r e  i s  a fundamental c o n t r a s t  in  t h e i r  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  
approaches .  This i s  h a r d ly  s u r p r i s i n g  c o n s id e r i n g  th e  d i f f e r e n t  
s ou rces  o f  t h e i r  thought and the  i n t e r t w i n i n g  o f  t r a d i t i o n s  to  
which they be long .  But i s  th e  e x t e n t  o f  th e  c o n t r a s t  obvious?
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I argue t h a t  Hayek 's argument i s  t e l e o l o g i c a l  because  he appea ls  
to  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom. Though he sometimes c la im s  t h a t  coe rc io n  
i s  e v i l  s imply becuase  i t  n eg a te s  t h e  t h i n k i n g  and v a l u i n g  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  he c l e a r l y  does no t  couch his j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
p r i m a r i l y  in  t h e s e  te rms.  Hence i t  can be r e a d i l y  assumed t h a t  Hayek's  
main j u s t i f i c a t o r y  concern i s  f o r  c o e r c i o n ' s  d e n i a l  o f  b e n e f i t s .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  though Nozick c la ims t h a t  u to p i a  ( th e  minimal s t a t e )  
i s  ' i n s p i r i n g '  because i t  f u l f i l s  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  Utopians  (by 
presumably maximising the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  h a p p i n e s s ) ,  i t  would be mis­
l e a d in g  to  a t t r i b u t e  much j u s t i f i c a t o r y  im por tance  to  t h i s  c la im .  
N oz ick ' s  a p p e a l ,  r a t h e r ,  i s  to a concep tion  o f  ' t h e  r i g h t '  and no t  
' t h e  good ' .  G o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r y ,  he b e l i e v e s ,  to  
suppo r t  t h e  va lue  o f  autonomy.
Thus t h e  c o n t r a s t  between Hayek and Nozifck r e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  
arguments i s  v a l i d .  However, though the se  a re  th e  main arguments 
used to  exclude i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m  from p o l i t i c s ,  they  a r e ,  upon f u r t h e r  
exam ina t ion ,  n o t  th e  only  ones .  That autonomy i s  seen p r i m a r i l y  
th rough e i t h e r  the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom or  the  n a t u r e  o f  man and 
h i s  r i g h t s  i s  not  t h e  end o f  the  deba te  fo r  Hayek and Nozick.  For 
they bo th  pu t  forward a s e r i e s  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  as to  th e  t r u e  n a t u r e  
o f  s o c i e t y  which are  s a id  to  y i e l d  only  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .  These s t a t e m e n t s  a re  l a r g e l y  e m p i r i c a l ;  they  a t tem p t  
to  dem onst ra te  the  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  (o r  f u t i l i t y )  o f  moving beyond t h e i r  
own p r e f e r r e d  form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n .  Although such assumptions  
about  s o c i e t y  are  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t i v e ,  they  can u l t i m a t e l y  be reduced 
to  th e  n o t io n  t h a t  s o c i e t y  c o n s i s t s  o f  no more than  a c o l l e c t i o n
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o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i thou t  common bonds ,  whose major  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  
o th e r s  a re  immunit ies  r a t h e r  than  o b l i g a t i o n s .  This  th o ro u g h ­
going i n d i v i d u a l i s m  i s  m a n i fe s t  in p a r t i c u l a r  p rem ises  and assump­
t i o n s  in bo th  Hayek and Nozick,  though i t  i s  c l e a r l y  common to  
bo th  o f  them.
A complete assessmen t o f  Hayek' s and N o z ick ' s  l i b e r t a r i a n  
p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n ,  th e n ,  i s  im p o ss ib le  w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e i r  
sha red  assumpt ions  about  the  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y ,  which lead  to  a 
sha red  i n d i v id u a l i s m .  For t h i s  t a s k  i t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  argue 
t h a t  t h e i r  cla ims on b e h a l f  o f  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  
which appeal  to  the  va lu e s  o f  freedom and r i g h t s ,  a re  fundam enta l ly  
f lawed.  For u l t i m a t e l y  t h e i r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n  
r e s t s  on much more than t h i s .  A c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  both  t h e i r  
gene ra l  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  and i t s  s p e c i f i c  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  i s  th e  t a s k  
o f  the  f i n a l  c h a p t e r .
1 4 8 .
CHAPTER 6 . INDIVIDUALISM, SOCIETY AND THE REJECTION OF THE 
INTERVENTI ONIST ORDER.
I . INTRODUCTION.
I have argued t h a t  Hayek and Nozick approach th e  problem o f  
j u s t i f y i n g  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  one t h a t  does no t  i n t e r f e r e  
c o e r c i v e l y  wi th  i n d i v i d u a l  c h o i c e s ,  from two fundam en ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  
p e r s p e c t i v e s .  However, n e i t h e r  Hayek 's  c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t  argument 
n o r  Nozick’s d e o n t o lo g ic a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  su p p o r t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  only a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  l e g i t i m a t e .
C e r t a i n  uses o f  s t a t e  compulsion,  l i m i t e d  to  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  th rough th e  a m e l io r a t i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
upon a c t i o n  o t h e r  than i n t e r p e r s o n a l  c o e r c io n ,  a re  f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  t h e  va lues  o f  autonomy appea led  t o  by bo th  Hayek and Nozick.
Hence t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  arguments on b e h a l f  o f  freedom and r i g h t s  
do n o t  d ismiss  the  c la ims o f  th o se  who favour  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r .
In t h i s  c h a p t e r  I want to  examine the  im p o r tan t  a d d i t i o n a l  
c la ims  made j o i n t l y  by Hayek and Nozick in s u p p o r t  o f  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  
t h a t  a re  d i s t i n c t  from t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  claims o u t l i n e d  above.  I f  
t h e  l a t t e r  a re  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  d e l e g i t i m i s e  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r ,  what o t h e r  claims  can be made t o  ach ieve  t h i s  end? How can 
th e s e  claims  be d e s c r ib e d ?  What, i f  any th in g ,  do they  have in  
common? What i s  t h e i r  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  fo rce  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  
p o l i t i c a l  co n c lu s io n s  reached  by Hayek and Nozick r e g a r d i n g  freedom, 
r i g h t s  and j u s t i c e ?
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I w i l l  argue t h a t  Hayek and Nozick s h a re  c e r t a i n  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  
p rem ises  and assumptions conce rn ing  th e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  which 
s e rve  as j u s t i f i c a t i o n s ,  and n o t  merely d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  o f  t h e i r  
p r e f e r r e d  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n .  We ought, on t h i s  a cc o u n t ,  t o  r e j e c t  
the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  no t  because  i t  i n f r i n g e s  i n d i v i d u a l  
autonomy, bu t  because  i t  i s  based  on f a l l a c i o u s  p r e m is e s .  S o c i e ty ,  
they  a rgue ,  i s  no t  an ’o r g a n i s a t i o n ' ,  i f  t h i s  i s  taken  t o  i n c lu d e  
a s e t  o f  common g o a l s .  Rather  i t  c o n s i s t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  who come 
i n t o  c o n t a c t  ' a c c i d e n t a l l y '  in  the  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  g o a l s .  
Hence th e  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  ought  s imply t o  p ro v id e  a s e t  o f  
r u l e s  which a l lows i n d i v i d u a l s  to  pu rsue  t h e i r  goa ls  through 
v o lu n t a r y  c o o p e ra t io n  and m utua l ly  b e n e f i c i a l  c o n t r a c t s .  There 
can be no ' s o c i e t a l '  goa ls  as such ,  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  cannot  agree  
upon c o l l e c t i v e  ends.  Hence such q u e s t i o n s  as ' s o c i a l . j u s t i c e ' a re  
s a i d  to  be merely pseudo-problems posed by d e fen d e rs  o f  c e n t r a l i s t  
p l a n n in g  which a r e ,  in  p r i n c i p l e ,  u n s o lv a b le .  There i s  no 'cake* 
to  be somehow b e s t  d i s t r i b u t e d  amongst th e  members o f  s o c i e t y .
That the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  and r e s o u r c e s  i s  e n t i r e l y  a random 
p r o c e s s ,  p r o p e r l y  u n d e r s to o d ,  i s  s a i d  to  have p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i t i c a l  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .  I t  i s  no t  one o f  the  t a s k s  o f  government t o  c r e a t e  
c r i t e r i a  (need ,  d e s e r t ,  e q u a l i t y )  by which a d i s t r i b u t i o n  can be 
judged.  T h i s ,  a cc o rd ing  to  Hayek and Nozick,  would be a n o n s e n s i c a l  
e x e r c i s e  in  a f r e e  s o c i e t y .  I t s  on ly  p o s s i b l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  would 
be i f  s o c i e t y  were an o r g a n i s a t i o n  w i th  common ends .
This sha red  view o f  s o c i e t y  i s  m a n i fe s t  in  v a r io u s  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
and arguments .  Hayek' s  most im p o r ta n t  p remise  r e l a t e s  to  h i s  t h e o ry  
o f  knowledge.  I t  i s  t h a t  th e  argument f o r  freedom i s  based  on human
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igno rance .  The l i m i t e d  n a t u r e  o f  our  knowledge i s  s a i d  to  p r e c lu d e  
p l a n n in g ,  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  and s t a t e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in  i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s .  
Moreover t h e r e  i s  a p l u r a l i t y  o f  ends and an i n d i v i d u a t i o n  o f  needs 
in  s o c i e t y  which a l l e g e d l y  exclude p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n .  For 
Hayek, we cannot  know enough about  th e  ends o f  o t h e r s  t o  j u s t i f y  
d i c t a t i n g  t h e i r  goals  and c h o ic e s .  And th e  n o t i o n  o f  a ' c o l l e c t i v e  
g o a l '  i s  meaningle ss  and i l l u s o r y .
Nozick a l s o  argues a g a i n s t  th o se  ’u to p i a n  p l a n n e r s ’ who a re  
s a i d  to  igno re  the  p l u r a l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t s  and th e  i n h e r e n t  complexity  
o f  s o c i e t y .  Though h i s  th e o ry  o f  knowledge i s  much l e s s  deve loped  
than  H ayek ' s ,  Nozick n e v e r t h e l e s s  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  u to p i a n  ( c o l l e c t i v e l y  
conceived] v i s i o n s  o f  th e  good l i f e  a re  bo th  u n d i s c o v e r a b l e  and 
u n a c h ie v a b le .  They are  beyond th e  rea lm o f  l e g i t i m a t e  s o c i e t a l  
endeavour.  There can be no ’s o c i a l '  good beyond th e  ends o f  s p e c i f i c  
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and any a t tem pt  by th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  to  ach ieve  
such ends i s  bound u l t i m a t e l y  t o  f a i l .  On t h i s  argument,  th e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  no t  to  be r e j e c t e d  because  i t  i n f r i n g e s  freedom 
and v io l a te s  r i g h t s , bu t  because the  whole n o t i o n  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i s  i t s e l f  f a l s e l y  conce ived .
In a d d i t i o n ,  both  Hayek and Nozick make use o f  Adam S m i t h ' s  
n o t i o n  o f  t h e  ' i n v i s i b l e - h a n d '  in  o r d e r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  the  primacy 
o f  t h e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r .  Hayek c la ims t o  adopt  an e v o l u ­
t i o n a r y  approach to  freedom. Although human a c t i o n s  d e t e rm in e ,  
f o r  example,  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  goods,  human p l a n n in g  does n o t .
For t h e  appearance  o f  a s o c i e t y  w i th  a p a r t i c u l a r  shape i s  an 
a c c i d e n t ,  r e s u l t i n g  by chance from t h e  u n co o rd in a te d  a c t i o n s  o f
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many i n d i v i d u a l s  and by the  im personal  mechanism o f  th e  marke t .  To 
i n t e r f e r e  with  th e  n a t u r a l  p ro ces s  o f  e v o l u t i o n  th rough s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  he a rg u es ,  would d e s t r o y  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  i n v i s i b l e -  
hand which al lows the  f r e e  s o c i e t y  to  develop .
S i m i l a r l y ,  Nozick j u s t i f i e s  h i s  minimal s t a t e ,  a g a i n s t  both  
anarchism and i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m ,  by c la im ing  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  a 
s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  could 'back i n t o '  a p a r t i c u l a r  k in d  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th o u t  hav ing  in ten d ed  i t .  Such an approach r e f l e c t s  
t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a l l  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  e x p l a n a t i o n s  which could j u s t i f y  
a more- than-min imal  s t a t e .  Only an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  p ro c e s s  (which 
does no t  d i c t a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s ’ r i g h t s  and needs)  can a d e q u a te l y  
account  f o r  t h e  emergence o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  T h e re fo re  a l l  c o n t r a r y  
e x p la n a t i o n s  a re  s a id  to  be f a l s e l y  conce ived ,  and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  
co n c lu s io n s  v o id .^
The a c c u racy ,  and the  means o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  g e n e ra l  
p remise  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  good,  only  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l s ,  
remain u n c l e a r .  However, t h i s  i s  the  u l t i m a t e  appea l  made by 
Hayek and Nozick i n  t h e i r  a t t em p t  t o  r e f u t e  c la ims in  s u p p o r t  o f  
p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n .  They are  fo rced  to  r e l y  on t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  
concep t ion  o f  s o c i e t y  s in c e  t h e i r  s p e c f i c  arguments on b e h a l f  o f  
freedom and r i g h t s  do no t  y i e l d  t h e i r  d e s i r e d  c o n c l u s i o n s .
Desp i te  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  j u s t i f y i n g  (or  r e j e c t i n g )  such 
uncompromisingly i n d i v i d u a l i s t  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  some s p e c i f i c  problems 
c o n f ro n t  Hayek*s and Nozick*s p a r t i c u l a r  arguments .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
between a ' c a t a l l a x y * ,  in  Hayekian te rm s ,  and an o r g a n i s a t i o n ,
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based  on th e  p re s e n c e  o r  absence o f  common ends among t h e i r  members, 
i s  somewhat ex a g g e ra te d .  For every  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  has a t  
l e a s t  one end,  by d e f i n i t i o n  - i t s  own p e r p e t u a t i o n .  Hence, th e  
n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  has as i t s  end the p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
autonomy. I f  'common ends '  can be reduced to  ' ag reed -upon  e n d s ' ,  
then  c l e a r l y  even a f r e e  s o c i e t y  may c o n ta in  agreement over  some 
t h i n g s .  Hayek, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  assumes t h i s  in h i s  n o t i o n  o f  t h e  
r u l e  o f  law, which can only be ' d i s c o v e r e d ' ,  n o t  made. Yet such 
a d i s co v e ry  must r e l y  upon the  use o f  human rea s o n .  And th e  d e t e r m i ­
n a t i o n  o f  th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  p r i v a t e  sphere  c l e a r l y  has  t o  r e l y  on 
some common agreement; o th e rw is e  i t s  d e l i m i t a t i o n  and p r o t e c t i o n  
would be im p o ss ib le .  Hence i f  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  r e a c h in g  agreement 
o ve r  ends are  taken to  be an argument a g a i n s t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r ,  the  l o g i c a l  outcome i s  n o t  Hayek' s and N o z ic k ' s  p r e f e r r e d  
p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  b u t  anarchism.
Many forms o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  concede th e  im por tance  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  ends w i thou t  a t  th e  same time r e a c h in g  the  a b s o l u t e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  p r e c l u d i n g  any common agreement.  Again,  t h e r e  i s  
pe rhaps  a continuum o f  agreements :  a t  one end,  an o r d e r  which 
r e f l e c t s  agreement only  on th e  need f o r  mutual p r o t e c t i o n ,  and a t  
th e  o t h e r  a c o l l e c t i v i s t  o r d e r  which a c t u a l l y  de te rm ines  what 
i n d i v i d u a l  ends w i l l  be .  Seemingly the  l a t t e r  ig n o re s  the  p l u r a l i t y  
o f  i n t e r e s t s  appea led  to  by Hayek and Nozick,  bu t  c l e a r l y  i n t e r ­
mediate forms along  t h e  continuum can al low f o r  l i m i t e d  agreement 
w i thou t  g o a l - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  Hence arguments from the  p rem ise  o f  
a p l u r a l i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  need no t  exc lude  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
o r d e r  t h a t  i s  committed t o  th e  n o n - d i c t a t i o n  o f  what i n d i v i d u a l
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goa ls  w i l l  be .
I f  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  as posed by Hayek and Nozick,  between 
’s o c i e t y '  and ' o r g a n i s a t i o n ’ can be shown to  be a t  l e a s t  m i s l e a d i n g ,  
i f  n o t  f a l s e ,  then the  co n c lu s io n s  they  reach  r e g a r d i n g  j u s t i c e  
and common ends lo se  much o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e .
1 1 »HAYEK'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL PLURALISM.
The most im p o r tan t  f e a t u r e  o f  Hayek' s  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  i s  t h a t ,
n o t  only  i s  man a r a t i o n a l  and r e s p o n s i b l e  ch o o s e r ,  bu t  in  s o c i e t y
h i s  s e p a r a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ices  cannot  r e n d e r  a h i e r a r c h y  o f  en d $ ,
a commonly agreed-upon s e t  o f  goa ls  to  be maximised.  In d e s c r i b i n g
Hayek’s l i b e r a l i s m ,  M.W. Wilhelm p o i n t s  out  t h a t  ' [ t j h e r e  i s  no
2
" n a t u r a l  harmony o f  i n t e r e s t s ' " .  I n d i v i d u a l s  in  a spontaneous  
o r d e r  p u r s u e  t h e i r  own goa ls  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f ,  and ig n o r a n t  o f ,  
t h e  goa ls  and wants o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  t h a t  the y  do n o t  know. On 
t h i s  view, t h e r e  i s  no n e c e s s a ry  c o in c id en c e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s .
The s p e c i f i c  purposes  o f  each p a r t y  i n  a v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r a c t
may de te rmine  what mutual b e n e f i t s  w i l l  accrue from i t .  But the
ends o f  one pe rson  a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  those  o f  the  o t h e r ,  n o r  need
they be f o r  t h e  co o p e ra t io n  t o  be s u c c e s s f u l .  Vo lun ta ry  c o n t r a c t s
3
can s e rv e  th e  d i f f e r e n t  ends o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s .  Hayek 's  
b e l i e f  in  the  i n d i v i d u a t i o n  and p l u r a l i t y  o f  human purposes  
engenders  a commitment to  freedom as a p o l i t i c a l  v a lu e .  He argues  
t h a t  on ly  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  a d e q u a te ly  accoun ts  f o r  the
f a c t  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  d i f f e r .
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Hayek*s individualism rests principally on his theory of 
knowledge. He argues
... that the case for individual freedom 
rests chiefly on the recognition of the 
inevitable ignorance of all of us concerning 
a great many of the factors on which the 
achivement of our ends and welfare depends...
If there were omniscient men, if we could 
know not only all that affects the attain­
ment of our present wishes but also our 
future wants and desires, there would be 
little case for liberty ...
It is because every individual knows so 
little, and, in particular, because we 
rarely know which of us knows best that 
we trust the independent and competitive 
efforts of many to iiiduce the emergence of 
what we shall want when we see it.2*
For Hayek, this condition of man's ignorance of both the means 
and the ends of the best form of life demands the political con­
clusion that
... we should provide the maximum of oppor­
tunity for unknown individuals to learn the 
facts that we ourselves are yet unaware of 
and to make use of this knowledge in their 
actions.^
With this assumption of what Wilhelm calls 'the limited rationality
6 7of man', Hayek is claiming, with Popper, that individuals cannot
know the future course of their development, since knowledge is
transitory, and the unintended consequences of human actions in
the future would make meaningful prediction (and therefore planning)
of future needs impossible.
The whole conception of man already en­
dowed with a mind capable of conceiving 
civilisation setting out to create it is 
fundamentally false. Man did not simply 
impose upon the world a pattern creatred 
by his mind. His mind is itself a system 
that constantly changes as a result of 
his endeavour to adapt himself to his 
surroundings.8
The conception of man deliberately building
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h i s  c i v i l i s a t i o n  steins from an e r roneous  
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m  t h a t  r e g a rd s  human reason  
as something s t a n d i n g  o u t s i d e  n a t u r e  and 
p o s se s s e d  o f  knowledge and r e a s o n in g  c a ­
p a c i t y  independen t  o f  ex p e r i e n c e  . . .  The 
mind can n ev e r  f o r e s e e  i t s  own advance .^
Knowledge, f o r  Hayek, seems both  a s e t  o f  f a c t s ,  a s t o r e  o f  in fo rm ­
a t i o n  used by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and an a c t i v i t y  o r  p ro c e s s  o f  s o c i a l  
i n t e r a c t i o n .  In e i t h e r  c a s e ,  i t  can be used only by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
and i s  c r e a t e d  by i n d i v i d u a l s ,  in the  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  
p u rp o s e s .  Knowledge o f  s o c i e t a l  g o a l s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Hayek, i s  
t h e r e f o r e  im p o ss ib l e .  Moreover,  ou r  s c i e n t i f i c  o r  t e c h n i c a l  
knowledge grows only  t o  i n c r e a s e  our  r e l a t i v e  igno ranc e  o f  more 
and more complex phenomena. Thus though i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  r a t i o n a l ,  
s o c i e t y  cannot  be s i m i l a r l y  d e s c r i b e d .  To t h i s  e x t e n t ,  Hayek argues  
a g a i n s t  th e  use o f  human reason  f o r  t h e  a t t a in m e n t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
p u r p o s e s ,  f o r  i t  i s  s e n s e l e s s  to  even t a l k  about  c o l l e c t i v e  p u rp o s e s .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  man simply has no t  d i s c o v e re d  c r i t e r i a  by which s o c i a l  
j u s t i c e  can be judged ,  and t h e  q u e s t i o n s  i t  poses  a n s w e r e d . ^  
P lann ing  p resupposes  a t e c h n i c a l  knowledge o f  means,  and s o c i a l  
j u s t i c e  r e q u i r e s  a moral knowledge o f  ends t h a t  a re  r eg a rd ed  as 
u n a t t a i n a b l e  in Hayek 's  ' l i m i t e d  r a t i o n a l i t y '  t h e s i s .
For Hayek, a l l  human a c t i o n s  a re  de termined  by i n d i v i d u a l  
uses  o f  knowledge.  This  i s  th e  b a s i s  f o r  h i s  c l a im  t h a t  man can 
and does have i n d i v i d u a l  purposes  t h a t  a re  th w ar te d  by c o e r c io n .  
Although i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  u l t i m a t e l y  i g n o r a n t  in  r e l a t i o n  to  the  
s t o r e  o f  t e c h n i c a l  knowledge developed  by s o c i e t y ,  and in  r e l a t i o n  
to  t h e  needs and pu rposes  o f  c o u n t l e s s  unknown i n d i v i d u a l s ,  they  
a re  in  t h e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  to  know t h e i r  own wants and g o a l s .  D esp i te
an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  ignorance  o f  a l l  th e  f a c t s  he needs t o  know in  
making p u rpos ive  d e c i s i o n s ,  we can be c e r t a i n  t h a t  no one e l s e  
w i l l  know them b e t t e r  than  the  i n d i v i d u a l  h i m s e l f ,  s i n c e  an i n d i v i d ­
u a l ’s knowledge i s ,  f o r  Hayek, c o n c re te  r a t h e r  than  g e n e r i c .  Tne 
i n d i v i d u a l  knows b e s t  the  c o n d i t i o n s  which a f f e c t  h i s  w an ts ,  needs 
and l i f e - p l a n s .  But ,  on the  o t h e r  hand,  s in c e  ou r  goa ls  a re  t r a n s i ­
t o r y ,  ' [ l ] i b e r t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l  in  o r d e r  to  le ave  room f o r  the
12u n f o r e s e e a b l e  and u n p r e d i c t a b l e  . . . ' .
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Hence H ayek ' s argument f o r  freedom from t h e  s t a t e  o f  human
knowledge in v o lv es  a s s e r t i o n s  about bo th  the  knowledge we do n o t
have ,  and t h a t  which we do p o s s e s s .  We cannot  know a l l  th e  f a c t s
t h a t  a re  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  the  fo rm u la t io n  o f  an o th e r  i n d i v i d u a l ' s
p l a n s .  As N..P. Barry n o t e s ,
[ t ] h i s  has im por tan t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
m o r a l i t y  because  t h i s  t h e s i s  o f  man's 
l i m i t e d  knowledge means t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
cannot  be expec ted  t o  have moral o b l i ­
g a t io n s  to  s o c i e t y  as a whole,  no t  
merely because  they  a re  i n c a p a b le  o f  
th e  degree  o f  a l t r u i s m  t h i s  would r e ­
q u i r e ,  b u t  because  th ey  can n ev e r  know 
what th e s e  o b l i g a t i o n s  a r e .
This t h e s i s  . . .  i s  no t  merely an e m p i r i c a l  
prob lem, o r  a c o n t in g e n t  f a c t  about men 
which may be a l t e r e d  by some t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
advance.  I t  i s  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t h e s i s  
about  th e  form in  which knowledge e x i s t s  
in  t h e  world and about  the  way in  which 
the  mind becomes aware o f  t h i s  knowledge.
The sum t o t a l  o f  knowledge e x i s t i n g  in  
any s o c i e t y  w i l l  be fragmented and d i s ­
p e r s e d  th roughou t  the  members o f  t h a t  
s o c i e t y  and n e i t h e r  economic knowledge 
o r  any o t h e r  k ind  o f  knowledge can be 
c e n t r a l i s e d  in  any one mind o r  i n s t i t u t i o n .13
Thus t h e  cla im  t h a t  in  s o c i e t y  t h e r e  cannot  be a h i e r a r c h y  o f
common goals  o r  a n a t u r a l  co in c id en c e  o f  i n t e r e s t s  i s  n o t  r e d u c i b l e
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to man’s so-called egoism or self-interest, but is for Hayek the
product of our imperfect moral knowledge. That we cannot agree on
ends is related to our inability to even know what those ends might
be. Hence George and Wilding point out that
[f]or this reason no one man can have a 
panoramic view of society and can know 
what ought or ought not to be done on a 
grand scale. Rather, through their inter­
action, by correcting, modifying or adding 
to what others have done, individuals pro­
duce achievements that are beyond their 
individual capacities.^
Hayek's theory of knowledge has the clear political implication 
that the formulation of much public policy (legislation) is 
fundamentally mistaken. Hayek argues that freedom must be upheld, 
and coercion therefore minimised, in order to provide individuals 
with the opportunity of using their specific knowledge for knowable, 
specific purposes. On the other hand, public policy, in Hayek’s 
view, involves making claims about 'general' knowledge and 'social' 
goals which do not take account of the use of specific knowledge 
by individuals. And since this latter kind of knowledge is the only 
kind that we can ever possess, it follows for Hayek that only a 
non-interventionist state can be derived from a proper understanding 
of the nature of human knowledge. Positive state actions of the 
kind rejected by Hayek are said to be inconsistent with the kind 
cf knowledge that humans possess and can meaningfully use.
Hence a clear argument for freedom can be adduced from Hayek's 
individualistic view of man and society - in hi-s rational choosing, 
his plurality of wants and his inevitable ignorance. Moreover 
this argument serves not only as a description of how real societies
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deve lop ,  bu t  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a r rangem en ts .  I t  s t ands  as a s e p a r a t e  argument d i s t i n c t  from b i s  
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t  cla ims about the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom . The l a t t e r  
seeks to  maximise spontaneous  f o r c e s ,  whereas t h e  argument about  
knowledge r e f e r s  to  the  a c tu a l  d i s c o v e ry  o f  the  n a t u r e  o f  those  
f o r c e s ,  and r e l a t e s  to  the  a l l e g e d  s p u r io u s n e s s  o f  t h e  c la ims made 
by i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s :  they  are p rom is ing  to  ach ieve  th e  u n a c h ie v a b le .  
According to  Hayek,
[ t ] h e  i d e a l  o f  us ing  th e  co e rc iv e  powers 
o f  government to  achieve ’p o s i t i v e '  ( i . e .  
s o c i a l  o r  d i s t r i b u t i v e )  j u s t i c e  l e a d s ,  
however,  n o t  only n e c e s s a r i l y  t o  th e  de ­
s t r u c t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom, which 
some might no t  th ink  too  h igh  a p r i c e ,  
bu t  i t  a l s o  proves  on exam inat ion  a 
mirage or  an i l l u s i o n  which cannot  be 
ach ived  in  any c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  because  
i t  p resupposes  an agreement on the  r e l ­
a t i v e  importance o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c re t e  : 
ends which cannot  e x i s t  in  a g r e a t  s o c i e t y  
whose members do n o t  know each o t h e r  or  
t h e  same p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t s . 1?
Hence Hayek i s  a rgu ing  from p rem ises  o f  bo th  igno ranc e  and s o c i a l  
p l u r a l i s m .  He i n s i s t s ,  n o t  only t h a t  we cannot  know enough in  o r d e r  
to  make p la n n in g  p o s s i b l e ,  bu t  a l s o  t h a t  t h e r e  i s ,  i n  a s e n s e ,  
n o th in g  to  know, s in c e  th e  very  n o t i o n  o f  ag reed-upon ,  c o l l e c t i v e  
goa ls  i s  f a l l a c i o u s .  His t h e o ry  o f  ignorance  p e r t a i n s  to  our  
knowledge o f  th e  goa ls  o f  o t h e r s ,  whereas h i s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  no 
common goa ls  e x i s t  r e f l e c t s  our  i n a b i l i t y  to  reach  agreement w i th  
o t h e r s .  Hence t h e r e  a re  two s e t s  o f  p rem ises  r e l e v a n t  to  Hayek's  
co n c lu s io n s  about  t h i s  a l l e g e d  confus ion  in  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  t h i n k i n g  
- ignorance  and p l u r a l i s m .  Taken t o g e t h e r ,  they'  a r e  s a i d  t o  r e n d e r  
s o c i e t a l  goa ls  m ean ing le ss .
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For Hayek, i t  i s  only in a f r e e  s o c i e t y  t h a t  igno ranc e  sind 
p l u r a l i s m  e x i s t ,  f o r  in  the  absence o f  d i c t a t e d  g o a l s ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w i l l  pursue  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s ,  which do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o i n c id e  
with  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  o t h e r s .  In such a s o c i e t y  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
d e t e r m in a t io n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  i s  t h e r e f o r e  im p o s s i b l e ,  due 
to  bo th  the  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  purposes  and our  i n a b i l i t y  to  o r d e r  
them. The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  on the  o t h e r  hand ,  i s  s a i d  t o  deny 
p l u r a l  v a lu e s  and human ignorance  in  i t s  a t t em p t  to  de te rm ine  
outcomes. Hence Hayek can say bo th  t h a t  ou r  ends a re  n o n - c o i n c i d i n g ,  
and t h a t  we cannot  know1 enough o f  the  i n t e r e s t s  and goa l s  o f  o t h e r s  
t o  j u s t i f y  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
Hayek*s e v o l u t i o n a r y  l i b e r a l i s m ,  which acc o rd in g  to  h i s  own 
view, * . . .  d e r iv e s  from th e  d i s c o v e ry  o f  a s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g  o r  
spontaneous  o r d e r  in s o c i a l  a f f a i r s  . . . ' ^  could n o t ,  he a r g u e s ,  
p o s s i b l y  give r i s e  t o ,  o r  j u s t i f y ,  s o c i a l  p l a n n i n g ,  e n fo rc e d  w e l f a r e  
and the  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w ea l th .  His u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  how i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  
cus toms,  morals  and t r a d i t i o n s  a r i s e  and develop  - by undes igned  
growth as the  p ro d u c t  o f  spontaneous  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n s ,  r a t h e r  than 
as th e  d e l i b e r a t e  im p o s i t io n  by p la n n e r s  o f  a t h o u g h t - o u t ,  c o n t r i v e d  
s c a l e  o f  v a lu es  - can only  f i n d  f u l f i l m e n t  in  a p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  
t h a t  above a l l  r e c o g n i s e s  and v a lu e s  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom. Hayek 
a t t e m p t s  to  j u s t i f y  t h i s  o r d e r  by an e x p l i c i t  appea l  to  both  a 
d i s t i n c t i v e  and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  t h e o ry  o f  knowledge,  and to  a s e t  
o f  a s s e r t i o n s  as to  the  p l u r a l i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  ends .
Thus Hayek can c la im  t h a t  ’ s o c i a l  j u s t i c e *  i s  a m i r a g e , t h e  p u r s u i t  
o f  which i s  f u t i l e  as w ell  as d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom.
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I n d iv i d u a l s  have t h e i r  own pe r s o n a l  g o a l s ,  in dependen t  o f  th e  goals  
o f  o t h e r s ,  and t h e r e  i s  s imply no c o in c id e n c e  o f  gene ra l  i n t e r e s t s .  
The very n o t i o n  o f  ’s o c i e t a l  good' i s  mean ingless  on Hayek 's  s o c i a l  
p l u r a l i s m .
On t h i s  view a l l  arguments r e l a t i n g  t o  g o v e rn m e n t - c o n t ro l l e d
programmes,  whether  in  w e l f a r e ,  the  economy, o r  n a t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ,
a re  misconce ived in  th e  beg inn ing  and doomed to  f a i l u r e .  They
r e l y  on an a l l e g e d l y  f a l s e  b e l i e f  in  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  d e t e rm in a b le
s o c i a l  g o a l s ,  on an ex agge ra ted  view o f  human r a t i o n a l i t y ,  and on
a m isu n d e r s t an d in g  o f  the  n a t u r e  o f  th e  spontaneous  market  o r d e r .
The l a t t e r ,  Hayek c l a im s ,  i s  an im p ers o n a l ,  undes igned  p ro c e s s
in  which goods and s e r v i c e s  a re  a l l o c a t e d  in  a random manner.
There i s  no ' c u t t e r  o f  t h e  cake '  who de te rm ines  who i s  to  ge t
what.  This  can only be achieved  in  a p u rp o s e -g o v e rn e d , and n o t
18in  a p u rp o s e - in d e p e n d e n t ,  s o c i e t y .  Hence d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e  
can have l i t e r a l l y  no meaning in  Hayek 's  o r d e r ;  s o c i a l  ends can n e v e r  
be any th ing  more than the  sum o f  th e  ends o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  t h a t  
make up the  s o c i e t y .
In sum, Hayek concludes  t h a t  th e  t a s k s  o f  freedom, j u s t i c e  and 
th e  market a re  d e r iv e d  from a p r o p e r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  the  p l u r a l i s t  
n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y ,  and t h a t  our  e s s e n t i a l  ignorance  o f  the  needs  
and goa ls  o f  o t h e r s  p r e c l u d e s  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s o c i a l  p l a n n in g .
Any a t tem p ts  to  c la im  t h a t  t h e r e  can be s o c i e t a l  goa ls  a re  s a i d  to  
be u l t i m a t e l y  g ro u n d le s s .
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111 .NOZICK' S INDIVIDUALISM AND THE SOCIAL GOOD.
I have argued t h a t  Noz ick ' s  m o r a l i t y ,  which c o n d i t i o n s  h i s  
p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h y ,  i s  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  in n a t u r e .  The i n d i v i d u a l  
i s  the  focus o f  moral agency and meaningful  l i f e  which d e t e rm in e s  
t h e  im mora l i ty  o f  c o e rc iv e  s t a t e  a c t i o n .  However, Nozick a l s o  makes 
c la ims o f  a non-moral  n a t u r e  about the  i n d i v i d u a l  in  s o c i e t y ,  which 
c l e a r l y  suppo r t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  co n c lu s io n s  o f  h i s  o t h e r  argument 
b u t  which a re  d i s t i n c t  and s e p a r a t e  c l a im s .  These arguments r e l a t e  
to  th e  n a t u r e  o f  human i n t e r e s t s  and to  t h e  a l l e g e d  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  c o l l e c t i v i s t  ' u t o p i a n '  p l a n n in g .
Not only  a re  our  i n t e r e s t s  s e p a r a t e  and i n d i v i d u a l ,  t h e y . a r e  
i n v a r i a b l y  d i f f e r e n t  and complex. N oz ick ' s  th e o ry  o f  t h e  p l u r a l i t y  
o f  human goa ls  and w an ts ,  and o f  our  n e c e s s a r y  igno ranc e  o f  the  
goa ls  o f  o t h e r s ,  i s  cl aimed to  be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  e n f o r c i n g  
i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s .  (But i t  i s  n o t  a defence  o f  the  r i g h t s  them­
s e l v e s  - t h i s  i s  the  fu n c t io n  o f  h i s  s t r i c t l y  moral argument o u t ­
l i n e d  in  t h e  p r e v io u s  c h a p t e r . )
F i r s t l y ,  Nozick cla ims t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no ' s o c i a l  good'  o r  
' s o c i a l  e n t i t y ' .
I n d i v i d u a l l y ,  we each sometimes choose to  
undergo some pa in  o r  s a c r i f i c e  f o r  a g r e a t e r  
b e n e f i t  o r  t o  avoid a g r e a t e r  harm: we go 
to  th e  d e n t i s t  t o  avoid  worse s u f f e r i n g  
l a t e r ;  we do some u n p le a s a n t  work f o r  i t s  
r e s u l t s ;  some persons  d i e t  t o  improve t h e i r  
h e a l t h  o r  good looks ;  some save money t o  
s u p p o r t  themse lves  when the y  are  o l d e r .  In 
each c a s e ,  some co s t  i s  borne f o r  th e  sake 
o f  the  g r e a t e r  o v e r a l l  good. Why n o t ,  s i m i - 
1a r l y , ho ld  t h a t  some p e r s o n s  have to  b e a r  
some c o s t s  t h a t  b e n e f i t  o t h e r s  more,  f o r  
the  sake o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  s o c i a l  good? But
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t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  e n t i t y  with  a good t h a t  
undergoes some s a c r i f i c e  f o r  i t s  own good.
There are only  i n d i v i d u a l  p e o p l e ,  d i f f e r ­
en t  i n d i v i d u a l  p e o p l e ,  w ith  t h e i r  own 
i n d i v i d u a l  l i v e s . ^
The concept  o f  ’ s o c i a l  g o a l s '  can t h e r e f o r e  mean no more than  th e
sum o f  a l l  the  i n d i v i d u a l  goals  in  the  s o c i e t y .  There i s  no
mechanism which somehow 'adds  up'  a l l  t h e s e  d i s p a r a t e  i n t e r e s t s
amd makes a combined p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  i s  a c h i e v a b le  and
knowable.  'Tha t  i t  i s  im poss ib le  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  and c o n t i n u a l l y
to  r e a l i z e  a l l  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  goods i s  a r e g r e t t a b l e  f a c t
20about the  human c o n d i t i o n  . . . ' .
Hence the  second i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  N o z ick ' s  p l u r a l i t y  argument
i s  t h a t  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  non-complementa ry .
The b e s t  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  worlds f o r  me, 
w i l l  n o t  be t h a t  f o r  you. The w or ld ,  o f  
a l l  th o s e  I can imagine,  which I would 
most p r e f e r  to  l i v e  i n ,  w i l l  no t  be 
p r e c i s e l y  the  one you would c h o o s e . 21
As I argued e a r l i e r ,  a l l  q u e s t s  f o r  u t o p i a  a r e ,  in  N oz ick ' s  t h e o r y ,
22simply q u e s t s  f o r  u t o p i a s . Our s e p a r a t e , i n d i v i d u a l  meaningful
l i v e s  only  c o in c id e  through the  v o lu n t a r y  cho ices  o f  f r e e  i n d i v i d u a l s .
There i s  no n a t u r a l  co inc idence  o f  i n t e r e s t s .  For Nozick,  t h i s
simply  r e f l e c t s  the  f a c t  t h a t  peop le  a re  d i f f e r e n t .
They d i f f e r  in  temperament,  i n t e r e s t s ,  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  a b i l i t y ,  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  n a t u r a l  
b e n t ,  s p i r i t u a l  q u e s t s ,  and th e  k ind  o f  
l i f e  they  wish to  l e ad .  They d iv e rg e  in  
the  v a lu es  they  have and have d i f f e r e n t  
w e igh t ings  f o r  the  v a lues  they  s h a re  . . .
There i s  no reason  t o  th in k  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  one community which w i l l  s e rv e  as i d e a l  
f o r  a l l  peop le  and much reason  to  th in k  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  not.23
That  t h e r e  a re  numerous i n d i v i d u a l  goa l s  and l i f e - c h o i c e s  which
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i n v a r i a b l y  d i f f e r  in  the  r e a l  world i s ,  f o r  Nozick,  s u f f i c i e n t  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  defending  a p l u r a l i s t  s o c i e t y  governed by a 
minimal s t a t e  t h a t  does no more than p r o t e c t  us from th e  c o e rc iv e  
i n t e r f e r e n c e s  o f  o th e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  The id e a  t h a t  u t o p i a  can be r e ­
garded as a s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  in  which a l l  problems a re  s o l v a b l e ,  and
a l l  i n d i v i d u a l  wants s im u l tan e o u s ly  s a t i s f i e d ,  i s  f o r  Nozick 
24' i n c r e d i b l e ’ . “ R igh t s -en fo rcem en t  as a p o l i t i c a l  va lue  t a k e s  account  
o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  man's needs ,  whereas the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  i s  s a id  to  r e s t  upon the  i 11-conce ived  a t t e m p t  to  s im u l t a n e o u s l y  
f u l f i l  fundam enta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  and,  indeed ,  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  g o a l s .
However, t h e r e  i s  a t h i r d  a s p e c t  o f  N oz ick ' s  p l u r a l i t y  t h e s i s
t h a t  should  be emphasised.  Not only i s  the  id e a  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  one
b e s t  s o c i e t y  f o r  a l l  o f  us s p e c io u s ,  b u t  ' . . .  the  id e a  t h a t ,  i f
t h e r e  i s  one,  we now know enough to  d e s c r i b e  i t  i s  even more 
25i n c r e d i b l e  . . . ' .  N oz ick ' s  problem i s :  'How a re  we to  f i n d  out
26what t h i s  s o c i e t y  i s  l i k e ? ' “ Man i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  i g n o r a n t  o f  a l l  
the  f a c t s  needed to  make the  k ind  o f  s t a t e m e n t :  ' t h e  b e s t  p u b l i c  
p o l i c y  i s  x, because  o f  y T. Or in  Hayekian language ,  knowledge i s  
co n c re te  r a t h e r  than  g e n e r i c ,  i s  d i s p e r s e d  and f r agm en ta ry .  A 
minimal s t a t e ,  concerned only with  the  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  ou r  a b s o l u t e  
n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s ,  i s  j u s t i f i e d  because  i t  does no t  have to  make 
im p o ss ib l e  assumptions  about our  v a r io u s  s p e c i f i c  needs .  In N oz ick ' s  
accoun t ,  man's  ignorance  i s  s imply a f u n c t i o n  o f  the  com plexity  
o f  s o c i e t y .
Given the  enormous complexity  o f  man, h i s  
many d e s i r e s ,  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  im p u ls e s ,  t a l e n t s ,  
m i s t a k e s ,  lo v e s ,  s i l l i n e s s e s ,  given the  t h i c k -  
ness  o f  h i s  i n t e r t w i n e d  and i n t e r r e l a t e d
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l e v e l s ,  f a c e t s ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  (compare the  
t h i n n e s s  o f  th e  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s ’ d e s ­
c r i p t i o n  o f  man to  t h a t  o f  th e  n o v e l i s t s ) ,  
and given the  complexity  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  and the  
com plexity  o f  c o o rd in a t io n  o f  the  a c t i o n s  
o f  many p e o p le ,  i t  i s  enormously u n l i k e l y  
t h a t ,  even i f  t h e r e  were one i d e a l  p a t t e r n  
f o r  s o c i e t y ,  i t  could be a r r i v e d  a t  in  
t h i s  a p r i o r i  ( r e l a t i v e  to  c u r r e n t  know­
ledge) f a s h i o n . 27
Nozick can t h e r e f o r e  conclude t h a t ,  given man's i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,  
t h e  lack o f  a n a t u r a l  s h a r in g  (and the  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an a r t i f i c i a l  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n )  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  and h i s  i n n a t e  igno ranc e  o f  the  
'panoramic  view o f  s o c i e t y '  r e f e r r e d  t o  by George and W ild ing ,  
b o m  o f  th e  complexity  o f  man's i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  th e  only  
p o l i t i c a l  o rde r  which f u l l y  r e c o g n i s e s  the  n a t u r e  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l  
and s o c i e t y  i s  N oz ick ' s  own minimal s t a t e .  This s t a t e  a l o n e ,  he 
c l a im s ,  a l s o  ta kes  i n t o  account  the  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no s u p e r -
9 g
i n d i v i d u a l  ( s o c i a l )  i n t e r e s t s . “ Man, as an i n i t i a t o r  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  
wants and d e s i r e s ,  i s  s a i d  to  demand no more th an  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r .
Attempts  to  i g n o re  the  complexity  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa l s  by
imposing o n e ' s  own u to p ia n  v i s i o n ,  o r  through what Nozick terms
'd e s ig n  d e v i c e s ' ,  a r e  f a l l a c i o u s ,  bound to  f a i l  and a t  th e  same
time i n j u r i o u s  t o  ou r  r i g h t s .  Utopian v i s i o n  a r i e s ,  he c l a im s ,
29i n v a r i a b l y  a t tem p t  t o  impose t h e i r  own schemes upon o t h e r s . "
They have a composite  p i c t u r e  o f  th e  one k ind  o f  s o c i e t y  t h a t  i s  
b e s t  f o r  a l l .  For i n s t a n c e ,  the  u t i l i t a r i a n  maxim isa t ion  o f  happ iness  
a l l e g e d l y  demands some a u t h o r i t y  t o  judge what h a p p in e s s  c o n s i s t s  
i n ,  and how i t  i s  to  be a p p o r t i o n e d .  However, f o r  Nozick,  any 
a t tem p t  t o  en fo rce  a u to p i a n  v i s i o n  n e c e s s a r i l y  p r e c l u d e s  the
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possibility of individuals having (and fulfilling) their own goals
and visions. In any case, Nozick argues, '... even supposing that
some great genius did come along with the blueprint, who could have
30confidence that it would work out well?'
In addition to his rejection of utopian theorising in general,
on the grounds that there is no social good, Nozick questions on
similar grounds several particular attempts by the interventionist
state to impose patterned results on individuals. For example, his
rejection of all conceptions of social or distributive justice
other than the entitlement theory is based on the following reasoning
The term "distributive justice" is not a 
neutral one. Hearing the term "distribution", 
most people presume that some thing or 
mechanism uses some principle or criterion 
to give out a supply of things. Into this • 
process of distributing shares some error 
may have crept. So it is an open question, 
at least, whether redistribution should 
take place; whether we should do again 
what has already been done once, though 
poorly. However, we are not in the position 
of children who have been given portions 
of pie by someone who now makes last minute 
adjustments to rectify careless cutting.
There is no central distribution, no person 
or group entitled to control all the re­
sources, jointly deciding how they are to 
be doled out. What each person, gets, he 
gets from others who give to him in exchange 
for something, or as a gift. In a free society, 
diverse persons control different resources, 
and new holdings arise out of the voluntary 
exchanges and actions of persons. There is 
no more a distributing or distribution of 
shares than there is a distributing of mates 
in a society in which persons choose whom 
they shall marry. The total result is the 
product of many individual decisions which 
the different individuals involved are en­
titled to make.^
For Nozick, redistributive thinking can never avoid making this
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f a l s e  b a s i c  assumption t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a ’someone' t o  do th e  d i s t r i b u t i n g
- some a u t h o r i t y  to  which claims  may be a d d re s s e d ,  and which i s
e n t i t l e d  to  make e f f e c t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  about t h e s e  c l a im s .  Since
a l l  such p a t t e r n s  a re  f a l s e l y  conce ived ,  s o c i e t a l  needs  cannot  be
s a i d  to  e x i s t ,  and cannot  be d e f in e d .  This i s  why Nozick can c la im
t h a t  ’ . . .  t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  e n t i t y  w ith  a good t h a t  undergoes  some
32s a c r i f i c e  f o r  i t s  own good. There a re  only  i n d i v i d u a l  p e o p l e ' .
P a t t e r n e d  t h e o r i e s  a re  s a i d  t o  r e f l e c t  the  b a s i c  assum pt ion ,  
r e j e c t e d  by Nozick,  t h a t  a community or  s o c i e t y  c o n s i s t s  o f  something 
more than  the  sum o f  i t s  s e p a r a t e  p a r t s ,  t h a t  a s t a t e  has r i g h t s  
and o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  i t s  own to  s e rve  the  needs o f  s o c i e t y .  For -Nozick ,  
t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  the  whole n o t i o n  o f  ' s o c i e t a l  n e e d s '  i n c lu d e s  
t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  which a t t e n d s  t o  them.
He r e j e c t s  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r tu n i ty  because  i t  r e s t s  on a f a l s e  
p r e m is e ,  namely t h a t  human l i v e s  can be t r e a t e d  in  terms o f  the  
' r a c e  and p r i z e '  ana logy ,  in  which some ' s t a r t e r s '  a re  u n f a i r l y  
h a n d i c a p p e d . ^  Advocates o f  equal  o p p o r tu n i ty  b e l i e v e  t h a t ,  by 
moving towards an e q u a l i s a t i o n  o f  s t a r t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ,  th e y  can 
make th i n g s  f a i r e r  f o r  a l l .  But Nozick claims t h a t  th e  analogy 
i s  a f a l s e  one.  There i s  no ' r a c e '  f o r  Nozick; t h e r e  a re  only  
random i n d i v i d u a l  c h o i c e s .  Hence, on t h i s  view, th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  ought to  be r e j e c t e d  on l o g i c a l  as well  as moral grounds .
Not only does s t a t e  coe rc ion  f o r  the  purpose o f ,  f o r  example,  
mutual a i d ,  i n f r i n g e  th e  moral agency o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ;  i t  a l s o  
r e f l e c t s  an u n a t t a i n a b l e  goal  which i s  i n i t i a l l y  misconce ived .  N oz ick ' s  
argument h e r e  i s  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n c t  from h i s  e a r l i e r  p rem ises  r e g a r d i n g
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man as a r i g h t s - b e a r i n g  an imal.  I t  must t h e r e f o r e  be a s s e s s e d  s e p a r a t e l y .
I V . INDIVIDUALISM AND THE INTERVENTIONIST ORDER.
Desp ite  the  fundamental d i f f e r e n c e  between Hayek' s u t i l i t a r i a n  
defence  o f  freedom and N oz ick ' s  argument from the  im m ora l i ty  o f  
c o e rc io n ,  they  c l e a r l y  sha re  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  b e l i e f s  as to  the  n a t u r e  
o f  s o c i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  they  deny th e  very  n o t i o n  
o f  ’ s o c i a l  good’ and d i s a l lo w  the  p o s s i b l e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  ’ s o c i a l  
e n d s ' .  They ta k e  a 'good '  to  be a ' g o a l '  o r  ' e n d '  t h a t  one chooses .
This makes i t  easy f o r  them to  argue  t h a t  only i n d i v i d u a l s  can choose ,  
and easy to  e x p l o i t  t h e i r  arguments about knowledge.  Man cannot  
agree on what a s o c i e t y ' s goal  should  b e ,  and he cannot  know enough 
to  be ab le  t o  fo rm u la te  i t . N o r  does he have adequa te  knowledge 
o f  th e  needs '  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  This a l s o  i s  s a i d  t o  p r e c l u d e  
s o c i a l  p l a n n in g .  The on ly  way to  f u l l y  t a k e  account  o f  th e  p l u r a l i t y  
o f  i n t e r e s t s  in  s o c i e t y  and the complex ity  o f  th o s e  i n t e r e s t s ,  i s  
acco rd ing  to  t h i s  view, t o  al low the  voluntary '  c o n t r a c t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
to  take  precedence  ove r  any concept  o f  s o c i e t a l  g o a l s .
This  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  se rv es  as an argument a g a i n s t  bo th  the  very  
n o t io n  o f  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r ,  and th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  engaging 
in  i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i v i t i e s .  I f  t h e r e  i s  no ’common good’ , (and 
even i f  t h e r e  were,  we could n e v e r  know enough to  de te rmine  what 
i t  would in v o l v e } ,  t h e r e  can be no d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e .  S ince  human 
needs v a ry ,  t h e r e  can be n e v e r  a genuine e q u a l i t y  b u t  on ly  th e  
co e rc iv e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o f  the  c e n t r a l  p la n n in g  agency.  The n o t i o n  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  s a i d  t o  be undermined by th e  e n d - s t a t e  c o n ce p t io n  
o f  s o c i e t y  t h a t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .
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Thus f o r  both Hayek and Nozick,  ' . . .  the  world i s  a m arke t ­
p l a c e  in  which i s o l a t e d ,  autonomous i n d i v i d u a l s  wi th no s o c i a l  bonds
r e l a t e  only  through formal p ro c e s s e s  o f  exchange where th ey  give
34o r  r e c e iv e  p e r s o n a l  goods fo r  p r i v a t e  gain and s a t i s f a c t i o n ' .  
I n d i v i d u a l s  have no gene ra l  p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  o t h e r s ,  on ly  
those  s p e c i f i c  o b l i g a t i o n s  acqu i red  th rough v o lu n t a r y  c o n t r a c t s  
which b e n e f i t  the  s e p a r a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  d i f f e r e n t  ways. According 
to  M.F. P l a t t n e r ,
[ t ] h i s  l i n e  o f  r e a s o n in g  . . .  i s  based  on 
th e  assumption t h a t  th e  wants o r  p r e f e r e n c e s  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  form the  u n q u e s t io n a b le  
s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  ph i lo so p h y .  I t  
i s  no t  p o s s i b l e  t o  make moral judgments 
about th e  i n t r i n s i c  va lue  o f  th e se  wants 
and p r e f e r e n c e s ,  o r  to  rank them in any 
way. C o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  what i s  good o r  
moral come i n t o  p la y  only  e x t r i n s i c a l l y , 
th rough th e  c o l l i s i o n  o f  o n e ' s  i n d i v i d u a l  
wants wi th th o se  o f  o t h e r s . ^
Hence,  f o r  Hayek and Nozick,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  realm cannot  be i t s e l f
g o a l - d i r e c t e d , cannot  be concerned with  moral judgements as to  the
b e s t  form o f  l i f e .  I t s  co e rc iv e  r o l e  i s  t o  be reduced to  what Richard
Vernon has c a l l e d  a 'main tenance  s q u a d ' , ^  o r  in Karen J o h n s o n ' s
3 "7t e rm in o lo g y ,  'government by i n s u r a n c e  company' .^
The immediate p o l i t i c a l  i n f e r e n c e  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p remise  
no te d  by P l a t t n e r  i s  t h a t  government can have no l e g i t i m a t e  purpose  
o t h e r  than  t o  al low i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  pursue  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  ends .  I t  
shou ld  no t  impose i t s  own co n ce p t io n s  o f  the  good l i f e  on them.
This  conc lu s ion  i s  s a i d  t o  r e f l e c t  th e  p l u r a l i t y  o f  needs and the  
igno ranc e  o f  ends .  But i s  th e  connec t ion  t h a t  i s  argued  f o r  by Hayek 
and Nozick between the  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  and th e  r o l e  o f  government 
shown t o  be j u s t i f i e d ?
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The argument t h a t  man's p r e f e r e n c e s  l a r g e l y  concern  h i s  p r i v a t e  
g o a l s ,  and t h a t  t h e s e  a re  i n d i v i d u a l l y  a r r i v e d  a t ,  i s  u n d e n i a b le .
The c r i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n  concerns whether  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n f l i c t s  w i th  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  arguments as to  the  n a t u r e  
o f  s o c i e t y .  I f  i t  can be shown t h a t  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  may be j u s t i f i e d  
on i n d i v l d u a l i s t  grounds ,  and t h a t  i t  t a k es  account  o f  the  very  
p l u r a l i t y  o f  needs  to which Hayek and Nozick a p p e a l ,  then  the  p o l i t i c a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e i r  c r u c i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' i n d i v i d u a l '  and 
' s o c i a l '  goa ls  i s  no t  e s t a b l i s h e d .  That  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  
p u r s u i n g ,  s ay ,  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r tu n i ty  th rough p r o g r e s s i v e  t a x a t i o n ,  
need no t  make judgements as to  the  worth o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l  
g o a l s ,  no r  need i t  deny t h e  complexity  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  Hayek and Nozick a r e  d e r i v i n g  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n c lu s io n s  
from what may be a q u i t e  l e g i t i m a t e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  By a p p e a l in g  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p r e m is e s ,  they  are  r e a l l y  r e j e c t i n g  only th e  c o l l e c t i v i s t  
o r d e r ,  and n o t  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  The n o t i o n  o f  a c e n t r a l  
agency a l l o c a t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  need n o t  d i s a l lo w  the  p u r s u i t  o f  g o a l -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  by i n d i v i d u a l s .  Moreover, an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  
need no t  r e l y  on common agreement over  i n d i v i d u a l  ends .  That  
i n d i v i d u a l  ends a re  d i f f e r e n t  and needs  complex,  i s  no t  den ied  simply  
by t a x i n g  some i n d i v i d u a l s  in  o r d e r  to  h e lp  o t h e r s ,  even i f  t h i s  i s  
seen as i n f r i n g i n g  t h e i r  r i g h t s .  Hence an appea l  t o  e i t h e r  p l u r a l i t y ,  
com plex i ty  o r  ignorance  does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  d e l e g i t i m i s e  the  
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  Nor i s  the  knowledge o f  the  ends o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
r e q u i r e d  by a c e n t r a l  p l a n n in g  agency concerned  to  maximise g o a l -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  by simply  p ro v id in g  i n d i v i d u a l s  with  m a t e r i a l  b e n e f i t s .
We need n o t  agree on what each i n d i v i d u a l  should do w i th  h i s  a l l o t t e d
sha re  o f  c e n t r a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  r e s o u r c e s  to  c o n s t r u c t  an argument
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in defence of such an allocation. Hence the argument that we cannot 
agree over ends says nothing of the legitimacy of a political order 
which does not depend on such agreement.
The general claim that there are no social goods is misleading. 
For any form of political association, arguably, incorporates 
collective goods, even if these are reduced to one, the maximisation 
of freedom, and even if their benefits are discovered by accident. 
Hence to assert that we cannot know enough to formulate any collective 
goals is incorrect. It denies the possibility of any political 
order, and is therefore consistent only with anarchism. Any political 
goal necessarily involves the collective commitment to some end.
Here it is worthwhile to distinguish between ends which are the 
same, but not shared (for example, we all want to be rich, or free), 
ends which are shared (we all want a road to the coast built); 
ends which we all share, but which we do not rate the same; and 
genuinely collective ends, that is, ends which relate to the 
collectivity, not to its individual members. These are important 
distinctions, but they need not all imply the abandonment of 
individually derived goals and values. That we can all agree on 
the need for public utilities does not require that we all use 
them to the same extent, nor that the particular benefits gained 
from our use of them be prescribed in any way. The important 
point is that some agreement is possible over share! concerns.
Hence compulsory schemes can serve individual ends in different 
ways, just as the free market does. The catallaxy is not the only 
form of political association to take account of the non-coincidence
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o f  i n d i v i d u a l  ends.
Once i t  i s  acknowledged t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  agreement ove r  some ends 
i s  p o s s i b l e ,  th e  c r u c i a l  c o nc lu s ion  o f  Hayek and Nozick t h a t  t h e r e  
a re  no s o c i a l  goals  i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  m ean ing le ss .  That i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  
in  p r i n c i p l e ,  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s  to  agree  to  m a in ta in  a p o l i t i c a l  
a s s o c i a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  leaves  open the  q u e s t i o n  o f  what s p e c i f i c  
goa ls  they  would agree on. Hence f o r  Hayek and Nozick to  r e j e c t  
p a r t i c u l a r  common goa ls  by argu ing  t h a t  common goa ls  can never  
e x i s t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  to e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n .  
D esp i te  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  a s s e s s i n g  the  g en e ra l  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  
c la im  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  no s o c i a l  g o a l s ,  i t  i s  no t  e s t a b l i s h e d  simply  
by an appeal  e i t h e r  to man’ s ignorance  o f  the  ends o f  o t h e r s  o r  
to  th e  p l u r a l i t y  o f  h i s  i n t e r e s t s .  ;
The q u e s t i o n  then becomes: a re  the  p a r t i c u l a r  goals  r e j e c t e d  
by Hayek and Nozick ( d i s t r i b u t i v e  j u s t i c e ,  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y ,  
mutual a i d , w e l f a r e  and p lann ing )  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the  p l u r a l i s t  
n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y ?  Does the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  n e c e s s a r i l y  deny 
th e  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p rem ises  upon which the  arguments o f  Hayek and 
Nozick are  based?
Hayek ' s  t h e s i s  on knowledge and N oz ick ’s appea l  to  p l u r a l i t y  
and complexity  p ro v id e  e x c e l l e n t  r easons  f o r  re jec t ing  any p o l i t i c a l  
o r d e r  which a t t e m p t s  to  d i c t a t e  what i n d i v i d u a l  goa l s  w i l l  be .
But only  a gen u in e ly  c o l l e c t i v i s t  o r d e r  s a c r i f i c e s  i n d i v i d u a l  
w i l l s  in the  p u r s u i t  o f  a g r e a t e r  common goa l .  Only a thoroughgoing
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redirection of wills, and the pursuit of common goals that are incon- 
sistent with theformulation and realisation of indiviudal goals, 
deny the individuation of human interests which concerns Hayek 
and Nozick. Ignorance and plurality, taken together, provide a 
justification for never denying individuals their right to fill 
in their own private spheres. Yet neither of these premises estab­
lishes that individuals cannot collectively agree to sacrifice some 
of their freedom in pursuit of other ends, such as the particular 
welfare concerns of the interventionist order. Only when the 
individualist conclusion that there can be no social good is bui1t 
into the premises of ignorance and plurality do the latter dismiss 
positive state actions. Yet such a conclusion is assumed by Hayek 
and Nozick to be true.
Both writers imply a necessary and inevitable contradiction 
between individual and social goals which is false. The pursuit 
of private interests is entirely consistent with certain social 
commitments, either to others, or to the collectivity. Many of 
the interventionist measures rejected by Hayek and Nozick need in 
no way deny the individual the determination of his own interests 
by the use of his own knowledge. Only when individual goals are 
actually denied by state coercion do the arguments of Hayek and 
Nozick have any force.
The implication of the necessary inconsistency between the 
individual and the social rests on the questionable assumption that 
a redistribution of resources is also a denial of the possibility
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of individual goal - formulation. Clearly the question of redistribution 
is different from that of goal-formulation. To suppose that re­
allocating resources involves the dictation of individual wills is 
quite misleading. Yet this is a necessary inference from the arguments 
appealed to by Hayek and Nozick. This is certainly not to argue 
that government actions do not affect individuals in significant 
ways; but it does not follow from an appeal to the importance of 
recognising separate individual interests that state intervention is 
to be rejected.
The problems of ignorance, knowledge and complexity are only 
relevant to the legitimacy of the interventionist order to the 
extent that the tasks of such an order attempt to determine what 
ends individuals should pursue. That the individual is the best 
judge of his own private interests does not imply that the state 
should not, for instance, legislate on minimum wage levels or working 
conditions, or should never reallocate resources. The redistribution 
of wealth that is involved in many state actions still takes into 
account the necessary impossibility referred to by Hayek and Nozick 
of achieving a ’blueprint' of the good society.
Clearly such interventionist orders as the welfare state contain 
positive guiding principles such as the maximisation of individual 
goal-satisfaction. But this does not necessitate dictating how 
particular individuals will use their lives. It simply provides 
a positive framework for realising individual ends. Even if it can 
be said to rely on the pursuit of a collective purpose upon which
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we do not all agree, the welfare state cannot be said to deny 
individual goal-formulation as such. And the possibility of such 
collective agreement being achieved is denied by neither our 
ignorance of the needs of others nor by the individuation of our 
ends. Hence the question of human ignorance is irrelevant to the 
legitimacy of particular forms of state intervention. It can only 
serve as an argument against a political order which presumes 
knowledge that it does not possess - that needed to determine or 
prescribe specific individual purposes.
A moderate interventionist order simply need not make the claims 
on knowledge that are attributed to it by Hayek and Nozick in.their 
assumptions of ignorance, complexity and plurality. Even if its 
criteria for distributing resources are achieved independently 
of the wills of individuals, the interventionist order need not 
fill in the goals to be pursued by them. And it is the actual 
filling in of goals and purposes by the state that is the principal 
concern of Hayek and Nozick in their appeal to knowledge and interests. 
The formulation of goals through the individual use of concrete 
knowledge is not inconsistent with the interventionist order. The 
latter is only inconsistent with the assertion that there are no 
positive obligations to others, and this, I suggest, is demonstrated 
neither by Hayek's and Nozick’s social pluralism nor by their theories 
of knowledge.lt is clearly possible that we can have obligations 
to others and remain ignorant of their particular needs. Hence 
ignorance is consistent with the existence of obligations. Equally, 
that our interests may be different and complex need not be seen
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as an argument t h a t  we must igno re  t h e  needs  ©f o t h e r s .
Hence th e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a c o l l e c t i v i s t  o r  genu ine ly  communitarian 
p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r  t h a t  i s  committed to  a h i e r a r c h y  o f  ends which 
den ies  the  f r e e  cho ices  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  does no t  imply t h e  r e j e c t i o n  
o f  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  which does no t  do t h e s e  t h i n g s .  The 
p l u r a l i s t  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  and th e  d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s  o f  s e p a r a t e  
human ends a re  no t  t h e r e f o r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the  p a r t i c u l a r  forms 
o f  s t a t e  a c t i o n  r e j e c t e d  by Hayek and Nozick.  Although such 
a c t i v i t i e s  as en fo rced  mutual a i d  and the  p u r s u i t  o f  m a t e r i a l  
e q u a l i t y  a re  to  be rega rded  as 'common' goa ls  by d e f i n i t i o n  ( in  
t h a t  they  a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  th e  goa ls  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  would 
s e p a r a t e l y  p u r s u e ) ,  t h i s  need no t  imply t h e i r  r e j e c t i o n .  For the  
ge n e ra l  d e s c r i p t i o n  'common g o a l ’ i s  too  b road  to  be e f f e c t i v e  as 
an argument a g a i n s t  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n .  There a re  d i f f e r e n t  
deg rees  and d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  common g o a l s .  The w e l f a r e  s t a t e  
i s  a d i f f e r e n t  l o g i c a l  animal from th e  c o l l e c t i v i s t  s t a t e .
The b a s i s  o f  t h i s  r e l e v a n t  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t h a t  w e l f a r e  s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  r e c o g n i s e s  the  p u r s u i t  o f  s e p a r a t e  i n t e r e s t s  as 
fundamenta l  to  the  common good, whereas th e  c o l l e c t i v i s t  o r d e r  
o v e r r i d e s  t h e s e  in  i t s  p u r s u i t  o f  the  common good. Hence the  l a t t e r  
can e l i m i n a t e  any i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  which c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e l y  
d e f i n e d  p u rp o s e ,  whereas in  th e  fo rmer ,  bo th  i n d i v i d u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e  
g o a l s  can c o - e x i s t  p e a c e f u l l y .  The p o i n t  i s  t h a t T l a y e k ' s  and N o z ic k ' s  
arguments conce rn ing  man's ignorance  and the  p l u r a l i t y  o f  h i s  
i n t e r e s t s  s imply don’ t  work a g a i n s t  some o f  t h e  forms o f  s t a t e  i n t e r -
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ven t ion  t h a t  they  r e j e c t .  They f a i l  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between a c t i o n s  
t h a t  merely r e d i s t r i b u t e  r e s o u r c e s  and a c t i o n s  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  de termine  
which i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  a re  l e g i t i m a t e  o r  a re  to  be f avoured .
No doubt many o f  the  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n s  o f  c e n t r a l  p o l i t i c a l  
agenc ies  a re  i l l - c o n c e i v e d .  There i s  much to  be s a i d  f o r  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  
d e c i s ion -m ak ing ,  and f o r  t h i s  the  argument about com plexity  and 
igno rance  i s  c l e a r l y  r e l e v a n t .  But i t  i s  an unw arran ted  e x t e n s i o n  
o f  t h i s  argument t o  a l s o  s u gges t  e i t h e r  t h a t  no common agreement 
i s  p o s s i b l e ,  o r  t h a t  a l l  s t a t e  a c t i o n  o f  a r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  k ind  
i s  misconceived .  The former c la im  i s  den ied  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  
eve ry  form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  c o n ta in s  the  p u r s u i t  o f  some g o a l ,  
and t h e  l a t t e r  i s  den ied  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  
need  n o t  be i n c o n s i s t e n t  with  e i t h e r  the  r e c o g n i t i o n  ö f  human 
igno ranc e  o r  th e  acknowledgement o f  a p l u r a l i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
i n t e r e s t s .
Although the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  uses  th e  r h e t o r i c  o f  
c o l l e c t i v i s m ,  i n d i c a t e d  by such terms as ' s o c i a l  j u s t i c e '  which 
imply moving towards a known g o a l ,  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  t h a t  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  
p o l i c i e s  such as e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  need s p e c i f y  a p a r t i c u l a r  
outcome a t  a l l .  This  form o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a t  l e a s t ,  does n o t  
assume any p a t t e r n e d  e n d - r e s u l t ,  hence i t  need n o t  demand p e r f e c t  
knowledge.  At most ,  t h i s  u t i l i t a r i a n  approach could  a f f e c t  the  
r e l a t i v e  chances o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s . s a t i s f y i n g  t h e i r  wants ;  
i t  need n o t  de termine  th e  a c t u a l  c o n t e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l s .  Hence
t h e r e  seems no reason  to  conc lude from the  p rem ises  o f  e i t h e r
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ignorance  o r  p l u r a l i t y  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t  concep t ion  o f  s o c i e t y  i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  in c o m p a t ib le  with  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  p o l i t i c a l  o r d e r .
Despite  the  i n s i s t e n c e  o f  Hayek and Nozick t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
s o c i a l  good ( e i t h e r  one acc ep ts  the  view t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  have no 
genera l  p o s i t i v e  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  o r  one does n o t ) ,  i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  
to  conclude t h a t  our  i n e v i t a b l e  ig n o ra n c e ,  which in v o lv e s  the  
p l u r a l i t y  and complex ity  o f  human needs ,  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  reason  
f o r  r e j e c t i n g  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  All  H ayek 's and N o z ic k ' s  
p a r t i c u l a r  arguments a g a i n s t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r e f l e c t  th e  b a s i c  a s s e r t i o n  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  good. They t r y  to  j u s t i f y  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  
by an appeal to  the  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  - t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
who make up s o c i e t y  are  ig n o r a n t  and t h e i r  needs d i f f e r e n t .  But 
t h i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  argument only  d i s m i s s e s  the  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  can dec ide  which i n t e r e s t s  shou ld  be 
s a t i s f i e d  and which no t  s a t i s f i e d .  I have argued t h a t  p roponen ts  
o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  need n o t  make such a c la im .  Hence 
t h e  arguments used by Hayek and Nozick t o  s u p p o r t  th e  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  good do no t  d e l e g i t i m i s e  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r .
V. THE INVISIBLE-HAND.
An im p o r tan t  a s p e c t  o f  Hayek' s and N oz ick ' s  i n d i v i d u a l i s m  
concern ing  the  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  t h a t  i s  s e p a r a t e  from t h e i r  
arguments from ign o ran c e ,  complex ity  and p l u r a l i t y  i s  t h e i r  s h a red  
commitment to  what ,  p a r a p h r a s i n g  Adam Smith,  they  te rm ' i n v i s i b l e -  
hand * ex p lan a t io n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  Though i t  i s  an e m p i r i c a l  
cl a im about  th e  way t h a t  l i b e r a l  s o c i e t i e s  a c t u a l l y  deve lop ,  i t
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contains normative implications for the role of government in the
life of the individual. Hayek, for instance, draws the distinction
between spontaneous growth and constructivist planning. The former
is said to be characteristic of free societies and the latter of
interventionist orders. Nozick, on the other hand, explains the
formation of the minimal state by reference to the invisible-
hand. Individuals in a state of nature, he claims, would ’back
40into a state without really trying’. And Hayek argues that 
individuals 'discover', rather than 'construct' the value of 
freedom and the rule of law that it embodies. Again, the distinction 
is made between the unintended results of voluntary choices and 
the conscious determinations of centralised planning.
Is the invisible-hand an adequate means of explaining political, 
as opposed to economic life? Is the distinction between, unintended 
and planned outcomes an important one for political theory, 
yielding the conclusions drawn by Hayek and Nozick? As an important 
aspect of the individualist view of society, one which implies a 
commitment to the non-interventionist order and the rejection of 
positive state action (which would curtail the operation of the 
processes of the market), the invisible-hand model demands critical 
assessment. In terms of the proper role of the state in individual 
life, the distinction between spontaneity (limited rationality) and 
constructivism (the untrammelled use of human reason to solve political 
and social problems) is said by Hayek and Nozick to delegitimise 
the interventionist order, since the latter allegedly involves 
'unlimited' rationality.
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But perhaps government actions to uphold freedom or enforce 
rights are just as much directed towards a specific end as are more 
interventionist measures. And positive state activities need not, 
as I argued in the previous seciton, 'fill in' the ends of individual 
action to the extent that Hayek believes. Hayek's liberal order may 
be seen as not entirely the outcome of spontaneous individual forces, 
since he believes governments have a positive role to play in providing 
a free market. Similarly it is not clear that individuals in Nozick's 
state of nature would necessarily choose a minimal state, as he 
wants to suggest. Hence there is a tension in Hayek and Nozick between 
their commitment to the results of unimpeded individual choices in 
the spontaneous order and the particular picture they have of-a 
liberal order or minimal state. Such a tension reduces the effective­
ness of their individualist argument against the intervening state.
The argument against a particular end-state (such as the welfare 
state) by the use of a device (the invisible-hand) which denies 
all end states is substantially weakened if they themselves show a 
commitment to another end-state.
What is the nature of the 'invisible-hand' appealed to by
Hayek and Nozick? Milton Friedman refers to '... the economic
principles of Adam Smith, which explain how it is that a complex,
organised, soraoothly running system can develop and flourish
without central direction, how coordination can be achieved without 
42coercion'. And quoting Smith, Nozick explains the concept:
[ejvery individual intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in so many 
other cases, led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which has no part of 
his intention.45
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Hence, * [a]n i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  e x p l a i n s  what looks  to  be the
p roduc t  o f  someone's  i n t e n t i o n a l  d e s ig n ,  as n o t  b e in g  b rough t  about
44by anyone’s i n t e n t i o n s ' .  The id e a  t h a t  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  market  o r d e r  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  d i s t r i b u t e s  economic and p o l i t i c a l  power t o  a r u l i n g  e l i t e  
in  o r d e r  to  p e r s e r v e  the  e x i s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  i s  t h e r e f o r e  i n c o r r e c t ,  
acco rd ing  to  th e  i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  view o f  s o c i e t y .  Nozick uses  as
an example o f  an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  p ro ces s
. . . H a y e k ’s e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  how s o c i a l  co ­
o p e r a t i o n  u t i l i z e s  more knowledge than  
any i n d i v i d u a l  p o s s e s s e s ,  th rough  people  
a d j u s t i n g  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  how o t h e r  p e o p l e ’ s s i m i l a r l y  a d j u s t e d  
a c t i v i t i e s  a f f e c t  t h e i r  lo c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  
and through fo l lo w in g  examples they  are 
p r e s e n t e d  w i th ,  and the re by  c r e a t e s  new 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  forms,  genera l  modes o f  
b e h a v i o u r ,  and so on.*^
In t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ,  Hayek r e f e r s  to  the  ' c r e a t i v e  powers o f  a
46  *f r e e  c i v i l i s a t i o n ’ . The spontaneous  o r d e r  o f  f r e e l y ' a c t i n g
i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  s a i d  to  c r e a t e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  a re  n o t  i n t e n d e d ,  t h a t
cannot  be known in  advance.  Thus Hayek c la im s  t h a t
The Great  S o c ie ty  a rose  through the  d i s ­
covery t h a t  men can l i v e  t o g e t h e r  in  peace 
and m u t u a l l y  b e n e f i t i n g  each o t h e r  w i th o u t  
a g re e in g  on th e  p a r t i c u l a r  aims t h a t  they  
s e v e r a l l y  p u r s u e .  ^
Hayek e x p l i c i t l y  s t r e s s e s  th e  va lue  o f  e v o l u t i o n a r y  change.  Yet ,  
as S c o t t  Gordon p o i n t s  out  c o r r e c t l y ,  Hayek cannot  be committed to  
a thoroughgoing  e v o l u t io n i s m  which would admit  the  va lue  o f  any
48
p ro c e s s  t h a t  w-as spontaneous  simply because  i t  was spon taneous .
For t h e  growth o f  many i l l i b e r a l  s o c i e t i e s  may be e n t i r e l y  spon taneous .  
C o l l e c t i v i s t  t h i n k i n g  may develop w i th o u t  anyone i n t e n d i n g  a 
s p e c i f i c  outcome. Hayek' s view o f  j u s t  lawjs as th o s e  which have 
evo lved  ove r  t im e ,  a g a i n s t  ’ c o n t r i v e d ’ l e g i s l a t i o n  which i s  the
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p roduc t  o f  reason  and d e s ig n ,  le ads  him to  conc lude  (wrongly,  acc o rd in g
to  James Buchanan) t h a t  ' . . .  p o l i t i c a l l y  o r c h e s t r a t e d  change must ,
49in  most c a s e s , produce s o c i a l  chan g e ' .
Yet i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  spontaneous  p r o c e s s e s  must lead  to  
d e s i r a b l e  consequences ,  even to  the  maxim isa t ion  o f  freedom. Nor 
on th e  o t h e r  hand must p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n t r i v e d  change n e c e s s a r i l y  
endanger  freedom and i t s  v a l u e s .  The ' a b s t r a c t  o r d e r ’ t h a t  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  Hayek' s  r u l e  o f  law i s  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  g u a ra n t e e  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  use t h e i r  f r e e  cho ices  in  ways t h a t  Hayek would 
r e g a r d  as a c c e p ta b l e .
This i n c o n s i s t e n c y  in  Hayek c a l l s  i n t o  q u e s t i o n  th e  very  
u t i l i t y  o f  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between spontaneous  and p lanned  o r d e r s .
C l e a r l y  bo th  th e  p lanned  and unplanned a c t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
s t a t e s  have in te n d e d  and un in tended  consequences .  To say t h a t  the  
p u r s u i t  o f  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  w i l l  ’ . . . p r o d u c e  h i g h l y  u n d e s i r a b l e  
consequences . . . ’ to  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  w i l l  lead  to  ’ . . .  th e  
d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  the  i n d i s p e n s i b l e  environment in  which th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
moral v a lues  alone  can f l o u r i s h ,  namely p e r s o n a l  f r e e d o m ' s e e m s  
to  be a t t r i b u t i n g  to  governments an omnisc ience  t h a t  even they  
would deny hav ing .  And to  c o n t r a s t  such a p u r s u i t  t o  the  c la im  
t h a t  e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c t i o n s ,  on the  o t h e r  haid, produce de s i r a b l e  
consequences does no t  fo l lo w .
Nozick c la ims t h a t  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  r i g h t s - b e a r i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  
in  a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  would back i n t o  h i s  own v e r s i o n  o f  the  l e g i t i m a t e  
s t a t e  w i thou t  i n t e n d i n g  t o .  This  goes even f u r t h e r  than  Hayek' s
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claim that individuals 'discovered' the benefits of freedom, then 
implemented them. For Nozick's natural man simply joins a 'protective 
association', not a state.
Nozick's discussion of how a morally justifiable state can
arise is for him a justification of his own prescribed social order.
Individuals would, he claims, necessarily choose a minimal state.
On the other hand, utopia,in Nozick's view would consist of diverse
institutions, practices and communities independently arrived at,
irrespective of any particular individual's conception of what the
world should look like. Utopia '... is what grows spontaneously
from the individual choices of many people over a long period-of
time ...'^ Given that many communities would arise, it is plausible
to argue (Nozick does so himself) that these would include those with
compulsory redistribution of resources and governing associations
concerned with far more than the simple law-enforcement activities
52of the minimal state.
Nozick's image of man prior to the emergence of the state is 
well-defined and specific. His concept of man's nature, his needs 
and interests, is such that the minimal state only is conceivable.
The behaviour of self-interested man in the state of nature is 
entirely predictable.
However, the operation of the minimal state gives rise to a 
different image of man's interests and needs. Nozick claims to have 
no idea at all as to the kinds of political association that will 
arise, so long as they are voluntary. But the fact that individuals,
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in the  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e i r  d i s p a r a t e  g o a l s ,  w i l l  s u r e l y  r e q u i r e  from 
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t s  more than i s  o f f e r e d  by the  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
n e g a t i v e  r i g h t s ,  s i t s  awkwardly with  the  assumptions  u n d e r ly i n g  
N o z ick ' s  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  the  minimal s t a t e  and h i s  e x c l u s i o n  o f  th e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .
That a p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  such as N o z ick ' s  minimal s t a t e  
can a r i s e  in  a c e r t a i n  way b e a r s  no r e l a t i o n  t o  whether  i t  must so 
a r i s e ,  o r  to  whether  a l t e r n a t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  could n o t  a l s o  be 
d e r iv e d  from s i m i l a r  b e g in n in g s .  But N oz ick ’s own c la im  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
t h a t  n o t h ing  beyond a minimal s t a t e  i s  j u s t i f i a b l e ,  in  o t h e r  words 
t h a t  the  minimal s t a t e  must a r i s e  from th e  f r e e  cho ices  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
in  a s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e .  Here he seems to  be a c t u a l l y  gu id ing  the  
i n v i s i b l e - h a n d .  ; ;
The c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  N ozick ’s use o f  an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  
c o n c e rn s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  th e  b eh av io u r  o f  s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d  man. The 
b e h a v io u r  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  t h e  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  r e v e a l s  an e x c l u s i v e  
s o c i a l  concern  f o r  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e i r  n e g a t iv e  r i g h t s .  However, the  
w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  those  same i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  g ive up t h e i r  r i g h t s  and 
co n s e n t  by j o i n i n g  a more- than-min imal  s t a t e  in  u t o p i a  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  t h e  minimal s t a t e  cannot  s a t i s f y  t h e i r  needs  and i n t e r e s t s .
N a tu r a l  man chooses ’ government by i n s u ra n c e  company’ , b u t  f r e e  
Nozickean man has many more i n t e r e s t s  to  be p ro v id ed  f o r .
I t  seems t h a t  Nozick cannot  have i t  bo th  ways.  E i t h e r  he i s  
committed to t h e  view t h a t  only  the  minimal s t a t e  would a r i s e  from
th e  f r e e  cho ices  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  or  to  the  view that more than  one
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k ind  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  could  develop through i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  p r o c e s s e s
(o r  f i l t e r  d e v i c e s ) .  I t  i s  im poss ib le  to  s im u l t a n e o u s l y  ho ld  bo th
views.  I f  Nozick r e f u t e s  anarchism by means o f  an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  he must a l s o  accep t  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
o r d e r .  Again,  t h e r e  i s  a t e n s i o n  between f a v o u r in g  the  f r e e  cho ices
o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and an u n w i l l in g n e s s  to  a c c e p t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  consequences
o f  t h o s e  cho ices  i f  th ey  are  n o t  in  accordance  with  a p a r t i c u l a r
p o l i t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n .  As David Wood has n o t e d ,
. . .  i f  t h i s  r e a s o n in g  works e f f e c t i v e l y  in  
j u s t i f y i n g  the  move from th e  u l t r a m in im a l  
to  th e  minimal s t a t e ,  then i t  works j u s t  
as e f f e c t i v e l y  in j u s t i f y i n g  th e  move from 
the  u l t r a m in im a l  to  the m o re - th a n -m in imal 
s t a t e  - something Nozick w^ould n o t  
a p p r e c i a t e .* 3^
Hence N oz ick ’s very appea l  to  an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
l i f e  u n d e rc u t s  h i s  own r i g i d  conc lu s ion  t h a t  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  i s  i n a d m i s s i b l e .  I t  seems t h a t  i f  one r e s p e c t s  the  cho ices  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  one can say  n o th in g  p o s i t i v e  about  what th o s e  cho ices  
w i l l  b e ,  and whether  th e y  a re  t h e  ’ r i g h t ’ c h o i c e s .  This  e s s e n t i a l l y  
dem ocra t ic  commitment i s  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  A co n s en t -b a se d  th e o ry  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
o b l i g a t i o n  such as N ozick ’s which uses  as i t s  s o l e  c r i t e r i o n  i n d i v i d u a l  
cho ice  must accep t  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i th  s p e c i f i c  needs may be 
d i s s a t i s f i e d  wi th a s imply  n o n - i n t e r v e n i n g  (non -he lp ing )  o r d e r .  To 
r e j e c t  t h i s  conc lu s ion  i s  to make a moral judgement about  i n d i v i d u a l  
ch o ic e s  (some a re  the  ’r i g h t ’ c h o ic e s ,  and o t h e r s  a re  n o t ) ,  which 
in  e f f e c t  den ies  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  which
Nozick f av o u rs .
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C l e a r l y ,  an appeal  to  i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  p r o c e s s e s  such as those
o f  the  marke t ,  the  fo rm at ion  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  and the
argument about  e v o l u t io n  and the  r u l e  o f  law, i s  fundam en ta l ly  an
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  appea l .  I t  t a k es  as i t s  p remise  the  i n h e r e n t  worth o f
f r e e  c h o ic e ,  and den ies  t h e  le g i t im a c y  o f  any government i n t e r v e n t i o n
which c u r t a i l s  such ch o ice .  The focus i s  on th e  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  r a t i o n a l l y
choosing i n d i v i d u a l ,  f o r  as Hayek a r g u e s ,
[ l j i b e r t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a re  i n s e p a r a b l e .
A f r e e  s o c i e t y  w i l l  no t  f u n c t i o n  or  main­
t a i n  i t s e l f  u n le s s  i t s  members r e g a rd  i t  as 
r i g h t  t h a t  each in d i v i d u a l  occupy the  p o s ­
i t i o n  t h a t  r e s u l t s  from h i s  a c t i o n , ^ a n d  
accep t  i t  as due to  h i s  own a c t i o n . ^4 
The complementa r i ty  o f  l i b e r t y  and r e s p o n s ­
i b i l i t y  means t h a t  the  argument f o r  
l i b e r t y  can apply  only  t o  th o se  who can 
be h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e . . .
I t  p resupposes  t h a t  a person  i s  capab le  o f  
l e a r n i n g  from e x p e r ien ce  and o f  gu id ing  
h i s  a c t i o n s  by knowledge thus  a c q u i r e d . ^  <
Hence, i t  i s  Hayek 's and N oz ick ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  th e  n a t u r e  o f  the
i n d i v i d u a l  t h a t  de termines  t h e i r  commitment to  f r e e  c h o i c e ,  and an
accep tance  o f  the  r e s u l t s  o f  f r e e  cho ice .  Equa l ly  c l e a r l y ,  t h i s
argument from an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  no t  the  same as the
c la im  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  good. I t  i s  an in dependen t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n
o f  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r .
Yet I have argued t h a t  such an argument does n o t  s e rv e  t o  d i s p o s e  
o f  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  Hayek between the  
f r e e  cho ices  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  and the  s p e c i f i c a l l y  l i b e r a l  o r d e r  (which 
r e q u i r e s  government a c t i o n  to  m a in ta in  i t )  c o n t r a d i c t s  h i s  argument 
t h a t  e v o l u t i o n  i s  to  be favoured  ove r  p o l i t i c a l  d e s ig n ,  t h a t  f r e e  
cho ice p ro v id e s  g r e a t e r  good than ' p l a n n i n g ' .  S i m i l a r l y ,  N o z ick ' s
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cla im  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ice  must lead  t o  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  
i s  b e l i e d  by h i s  c o n v i c t io n  t h a t  u to p i an  s o c i e t y  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by many k inds  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n .  A g a in , t h e r e  i s  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
he re  between th e  r e s u l t s  from f r e e  cho ice  and the  req u i re m en ts  o f  
a l i b e r a l  s o c i e t y .  The two r e s u l t s  may be q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Hence the  
i l l e g i t i m a c y  o f  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
e i t h e r  Hayek o r  Nozick in  t h e i r  appea l  to  th e  n o t i o n  o f  the  i n v i s i b l e -  
hand .
V I . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
Although Hayek argues  f o r  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  in  terms 
o f  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom, and Nozick c la im s  t h a t  on ly  such an 
o r d e r  a d e q u a te ly  t a k e s  i n t o  account  th e  n a t u r e  o f  man's  r i g h t s -  
b e a r i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  i t  i s  a l s o  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e i r  sha red  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n s  r e s t  upon sha red  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  p rem is es .
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  bo th  Hayek's  and N oz ick ' s  ax iom at ic  c o n c lu s io n s  as 
to  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  a re  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  in  n a t u r e .  They take  as 
t h e i r  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  th e  u n a f f i l i a t e d ,  autonomous, b a r g a i n i n g  
i n d i v i d u a l  who seeks coopera t ive s o c i e t y  w i th  h i s  own g o a l -m ax i ­
m i s a t io n  i n  mind. Such an i n d i v i d u a l  has  no co n ce p t io n  o f  the  'ends  
o f  s o c i e t y '  beyond h i s  own s e l f - i n t e r e s t .  D esp i te  t h i s ,  a s o c i a l  
o r d e r  does a r i s e  through th e  v o lu n t a r y  c o n t ra c t s  o f  many f r e e  
i n d i v i d u a l s .  And i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by t h e  p re s e n c e  o f  a s t a t e  
t h a t  s imply p r o t e c t s  th e  r i g h t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  to  p u rsue  v o l u n t a r y  
re  1a t i o n s h i p s .
1 8 7 .
A ccord ing ly ,  f o r  Hayek and Nozick,  a s o c i e t y  made up o f  such 
i n d i v i d u a l s  cannot  be p r o p e r l y  s a i d  t o  have ’ common g o a l s ’ , f o r  which 
i n d i v i d u a l  goals  may be s a c r i f i c e d .  The p r i n c i p a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
t h i s  c onc lu s ion  are  t h a t  such n o t i o n s  as s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  can have 
l i t e r a l l y  no meaning,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  t h e i r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  a re  
g round less  and p u r s u i t  f u t i l e .  The arguments p rov ided  f o r  t h e se  
c o nc lu s ions  concern the  n a t u r e  o f  human knowledge and th e  p l u r a l i t y  
o f  human needs .  On t h i s  view, no one ’p l a n ’ can a t tem p t  t o  so lve  
the  problems o f  s c a t t e r e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  a f r e e  s o c i e t y ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  
who a re  s a i d  to  have no common bonds.  Man's ignorance  and the 
com plex i ty  o f  h i s  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  supposed to  j u s t i f y  a 
commitment to  a n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .  These s ugges ted  arguments 
f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l i s t  concep t ion  o f  s o c i e t y  have been the  s u b j e c t  
o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  .
I have argued t h a t ,  al though the  n o t i o n s  o f  i g n o ra n c e ,  com plex i ty  
and p l u r a l i t y  a re  good reasons  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  a c o l l e c t i v i s t  o r d e r  
which s t i p u l a t e s  what i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  w i l l  b e ,  they  do n o t  imply the  
r e j e c t i o n  o f  a more moderate i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  which p u rsues  
agreed-upon  ends ,  b u t  n o t  a t  th e  expense o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goa l -  
fo rm u l a t io n .  This  i s  an im por tan t  d i s t i n c t i o n  which i s  ig n o red  by 
bo th  Hayek and Nozick.  They f a i l  t o  admit  degrees  o f  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l ,  
and d i f f e r e n t  k inds  o f  ’ s o c i a l  g o a l ’ . Conceivably th e  aims o f  w e l f a r e  
programmes,  e q u a l i t y  (o f  o p p o r tu n i ty  o r  outcome) and s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  
concern  the  a b i l i t y  o f  some i n d i v i d u a l s  to  a t t a i n  t h e i r  g o a l s .  But 
t h e  im plem en ta t ion  o f  such programmes i s  no t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  deny o t h e r  
i n d i v i d u a l s  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  achieving g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n .
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The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  cannot  t h e r e f o r e  be d i s m is s ed  on 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  grounds i f  i t  does no t  a c t u a l l y  i n t e r f e r e  with  the  
p l u r a l i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  goal s  o r  the  p u r s u i t  o f  t h e s e  g o a l s .  A 
s o c i a l  goal which ' f i l l s  i n '  th e  c o n te n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  cho ice  i s  
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from one which merely seeks  t o  a l t e r  l i f e  c h a n c e s . ^
A r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  need no t  imply th e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  goa ls  to  th o s e  o f  the  c o l l e c t i v i t y .  Such programmes can 
c l e a r l y  work towards a s o c i e t a l  g o a l ,  f o r  example th e  a l l e v i a t i o n  
o f  p o v e r t y ,  bu t  they need n o t  imply t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  must abandon 
t h e i r  own ends in the  p u r s u i t  o f  o t h e r s .  Moreover,  the  ’ g o a l s '  o f  
an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  may be j u s t  as ' u n a d j e c t i v a l 1 and i n ­
d e t e rm in a te  as those  o f  th e  l i b e r a l  o r d e r  o r  minimal s t a t e .  Put 
s imply ,  Hayek’ s and N o z ick ' s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  can be no gen u in e ly  
s o c i a l  g o a l s ,  because  o f  man's ignorance  and t h e  p l u r a l i t y  o f  h i s  
ends ,  i s  n o t  su p p o r ted  by t h e i r  a rguments .  I t  does no t  mean t h a t  
th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  to  be r e j e c t e d .  Once a g a i n ,  t h e r e  i s  
an im p o r tan t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between argument and p o l i t i c a l  c o n c lu s io n .  
I n d i v i d u a l i s t  p remises  need n o t  be i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  
a c t i o n .
C l e a r l y  t h e r e  a re  degrees  o f  ' ag reem en t  ove r  e n d s '  t h a t  can 
be adm i t t ed .  We need no t  a l l  pu rsue  th e  same g o a l s ,  b u t  can s t i l l  
r e c o g n i s e  t h a t  some agreement i s  p o s s i b l e ,  d e s p i t e  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  i g n o ra n c e ,  complexity  and p l u r a l i t y .  Every form o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a s s o c i a t i o n  demands some agreement over  ends - o th e rw is e  anarch ism 
would p r e v a i l .  Hence th e  mere e x i s t e n c e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s o c i e t y  i s  
enough to  deny one fundamental  c la im  made by Hayek and Nozick.  I f
189  .
we can agree  on th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom, as Hayek s u g g e s t s ,  o r  can
jo i n  p r o t e c t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  to  o b v ia t e  th e  problems o f  Noz ick’ s
s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e ,  i t  i s  e q u a l ly  p l a u s i b l e  to  assume t h a t  o t h e r
ends may be agreed on by a l l .  We may even 'back i n t o '  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
o rd e r ,  i f  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  adher ing  to  an i n v i s i b l e - h a n d
e x p la n a t io n  are taken  s e r i o u s l y .  Agreement over  c o l l e c t i v e  ends
may wel l  be j u s t  as ' a c c i d e n t a l '  o r  ' s p o n ta n e o u s '  as Hayek and Nozick
cla im th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  i s .
I have adm it ted  d i f f i c u l t y  in  th e  assessmen t o f  such a b road  
cla im  as t h a t  ' t h e r e  i s  no s o c i a l  e n t i t y ' .  Taken a t  f ace  v a l u e ,  
i t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  m ean ing less .  What i s  a t  i s s u e  i s  whether t h i s  s t a r k l y  
i n d i v i d u a l i s t  c o nc lu s ion  i s  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  in  any way by arguments .
And t h i s  i s  s imply n o t  t h e  case in Hayek and Nozick.  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
between th e  ' i n d i v i d u a l '  and the  ' s o c i a l '  i s  more b l u r r e d  than 
Hayek and Nozick admit .  There i s  a continuum o f  i n t e r f e r e n c e s  
and g o a l - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ;  i t  i s  n o t  s imply a m a t t e r  o f  ex t remes .  The 
arguments used by Hayek and Nozick to  condemn a l l  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  
on ly  s e rv e  to  exc lude  the most extreme forms.
Hayek and Nozick appeal  to  the  n o t io n  o f  the  i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  
in  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l i s t  concep tion  o f  s o c i e t y ,  in  o r d e r  to  j u s t i f y  
th e  m in im isa t ion  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  But the  i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  n o t io n  
i t s e l f  i s  an i n s u f f i c i e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  In Hayek' s 
case  i t  r e s t s  on a p o s s i b l e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  between spontaneous  
o r d e r  and the  l i b e r a l  o r d e r ,  and in  N o z i c k ' s ,  i t  does n o t  imply 
t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  would n e c e s s a r i l y  choose t h e  minimal s t a t e .
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In sura, many o f  t h e  assumptions  made by Hayek and Nozick 
concern ing  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  are  c l e a r l y  p l a u s i b l e  warnings 
a g a i n s t  too much r e l i a n c e  on the  b e n e f i c e n c e  o f  s t a t e  a c t i o n .
That t h e r e  a re  l i m i t s  to  the  concept  o f  s o c i a l  agreement i s  no t  
in  doubt .  But whe ther  t h e s e  arguments p r e c l u d e  a l l  forms o f  p o s i t i v e  
s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  a n o th e r  q u e s t i o n .  I have argued t h a t  n e i t h e r  
Hayek n o r  Nozick p r o v i d e ,  in  t h e i r  sha red  appea l  to  e i t h e r  human 
igno rance  o r  s o c i a l  p l u r a l i s m ,  s u f f i c i e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  r e a c h in g  
such a c o n c lu s io n .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with  a 
concep t ion  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  t h a t  has  as i t s  b a s i s  a concern  f o r  
th e  w e l f a r e  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l .  T h e re fo re  H ayek 's and N oz ick ' s  
arguments f a i l  in t h e i r  a t tem pt  to  admit  on] y th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
o r d e r .
191 .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
This t h e s i s  has  a t tem p ted  an e x p o s i t o r y ,  com para t ive ,  i n t e r ­
p r e t i v e  and c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  arguments and co n c lu s io n s  o f  
two i n f l u e n t i a l ,  contemporary l i b e r t a r i a n  t h i n k e r s  r e g a r d i n g  th e  
p ro p e r  r o l e  o f  the  s t a t e  in  the  l i f e  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l .
P a r t  I sought  to  c h a r a c t e r i s e  th e  p r i n c i p a l  p o l i t i c a l  maxims 
advanced by Hayek and Nozick.  P a r t  I I  exp lo red  the  v a r io u s  ways 
in  which they  r e a c h ,  and a t tem p t  to  j u s t i f y ,  t h e i r  uncompromising 
c o n c l u s i o n s .  This  invo lved  a c r i t i c a l  exam inat ion o f  the  premises  
and arguments appea led  to  and the  i m p l i c i t  assumptions  c o n ta in e d  
in  Havek’s and N ozick ’ s j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o rd e r .
I argued in  P a r t  I t h a t  the  n o t i o n s  o f  freedom, r i g h t s  and 
j u s t i c e  d e s c r ib e d  by Hayek and Nozick are  both  s i m i l a r  and r e l a t e d .  
They u t i l i s e  p a r t i c u l a r  concep t ions  o f  consen t  and autonomy in  
c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  i d e a l i s e d  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  and make the  
im p o r tan t  d i s t i n c t i o n  between freedom and r i g h t s  on th e  one hand,  
and s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  and c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  g o a l - f u l f i l m e n t  on th e  
o t h e r .  They see  s i m i l a r  t h i n g s  i n f r i n g i n g  the  p r i v a t e  sphere  o f  
t h e  autonomous i n d i v i d u a l .  In sum, the  p r i n c i p l e s  upheld  by Hayek 
and Nozick r e g a r d i n g  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  and the  s o c i a l  o r d e r  a re  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s i m i l a r  to  make a c l o s e  comparison o f  them p o s s i b l e  
and u s e f u l .  They have sha red  conce rns .
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  freedom and r i g h t s  have ,
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f o r  Hayek and Nozick,  s p e c i f i c  and im por tan t  p o l i t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s .
I t  i s  im p e ra t i v e ,  they  a rgue ,  t h a t  the  s t a t e  a c t  to  uphold freedom 
and p r e s e r v e  r i g h t s .  On t h i s  view, t h e i r  ' n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t *  
o r d e r  has a s e v e r e l y  c i rc um sc r ibed  r o l e  in  t h e  l i f e  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l .
According to  Hayek and Nozick,  the  s t a t e ' s  co e rc iv e  r o l e  shou ld  
be conf ined  to  the  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  freedom, the  enforcement o f  r i g h t s ,  
and the  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  v o lu n t a r y  and l e g i t i m a t e  p r i v a t e  c o n t r a c t s  
in  a market  s o c i e t y .  Governments,  t h e r e f o r e ,  must c r e a t e  laws only 
t o  pun ish  and p r e v e n t  co e rc iv e  i n t e r f e r e n c e s  w i th  the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
cho ice  p r o c e s s e s .  The e v i l  to  be avoided  i s  com puls ion , the  
d i c t a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  w i l l s ,  e i t h e r  by o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  or. by 
t h e  s t a t e .  The l a t t e r  must neve r  fo rm u la te  o r  d i r e c t  i n d i v i d u a l  
g o a l s ;  i t  has no o b l i g a t i o n  to  h e lp  i n d i v i d u a l s  p o s i t i v e l y  in  
t h e  achievement o f  t h e i r  goals  - by e q u a l i s i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  f o r  
example - and i t  must no t  fo rm ula te  i t s  own goa ls  i f  t h i s  in v o lv es  
th e  coe rc io n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  What the  p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r  may l e g i t i m a t e l y  
do to  i n d i v i d u a l s  d e r iv e s  from what i n d i v i d u a l s  may do t o  one 
a n o t h e r .  .And the  r i g h t s  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  p o s s e s s  a re  s t r i n g e n t  
and p u r e l y  n e g a t iv e  in  c h a r a c t e r .  They do no t  engender an o b l i ­
g a t i o n  in  any person  to  p rov ide  f o r  ano the r  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  w e l f a r e .
Hence, in  the  l i b e r t a r i a n  acc oun t ,  the  s t a t e ' s  p u r e l y  n e g a t i v e  
r o l e  exc ludes  p a t e r n a l i s m , t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  a common h i e r a r c h y  o f  
c o n c r e t e  ends ,  and t h e  achievement o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  q u a l i t y  o f  l i f e  
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  There i s  s a i d  to  be no room f o r  the  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  
' s o c i a l  j u s t i c e *  by a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  w ea l th  and the  r e g u l a t i o n  
o f  th e  economy. Nor need governments a t t e n d  to  human w e l f a r e  needs
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through en fo rced  mutual  a id  o r  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  a c c o rd in g  
to  moral m e r i t  or  d e s e r t .
As I have argued,  t h e s e  cla ims on b e h a l f  o f  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
o r d e r  a re  q u e s t i o n e d  by those  who see a p o s i t i v e  r o l e  f o r  the  s t a t e  
in th e  achievement o f  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n . For t h e s e  c r i t i c s ,  
the  requ i re m en ts  o f  j u s t i c e ,  needs and w e l f a r e  demand more than 
a simple nightwatchman r o l e  fo r  the  s t a t e .  Such c o u n te rc la im s  were 
addressed  in  P a r t  I I .
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  P a r t  II r e f l e c t e d  both  the  s i m i l a r i t i e s  and 
the  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  argument between Hayek and Nozick.  C h a p t e r - 4 
o u t l i n e d  and cha l lenged  Hayek’s argument f o r  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  which he couches i n  terms o f  th e  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  freedom 
p r o v id e s .  Chapter  5 add re s sed  the  moral arguments advanced by 
Nozick f o r  r i g h t s - p r o t e c t i o n  (and a g a i n s t  coe rc ion )  t h a t  a re  d e r iv e d  
from the n a u t r e  o f  man. Chapter  6 a t tem p ted  to  f i n d  a common 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m  in  Hayek and Nozick t h a t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  m a n i fe s t  
in  t h e i r  views o f  th e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y .  Hence I exp lo red  both  the  
a r e a s  o f  Hayek' s and Nozick 's  arguments t h a t  a re  d i f f e r e n t  and 
th o s e  t h a t  o v e r l a p .
I argued t h a t  Hayek’s p a r t i c u l a r  v e r s i o n  o f  l i b e r t a r i a n i s m  
r e f l e c t s  h i s  b e l i e f ,  f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  s o c i e t y  c o n s i s t s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w i th  s e p a r a t e  and n o n - c o in c id in g  i n t e r e s t s , w h i c h  i s  s a i d  to  p r e c lu d e  
c o l l e c t i v i s t  p l a n n in g  and g o a l -d e t e r m i n a t i o n ;  and second ly ,  t h a t  
spon taneous  fo r c e s  in s o c i e t y  should  be h a rn e s s e d  as much as 
p o s s i b l e  (by no t  co e rc in g  i n d i v i d u a l s )  to  al low them to f r e e l y
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ach ieve  th e  d i s t i n c t i v e  l i f e - p l a n s .  T h e i r  arguments I termed r e s p e c t i v e l y  
th e  'N a tu re  o f  S o c i e t y '  and th e  ’B en e f i t s  o f  Freedom' .  Together  they 
form an a t tem pted  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .
One i s  supposed ly  an e m p i r i c a l  s ta tem en t  about  the  n a t u r e  and 
development o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  while  the  o t h e r  e x p re s s e s  
a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  n o n -coe rc ion  and a b e l i e f  t h a t  freedom r e a l l y  
b e n e f i t s  i n d i v i d u a l s .
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between what I r e g a rd  as two 1 eveIs  
o f  argument in  Hayek i s  t h a t  h i s  i n s t ru m e n ta l  argument t r i e s  to  
d i sm iss  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  on the grounds t h a t  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  
c o n f l i c t  with  i n d i v i d u a l  freedom, whereas the  n a t u r e - o f - s o c i e t y  
argument a t t e m p t s  to  d i spose  o f  the  very b a s i s  o f  t h a t  o rd e r  by 
denying the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  the  n o t i o n s  (such as s o c i a l  good) which 
s u s t a i n  i t .  On th e  f i r s t  argument,  the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom a re  
removed or  c u r t a i l e d  by p o s i t i v e  s t a t e  a c t i o n s ,  and on the  second,  
t h e  supposedly  f a l l a c i o u s  n a t u r e  o f  the  fo u nda t ions  o f  the  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  o rd e r  p r e v e n t s  i t s  p r e s c r i b e d  goal s  from b e in g  ach ieved .
Hence t h e r e  i s  a meaningful  d i s t i n c t i o n  between what I took to  
be Hayek's  two p r i n c i p a l  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  arguments.
F i r s t l y ,  I examined Hayek's  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  freedom should  be 
maximised in  o r d e r  to  h e lp  i n d i v i d u a l s  to  ach ieve  t h e i r  goa l s  and 
f u l f i l  t h e i r  pu rp o s iv e  a c t i o n s .  This argument I d e s c r ib e d  as 
maximising,  i n s t r u m e n t a l ,  c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t  and u t i l i t a r i a n ,  s i n c e ,  
a l though  i t  does no t  in v o v le  the  c o l l e c t i v e  p u r s u i t  o f  a common s e t  
o f  g o a l s ,  i t  does j u s t i f y  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  terms o f  i t s  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n  to  the  w e l f a r e  o f  the c o l l e c t i v i t y . I argued t h a t  freedom,
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f o r  Hayek, i s  no t  s imply  good fo r  i t s  own sake ;  i t  i s  to  be pursued  
because i t  p ro v id e s  any in d i v id u a l  ( s e l e c t e d  randomly) w ith  the  
b e s t  p o s s i b l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n . Hayek does no t  
s p e c i f y  th e  g rea te s t  happ iness  fo r  the  g r e a t e s t  number, bu t  he 
t u r n s  out  to  be j u s t i f y i n g  freedom in  terms o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  concep t ion  
o f  t h i s .
This  argument - w i th  i t s  e x p l i c i t  concern  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  
g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  - can be c o n t r a s t e d  with  Hayek 's i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  
only coe rc io n  amongst a whole range  o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  upon in d i v i d u a l  
b e hav iou r  i s  t o  be minimised in  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r .
How can Hayek' s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  argument be r e c o n c i l e d  with  such a 
narrow conc lu s ion?  What makes coe rc ion  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
i f  the  gene ra l  aim i s  th e  maximisa t ion  o f  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n ?  I t  
would appea r  t h a t  t h i s  would r e q u i r e  much more than a n o n - i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e ,  t h a t  p o s i t i v e  h e lp  ought to  be p rov ided  by the  
s t a t e  f o r  the  i n d i v i d u a l  in  o rde r  t h a t  he may pursue  h i s  goals  
more m ean in g fu l ly .  However, t h i s  compromise, seemingly  r e q u i r e d  
by Hayek’s argument,  i s  excluded by h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  coe rc ion  
only  i s  t o  be p r e v e n t e d .  There i s  a t e n s i o n ,  th e n ,  betwen Hayek' s  
maximising argument f o r  freedom and h i s  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  h e ld  view 
t h a t  n o n -co e rc io n  i s  an a b s o lu t e  good in  i t s e l f .
The q u e s t i o n  was r a i s e d  to  what e x t e n t  th e  coe rc ion  t h a t  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  an i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  den ies  i n d i v i d u a l s  the  
o p p o r t u n i t y  to  ach ieve  g o a l s .  This  i s  supposed ly  the  reason  why 
Hayek wants us to r e j e c t  such an o r d e r .  These q u e s t i o n s  and the  
a p p a re n t  problems th e y  h i g h l i g h t  in  Hayek’s argument occupied
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Chap te r  4.
In Chapte r  6 I tu rn ed  t o  Hayek' s  conc lus ion  t h a t  s o c i e t y  
cannot  p r o p e r l y  be s a i d  to  have c o l l e c t i v e  goa ls  because  i t  c o n s i s t s  
only  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i th  s e p a r a t e  and n o n - c o in c id in g  i n t e r e s t s .
He c la ims t h a t  we a re  ig n o r a n t  o f  th e  needs o f  o t h e r s ,  and o f  th e  
s o c i a l  good because  such a c o l l e c t i v e  goal (m an i fes t  in  the  q u es t  
f o r  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e )  i s  i l l u s o r y ,  and only  p o s s i b l e  in  a pu rpose -  
governed o r g a n i s a t i o n .  There fo re  any a t t e m p t  by th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  to  coerce  pe rsons  f o r  the  sake o f  a g r e a t e r  o v e r a l l  good 
i s  g r o u n d le s s ,  and t o  be r e j e c t e d .
Hayek 's conc lu s ion  t u r n s  on h i s  t h e o ry  o f  knowledge,  h i s  s o c i a l  
p l u r a l i s m  and h i s  adherence to  an in v i s i b l e - h a n d  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  l i f e .  Like h i s  cla ims f o r  the  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom, 
t h e s e  s u p p o r t i n g  arguments and t h e i r  i m p l i c i t  assumpt ions  a re  open 
to  q u e s t i o n .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  r a i s e d  to  what e x t e n t  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  demands knowledge o f  a s o c i a l  good, o r  i f  i t  even r e l i e s  on t h i s  
n o t i o n  a t  a l l .  I f  the  n o t io n  o f  s o c i a l  good and the  re q u i re m e n t s  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  can be shown not  t o  be m u tua l ly  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  then  Hayek' s argument a g a i n s t  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  
on t h e s e  grounds i s  f lawed.  Secondly ,  Hayek 's emphasis  on the  n e c e s s a r y  
b e n e f i t s  o f  spon taneous ,  as  opposed to  c o n t r u c t i v i s t , a c t i o n s  demands 
c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y .  I f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  can be shown to  be p o l i t i c a l l y  
m e a n in g le s s ,  then many o f  Hayek' s  p o l i t i c a l  axioms remain unproven.
N o z ick ' s  p r i n c i p a l  arguments a g a i n s t  thb  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  - 
t h a t  which i n f r i n g e s  r i g h t s  - were ana ly sed  in Chap ters  5 and 6.  They
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were compared and c o n t r a s t e d  wi th  Hayek' s , and were c r i t i c a l l y  a s s e s s e d  
f o r  the  degree t c  which they  rende r  the  l i b e r t a r i a n  p o l i t i c a l  con­
c l u s i o n s  i n f e r r e d  by Nozick.
Nozick a t tem p ts  t o ‘j u s t i f y  the  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  by 
a p p e a l in g  to  a view o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  man which a l l e g e d l y  makes any 
form o f  s t a t e  coerc ion  immoral and t h e r e f o r e ,  on N oz ick ’s grounds ,  
i n d e f e n s i b l e .  He appea ls  t o  Kantian e t h i c s ,  man's s e p a r a t e n e s s ,  
moral agency and r a t i o n a l i t y ,  and h i s  c a p a c i t y  f o r  a t t a i n i n g  mean­
i n g f u l  l i f e .  On t h i s  view, we should  r e s p e c t  r i g h t s  because  man, 
qua man, de se rv es  r e s p e c t .  For Nozick,  uphold ing  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
r i g h t  t o  be f r e e  from s t a t e  compulsion p r e s e r v e s  human d i g n i t y .  I t  
i s  s imply immoral to  c o e rc e ,  to  ' u s e '  p e rsons  f o r  th e  achievement o f  
ends o t h e r  than  t h e i r  own. We would n o t ,  he s u g g e s t s , ,  f o r c e  p eop le  
to  work e x t r a  hours  in t h e i r  l e i s u r e  t ime to  a id  o t h e r s ,  so how 
can we l e g i t i m a t e l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  a p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  w ea l th  f o r  
s i m i l a r  r ea s o n s ?
Nozick ' s  d e o n t o lo g ic a l  argument f o r  r i g h t s - e n f o r c e m e n t  by 
th e  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  d i f f e r s  from Hayek 's i n s t r u m e n t a l  
argument in  t h a t  i t  avo ids  a p p e a l in g  t o  t h i n g s  t h a t  f low from 
th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  v o lu n ta ry  c o n t r a c t s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  a l though  Hayek 
a t  t imes  assumes th e  im m ora l i ty  o f  c o e rc io n ,  he does n o t  (u n l ik e  
Nozick) c o n s t r u c t  an argument to  dem onst ra te  i t .
In s p i t e  o f  t h i s ,  i t  must be q u e s t i o n e d  whether  N oz ick ' s  
argument (h i s  p remises  conce rn ing  the  n a t u r e  o f  man) d i s m i s s e s  
a l t e r n a t i v e  co n c lu s io n s  which al low some s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in
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t h e  l i f e  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  Nozick ' s  two s p e c i f i c  co n c lu s io n s  a re  
t h a t ,  f i r s t l y ,  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o rde r  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f r i n g e s  
r i g h t s ,  which le aves  i t  i n d e f e n s i b l e ;  and s econd ly ,  t h e r e  a re  no 
p o s i t i v e  r i g h t s  o r  o b l i g a t i o n s  which could j u s t i f y  such an o r d e r .
1 s e r i o u s l y  q u e s t i o n e d  bo th  th e s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  and r e l a t e d  them 
t o  Nozick’ s a c t u a l  p rem ises  about  man. D esp ite  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  
w e l f a r e  s t a t e  (a parad igm i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  o r d e r  in the  eyes o f  
Hayek and Nozick) c o e r c e s ,  a p p r o p r i a t e s  and r e d i s t r i b u t e s ,  I argued 
t h a t  t h e s e  p r a c t i c e s , n e e d  to  be examined in  the  l i g h t  o f  N oz ick’s 
d ic tum t h a t  we should  r e s p e c t  persons  qua p e r s o n s .  In o t h e r  words,  
Nozick must show t h a t  th e  only  l e g i t i m a t e  r i g h t s  t h a t  we p o s s e s s  
a re  n e g a t i v e  in  n a t u r e ,  and t h a t  the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f r i n g e  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  (h i s  primary'  concern) in  
meaningful  and s u b s t a n t i a l  ways. Whether o r  n o t  Nozick ach iev es  h i s  
s t a t e d  goal o f  d i s m i s s i n g  thb i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t a t e  i s  dubious 
when h i s  s u p p o r t i n g  arguments a re  examined in r e l a t i o n  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n s .
However, N oz ick ’s l i b e r t a r i a n  i n d i v id u a l i s m  i s  no t  con f ined  to  
h i s  view o f  man’s n a t u r e .  He a l s o  makes e x p l i c i t  claims about  the  
n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  which ,  he a rg u e s ,  i n v a l i d a t e  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e .  Here,  he i s  c l o s e  to  Hayek. In Chapter  6 I dem onst ra ted  t h a t  
Nozick, l i k e  Hayek, views s o c i e t y  (any c o l l e c t i v i t y )  n o t  as an 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  with  p u rp o s e s ,  bu t  as a loose c o l l e c t i o n  o f  s e l f -  
i n t e r e s t e d  and aütonomous i n d i v i d u a l s  w i thou t  n a t u r a l l y  c o i n c i d i n g  
i n t e r e s t s  o r  g o a l s .  S o c i e t y ,  Nozick a rgues ,  i s  too  complex,  and 
man's i n t e r e s t s  too  v a r i e d ,  to  al low f o r  a co e rc iv e  s t a t e  a p p a ra tu s  
which would a t t e m p t  t o  d e f in e  th e  s o c i a l  good. On t h i s  argument,
Nozick d i sm isse s  c la im s  f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  and
1 9 9 .
c o n s t r u c t s  h i s  own e n t i t l e m e n t  th e o ry .  Like Hayek, he a l s o  appea ls  
to  the  i n v i s i b l e - h a n d  t o  e x p la in  the  emergence o f  th e  minimal s t a t e  
as the  on ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  form o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n .
I argued in Chapte r  6 t h a t  Nozick’s view o f  s o c i e t y  i s  d i s t i n c t  
from, though r e l a t e d  t o ,  h i s  moral argument a g a i n s t  c o e rc in g  p e r s o n s .
I t  i s  one t h i n g  to  claim t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  should  no t  be coerced  
because -f some s p e c i a l  human t r a i t  t h a t  makes co e rc io n  immoral 
( i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  p o s s i b l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  o f  c o e r c i o n ) .  I t  i s  q u i t e  
an o th e r  t o  s u g g es t  t h a t  the  non -co in c id en ce  and com plexity  o f  
human i n t e r e s t s  makes coe rc ion  f u t i l e ,  and t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  
s t a t e  s u p e r f l u o u s .  C l e a r l y ,  one s e t  o f  p rem ises  i s  moral and t h e  
o t h e r  i s  n o t .  One concerns the  i n d i v i d u a l  qua i n d i v i d u a l ,  the  
o t h e r  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  in  s o c i e t y .  On N o z ick ' s  f i r s t  argument,  
even i f  t h e r e  were a d e f in a b le  s o c i a l  good, i t  would s t i l l  no t  
j u s t i f y  i n f r i n g i n g  in d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s .  But on the  second argument,  
th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  the  s o c i a l  good i s  denied  o u t r i g h t .  Hence i t  i s  
meaningful  t o  speak o f  a t  l e a s t  two k inds  o f  argument in  Nozick,  
d e s p i t e  h i s  p e r v a s iv e  i n d i v i d u a l i s m .
Again,  I c r i t i c a l l y  examined th e  s ubs tance  o f  N oz ick ' s  j u s t i f i ­
c a t o r y  p remises  in o rde r  t o  e s t a b l i s h  whether  they  y i e l d  only h i s  
own p o l i t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s .  To t h i s  end,  I ana ly se d  the  n a t u r e  
o f  a ' s o c i a l  good'  and t h e  degree to  which com plex ity  (and i t s  
concom itan t ,  ignorance)  and p l u r a l i t y  a c t u a l l y  r u l e  out  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
The q u e s t i o n  o f  whe ther  t h e  l a t t e r  genu ine ly  den ies  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  
s e p a r a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  was found to  be c e n t r a l  h e r e .
The general conclusion of the thesis is that neither Hayek's 
libertarianism nor Nozick's radical individualism is justified by 
the particular arguments to which they appeal. Hayek, for instance, 
admits that the notion of social justice is only meaningless in 
a purpose-independent order such as the market. Yet the atavism 
of social justice is one of his principle arguments for dismissing 
another kind of political association. Hence one only need accept 
his political conclusions if one also accepts the assertion that 
societies cannot have purposes. And this, I have argued, is never 
shown by Hayek to be the case. It is simply an article of the 
libertarian faith. All he has shown is that such notions as the 
social good are meaningless in his own preferred order.
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Similarly, Nozickls strength lies in his uncompromising 
individualism. All his arguments, moral and non-moral, and re­
garding man and society, make sense only in a world populated by 
individuals with absolute negative rights. Hence his arguments 
can only be defeated by taking on his individualism. This is 
quite a difficult task, since the latter is not susceptible to 
substantiation by his justificatory approaches. Hence one need 
only interpret his premises in an individualist way if one is 
already an individualist. The arguments themselves in no way 
justify his political position.
Hayek and Nozick have not demonstrated the illegitimacy of 
the interventionist order which seeks to pursue individual goal- 
satisfaction. It is tempting to interpret their arguments as 
actually necessitating such positive state actions. Yet I have
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not taken this additional step. To do so would require the defeat 
of their radical individualism, which cannot be dismissed lightly, 
and which is certainly beyond the bounds of this thesis. What I 
have simply attempted to do is to elucidate and criticise particular 
arguments in support of a political position that is accepted by 
few in the community. In doing so I have shown the lengths to 
which they must go to establish their claims. Nozick's arguments, 
for instance, demonstrate the difficulty of devising any theory 
of rights from the nature of man, even if one accepts his premises.
And Hayek does not show that a coercion-free society is to be 
specially favoured over an interventionist order in the pursuit 
of individual goal-satisfaction. Such an undertaking would require 
massive empirical documentation. Hayek does not establish it simply 
by dismissing totalitarian orders.
Many of the specific fclaims of Hayek and Nozick are intuitively 
plausible, while others are not. We may agree that the selection of 
marriage partners is beyond the realm of legitimate state intervention, 
without inferring that state assistance for the unemployed is not 
a worthwhile end (on the grounds of respecting persons qua persons). 
Hence on occasions Hayek and Nozick seem to ignore the logic of 
their own arguments. Yet in order to accept this logic they would 
have to abandon their individualism. And this is something that 
they are clearly not prepared to do.
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be i l l e g a l . '  Gordon i s  a rg u in g ,  c o r r e c t l y ,  t h a t  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  
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c o l l a p s e s ,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e  co n c lu s io n s  d e r iv e d  tha~efrom a re  
m e a n in g le s s .
11. O p . c i t . ,  Hayek, 1975, p p . 61-2 ,  and Hayek, Law', L e g i s l a t i o n  
and L i b e r ty ,  Volume 1, 'RulSs and O r d e r ' ,  (London, 1973),  
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16. Ib id .
17. Hayek argues  t h a t  ' . . .  no t e s t  or  c r i t e r i a  have been found 
o r  can be found by which such r u l e s  o f  ' s o c i a l  j u s t i c e '
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o b j e c t i v e l y  a c h i e v in g  a d es e rv in g  s t a n d a rd  o f  l i v i n g  fcr an 
i n d i v i d u a l  o r  c l a s s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  See Lang, W., 'Marxism, 
L ib e ra l i s m  and J u s t i c e ' ,  in  Kamenka, E . ,  Tay, A . ( e d s ) ,
J u s t i c e  (London, 1979),  p .  130. See a l s o  Hayek, 1960, p p .
85-102. In a market  s o c i e t y ,  Hayek s u b s t i t u t e s  the  c r i t e r i o n  
o f  va lue  f o r  t h a t  o f  m e r i t :  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  worth i s  measured 
acc o rd in g  to  h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  needs o r  wants o f  h i s  
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18. I b i d . , p . 62.
19. O p . c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, pp.  140-1.  He s t a t e s :  ' [ t j h a t  o t h e r  
p e o p l e ' s  p r o p e r t y  can be s e r v i c e a b l e  in  the  achievement o f  
our aims i s  due mainly  t o  th e  e n f o r c i b i l i t y  o f  c o n t r a c t s .
The whole network o f  r i g h t s  c r e a t e d  by c o n t r a c t s  i s  as im por tan t  
a p a r t  o f  our own p r o t e c t e d  s p h e re ,  as much the  b a s i s  o f  our  
p l a n s ,  as any p r o p e r t y  o f  our own' .  The impor tance  o f  the  
connec t ion  in  Hayek 's  thought between law and f r e e  c o n t r a c t  
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by laws and an u n f r e e  ' t e l o c r a t i c '  s o c i e t y  governed by s p e c i f i c  
p u rp o s e s .  The g r e a t  b e n e f i t  o f  the  market  o r d e r  f o r  Hayek i s  
t h a t  i t  ' . . .  r e s t s  noton common purposes  b u t  on r e c i p r o c i t y ,  
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CHAPTER 4 . HAYEK'S ARGUMENT FOR THE NON-INTERVENTIONIST ORDER:
THE BENEFITS OF FREEDOM.
1. Op. c i t . ,  Hayek, 1975, p .  57.
2. Watkins ,  J .W .N.,  ' P h i l o s o p h y ' ,  in Sei don, A . ( e d ) ,  Agenda For
A Free S o c i e ty :  Essays On Hayek's  The Cons t i t u t i o n  o f  L i b e r t y , 
(London, 1961),  p .  48. See a l s o  Barry ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .  67.
3. O p . c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, p .  9.
4. On Hayek' s t h e o r y  o f  knowledge,  see h i s  Chapter  2, o p . c i t . ,  
1960, e s p e c i a l l y  p p . 22-9.  This w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  more f u l l y  
in C hap te r  6,  S e c t io n  I I .
5. I b id .  , p .  42.
6. Ib id .  , p . 51.
7. Op. c i t . ,  W a tk in s , p . 55
8. Op. c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960,  p
9. Ib id .  , p .  31.
10. I b id .  See a l s o  Hayek, o p . c i t . ,  1976, p.  132, where he claims  
t h a t  ' [ t ] h e  good s o c i e t y  i s  one in  which the  chances o f  anyone 
s e l e c t e d  a t  random are  l i k e l y  t o  be as g r e a t  as p o s s i b l e '  ,
and Hayek, o p . c i t . , 1975, p.  71.
11. O p . c i t . ,  Watk ins ,  p.  34. See Hayek on t h i s  p o i n t ,  o p . c i t . ,
1960, p .  76. He s t a t e s : ' [ t ]hough we leave  p eop le  to  dec ide
f o r  them se lves  because  th e y  a r e ,  as a r u l e ,  in  th e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  
to  know th e  c i rc u m s tan c es  su r round ing  t h e i r  a c t i o n ,  we are  
a l s o  concerned t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  should pe rm i t  them to  use 
t h e i r  knowledge to  th e  b e s t  e f f e c t ' .  (My emphasis)  I t  i s  in 
t h i s  sense  t h a t  Hayek 's  o r d e r  i s  a maximising one.  I t  i s  f o r  
the  same rea son  t h a t  he r e c o g n i s e s  th e  impor tance  o f  i n c l u d i n g  
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  in  t h e  p r i v a t e  domain o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l .
Again,  th e s e  h e l p  t h e  l a t t e r  to  use h i s  freedom to  the  b e s t  
e f f e c t .
12. Op. c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, Chapter  2, p a s s i m .
13. I b i d . , p .  61.
14. I b i d . , p . 57.
15. I b i d . ,  p.  6. Whether Hayek sees  freedom simply  as an end t o  be 
pu rsued  f o r  i t s  own s a k e ,  o r  an in s t r u m e n ta l  v a l u e ,  o r  b o th ,  
i s  much deba ted .  I d i s c u s s  t h i s  f u r t h e r  in  S ec t ion  I I I  o f  t h i s  
c h a p t e r ,  f o r  example,  under  Footnote 22. N.P. Barry argues  
t h a t  Hayek r e g a r d s  freedom as both  an end in  i t s e l f  and an 
i n s t r u m e n t a l  v a lu e  ( p . 67 ) .  A. de C resp igny ,  however,  sees
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Hayek' s i n d i v i d u a l s  on ly  as ' . . .  p o t e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t o r s  to  
p r o g r e s s  r a t h e r  than  as i n d i v i d u a l s  w ith  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s ' .
See h i s  'F .A. Hayek: Freedom For P r o g r e s s ' ,  in  de C resp igny ,  A. ,  
Minogue, K .R . ( e d s ) ,  Contemporary P o l i t i c a l  Phi l s o p h e r s ,
(New York, 1975) p .  58.
16 . Op. c i t . ,  Hayek, 1975 , p .  60.
17. I b i d . , p .  59.
18. Cohen, M., ' B e r l i n  and th e  L ib e ra l  T r a d i t i o n ' ,  
Q u a r t e r l y ,  Vol. 10, 1960, p.  225.
Tne P h i lo s o p h i c a l
19. O p . c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, p .  21.
20. I b i d . , p . 6.
21. I b i d . , p.  68.
22. I b i d .  Hence de Cresp igny  admits  t h a t ,  in  s p i t e  
upon freedom as an i n s t r u m e n t a l  v a l u e ,  ' . . .  he
o f  Hayek' s s t r e s s  
sometimes
w r i t e s  as i f  he views i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  as i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
d e s i r a b l e  . . . '  (o p . c i t . , de Cresp igny ,  p .  58,  my em phas i s ) .
George and Wild ing  argue  t h a t ,  f o r  a n t i - c o l l e c t i v i s t s  such 
as Hayek, ' L i b e r t y  i s  va lued  both  as an end in  i t s e l f  and 
as a means to  an e n d ' .  See George,  V. , Wild ing ,  P . ,  Ideology 
and S o c ia l  W e l f a r e , (London, 1976),  p.  23. Hayek: himsfelf 
s t a t e s  t h a t  ' [s ] ome r e a d e r s  w i l l  perhaps  be d i s t u r b e d  by the  
im pres s ion  th a  I do n o t  take  th e  va lue  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  l i b e r t y  
as an i n d i s p u t a b l e  e t h i c a l  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  and t h a t ,  i n  t r y i n g  
t o  dem ons t ra te  i t s  v a l u e ,  I am p o s s i b l y  making the  argument 
i n  i t s  su p p o r t  a m a t t e r  o f  exped iency .  This  would be a m is ­
u n d e r s t a n d i n g '  . (o p . c i t . , 1960, p.  6) Hence Hayek c l e a r l y  
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  freedom can be both  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  and e x t r i n s i c a l l y  
v a l u a b l e .  But he does m a in ta in  t h a t  in  o r d e r  to  convince  
h i s  opponents  o f  the  m e r i t s  o f  h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  i n s t r u m e n t a l  
arguments a re  l i k e l y  t o  prove more e f f e c t i v e .  (See,  a g a i n ,  p .  6 
o f  h i s  I n t r o d u c t i o n ) .  He s t a t e s :  ' [we] can t h e r e f o r e  n o t  f u l l y  
a p p r e c i a t e  th e  v a l u e  o f  freedom u n t i l  we know how a s o c i e t y  
o f  f r e e  men as a whole d i f f e r s  from one in  which unfreedom 
p r e v a i l s ' .  (My em phases) .  This  s t a t e m e n t ,  pe rhaps  more than  
any o t h e r ,  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  Hayek b e l i e v e s  h i s  argument,  to  
be c o n v i n c i n g , must dem onst ra te  thb b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom. I t  
I t  i s  the  e f f e c t  o f  freedom on s o c i e t y ,  and on th e  l i v e s  o f  
th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  t h e r e i n ,  t h a t  i s  im por tan t  f o r  Hayek. Hence 
to  t a l k  mere ly  o f  th e  im m ora l i ty  o f  coe rc ion  i s  c l e a r l y  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t .  In t h i s  sense  h i s  argument i s  p r i m a r i l y  i n s t r u - 
m en ta l .  But B a r ry ,  George,  Wilding and o t h e r s  a re  c o r r e c t  to  
c l a im  t h a t  freedom f o r  Hayek i s  both  an end and a means, 
and t h a t  to  h o ld  such a d u a l i s t i c  view need no t  be c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
23. Op. c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, p .  79.
24. See Hayek, o p . c i t . ,  1960, Chapter  1, p a s s i m .
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25. See Tay lo r  in  Ryan, o p . c i t . ,  1979.
26. For i n s t a n c e ,  they  would argue t h a t  f u l l  employment,  a t  l e a s t ,  
i s  r e q u i r e d  to  g u a ran tee  a meaningful  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  
goal s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and t h e r e f o r e  s a t i s f y  Hayek 's  j u s t i f i c a t o r y  
appea l  to  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  freedom. Yet Hayek argues  a g a i n s t
th e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  employment in  t h i s  f a s h io n ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  the  
o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f r e e  market .  See Hayek, o p . c i t . ,  1960,
Chapters  17, 18 and 19, in  P a r t  I I I  o f  h i s  book: 'Freedom 
in the  Welfare  S t a t e ' .  Hence Hayek's  f r e e  s o c i e t y  cannot  accommo­
da te  h i s  c r i t i c s  in  t h i s  a r e a ,  f o r  he a r g u e s ,  i t  i s  up to  the  
i n d i v i d u a l  to  make the  most o f  h i s  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  Fac to rs  such 
as p e r i o d i c  unemployment, which c l e a r l y  a f f e c t  l i f e - p l a n s  and 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  a r e  no t  to  be s u b j e c t  t o  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l .  
Keynes ians ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  have argued d i f f e r e n t l y .
27. My coun te ra rgum en t  h e r e  i s  n o t  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  
c o n t r o l  g e n e r a l l y ,  o r  in  any p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a .  I t  s imply 
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  Hayek 's  c o n s e q u e n t ! a l i s t  appeal  r e q u i r e s  much 
more than a n e g a t i v e  concep t ion  o f  freedom in the  p o l i t i c a l  
rea lm.
00 I w i l l  argue  t h i s more f u l l y  in  th e fo l lo w in g  s e c t i o n .
29. O p . c i t . , W a tk in s , p . 34.
50. Op. c i t . •, Hayek, p ,. 160, p.  40. :
31. I b i d . , p . 29.
32. See N.P. Barry on Hayek's  s o - c a l l e d 'dogm at ism ' ,  ( o p . c i t .
p p . 70-1) and a l s o  Footnote  4 o f  t h e  fo l l o w in g  c h a p t e r .  Barry 
c la ims ( p . 69) t h a t  ' [ t ] h e  most im por tan t  f e a t u r e  o f  Hayek's  
defence o f  l i b e r t y  i s  i t s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  dogmatic approach,  
no t  dogmatic in  t h e  p e j o r a t i v e  sense  o f  the  word b u t  in  th e  
sense  o f  a g en e ra l  defence o f  l i b e r t y  r a t h e r  than p a r t i c u l a r  
cases  o f  i t ' .  And on p.  71, ' [d joes  i t  no t  e n t a i l  t h a t  
mass ive i n e q u a l i t i e s  a re  to  be t o l e r a t e d  because  t o  do any­
t h i n g  to  a l l e v i a t e  them would invo lve  t h e  use o f  coerc ion?
This would appea r  to  fo l low because  in  Hayek's  thought t h e r e  
i s  no q u a n t i f i a b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l i b e r t y  and o th e r  
p r i n c i p l e s ' .
53. O p . c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, p p . 133-4.
34. Hayek s t a t e s  ( i b i d . ,  p.  134) t h a t  ' . . .  though p h y s i c a l  c i r ­
cumstances w i l l  o f t e n  be u n p r e d i c t a b l e ,  they  w i l l  n o t  m a l i c i o u s l y  
f r u s t r a t e  our  a i m s ’ .
35. S t e r b a ,  J . P . ,  'N e o - L i b e r t a r i a n i s m ' ,  American P h i lo s o p h i c a l  
Q u a r t e r l y ,  V o l . 15, No. 2, A pr i l  1978, p .  117.
O p . c i t . ,  Hayek, 1960, p.  134. I t  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b le ,  on t h i s  
view,  why Hayek i n s i s t s  on t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  
in  h i s  view o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s p h e r e ,  and why he e q u a l ly  r e g a rd s
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the upho ld ing  o f  v o lu n t a r y  agreement as e s s e n t i a l  f o r  the  
f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  g o a l s .  And y e t  he ,  l i k e  Nozick,  
r e f u s e s  t o  embrace t h e  r i g h t  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  to  be in  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  m a t e r i a l  p o s i t i o n .  Given h i s  i n s t r u m e n t a l  view 
o f  freedom as a means o f  a ch iev ing  g o a l - s a t i s f a c t i o n , i t  i s  
s t r a n g e  t h a t  he shou ld  r e c o g n i s e  some ’ l e g i t i m a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s '  
y e t  exc lude  o t h e r s ,  such as the  t e rm i n a t i o n  o f  employment,  
as an o b j e c t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e g u l a t i o n .
37. Hayek s t a t e s  ( i b i d . ,  p .  146) t h a t  government ' s  main r o l e  
i s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  most s eve re  forms o f  c o e r c io n ,  so he 
does r e c o g n i s e  my d i s t i n c t i o n ,  ye t  he f a i l s  to t ake  account  
o f  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  i n  im por tan t  a r e a s .
38. For h i s  views on t a x a t i o n ,  see Hayek, op . c i t . ,  1960, Chapter  
20, 'T a x a t io n  and R e d i s t r i b u t i o n ' .  Here he d i s c u s s e s  why 
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